因明入正理論疏 3.46

3.46

此四過中，初二種因各唯違一，後二種因一因違二。其有一因通違三者，如勝論立所說有性非四大種，許除四大體非無故，如色聲等。自所餘法皆入同喻，無不定過。非四大種是法自相，能有四大非四大種、不能有四大非四大種，是法差別。彼意本成能有四大非四大種，故今與彼法差別為相違，云：所說有性非能有四大非四大種，許除四大體非無故，如色、聲等。所說有性是有法自相，與此有法自相為相違，云：所說有性應非有性，許除四大體非無故，如色、聲等。彼說有性離實有性，今非此有，不犯自語、自教相違，隨言即非，故違自相。有性既是有法自相，作有性有緣性、作非有性有緣性，是有法差別。彼意本成作有性有緣性，故今與彼有法差別為相違，云：有性應非作有性有緣性，許除四大體非無故，如色、聲等。不改本因即為違量，故成違三。

Among these four faults, the first two kinds of reasons each contradict only one, while the latter two kinds of reasons contradict two with a single reason. As for there being one reason that contradicts all three together, for example, the Vaiśeṣika establishes: "The stated existence-ness is not the four great elements; because it is accepted that, apart from the four great elements, its entity is not non-existent; like color, sound, and so forth." All other dharmas of their own enter the similar example, so there is no fault of inconclusiveness. "Not being the four great elements" is the own-character of the predicate; "being able to possess the four great elements while not being the four great elements" and "being unable to possess the four great elements while not being the four great elements" are qualifications of the predicate. Their intention was originally to establish "being able to possess the four great elements while not being the four great elements"; therefore, we now make a contradiction against their qualification of the predicate, saying: "The stated existence-ness is not able to possess the four great elements while not being the four great elements; because it is accepted that, apart from the four great elements, its entity is not non-existent; like color, sound, and so forth." "The stated existence-ness" is the own-character of the subject; making a contradiction against this own-character of the subject, we say: "The stated existence-ness ought not to be existence-ness; because it is accepted that, apart from the four great elements, its entity is not non-existent; like color, sound, and so forth." They asserted that existence-ness is an existence apart from substance; now negating this existence does not commit contradiction with one's own words or contradiction with one's own teaching, for following their words one simply negates it; hence it contradicts the own-character. Since existence-ness is the own-character of the subject, "acting as an object of cognitive apprehension of existence-ness" and "acting as not an object of cognitive apprehension of existence-ness" are qualifications of the subject. Their intention was originally to establish "acting as an object of cognitive apprehension of existence-ness"; therefore, we now make a contradiction against their qualification of the subject, saying: "Existence-ness ought to act as not an object of cognitive apprehension of existence-ness; because it is accepted that, apart from the four great elements, its entity is not non-existent; like color, sound, and so forth." Without changing the original reason, it becomes a contradictory inference; therefore it contradicts all three.'