因明入正理論疏 3.47

3.47

有唐興縣雋法師者，釋門之樞紐也，綺歲標奇，汎慈舟於濟蟻；髫年發頴，濤辨水於澂鶖。是以初業有宗，西河謝其獨步；創探空旨，北地譽其孤雄。天縱英姿，生摛叡質，余欣其雅量，偏結交期，情契蘭金，言符藥石。時假談咲，論及因明，法師乃囑古疏以文披，一攬略窮其趣；探新知以理窮，再閱廣究其微。始驗驥駿駑駘，驤中原以分駕；鵬鶱鸚翥，遶沖天而別羽。乃申難曰：「覈觀論勢，文理不同，准九因中第四、第六名曰相違因，於同品無、異品有，此四相違，唯法自相可與彼同。其後三違因皆同有、異品上無。既不同於四、六，如何返成相違？又法自相，他因於同遍無、於異品中說有，用他異品為同，得成相違之義。後之三違，他因皆於同有、異品上無，用他能立因、喻，與他作三相違。行相既自不同，如何可得法自相相違？與餘三合，而言二合違有六，三合違有四，四合違有一？」余性不匿賢，況乎知已，故錄之於疏例，示詳藻思玄深。自論道東譯，無申此難者，匪發彼之千鈞，誰發我之萬碩者歟！夫正因相者，必遍宗法，同有異無，生他決智。因法成宗，可成四義。有法及法，此二各有言陳自相、意許差別。隨宗所諍，成一或多。故宗同品，說所立法均等義品名為同品，隨其所諍，所立之法有處名同，非取宗上一切皆同。若爾，便無異喻品故。若令皆同，亦是分別相似過類。又非唯取言所陳法，不爾便無自餘過失，如前數說。故隨所應因成宗中，一乃至四，所兩競義，有此法處名為同品。

There was Master Jun of Tangxing District, an axis and pivot of the Śākya gate, who from his tender years displayed rare talent, floating the boat of compassion to rescue ants, and in his youth showed brilliant promise, raising waves of debate over the clear waters to purify water birds. Thus, when he first practiced the Realist school (Sarvāstivāda), Xihe yielded to his solitary preeminence; when he first explored the intent of emptiness, the Northern Land praised his singular heroism. Naturally endowed with heroic demeanor and born with astute intellect, I took joy in his noble capacity and especially formed a friendship with him; our sentiments agreed like orchids and gold, our words harmonized like medicine and stone. Once during leisurely conversation, our discussion reached hetuvidyā. The Master thereupon consulted the ancient commentaries, opening the texts, and in a single reading broadly plumbed their drift; exploring new knowledge to exhaust its principles, with a second perusal he extensively investigated its subtleties. Only then was it verified that fine steeds and common nags divide their harness when gallopping across the Central Plains, and the soaring roc and flitting parrot differ in plumage as they wheel toward the vaulted skies. Thereupon he presented an objection, saying: "Upon examining the trend of the treatise, the text and principle are not the same. According to the fourth and sixth among the nine types of reasons, which are named contradictory reasons (viruddha-hetu), [they are defined as] absent from the sapakṣa and present in the vipakṣa. Among these four contradictory [reasons], only [contradiction of] the property's svabhāva can be identical to them. The latter three contradictory reasons are all present in the sapakṣa and absent from the vipakṣa. Since they are not identical to the fourth and sixth, how do they conversely constitute contradictions? Furthermore, in the contradiction of the property's svabhāva, the opponent's reason is completely absent from the sapakṣa and stated to be present in the vipakṣa; by taking the opponent's vipakṣa as one's sapakṣa, the meaning of contradiction is established. In the latter three contradictions, the opponent's reason is present in the sapakṣa and absent from the vipakṣa; using the opponent's sādhanas—reason and example—one generates the three contradictions against him. Since the functional aspects (ākāra) are themselves different, how can contradiction of the property's svabhāva be combined with the remaining three, such that it is said that combinations of two contradictions number six, combinations of three contradictions number four, and the combination of four contradictions numbers one?" It is not my nature to conceal the worthy, especially a confidant; hence I record it in the commentary's examples to display in detail his profound and mysterious literary thought. Since the treatise's doctrine was translated to the east, no one had raised this objection; were it not for his triggering a thousand-weight bow, who would have released my ten-thousand-stone arrow? Now, as for the character of a correct reason, it must pervade the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva), be present in the sapakṣa, and be absent from the vipakṣa, generating decisive cognition in the other. When a reason's property establishes a thesis, it can establish four meanings. Both the subject (dharmin) and the property (dharma) each have an explicitly stated svabhāva and an intended viśeṣa. In accordance with what is disputed in the thesis, it establishes one or many. Therefore, regarding the thesis's sapakṣa, things that share an equivalent meaning with the property to be established (sādhya-dharma) are called sapakṣa; in accordance with what is disputed, the locus where the property to be established exists is called sapakṣa, not taking everything upon the thesis as identical. If that were so, there would be no instance of a vipakṣa. If one made everything identical, it would also be the fault-class of distinction-similarity (bhedasama-jāti). Furthermore, one does not only take the property explicitly stated; otherwise, there would be no remaining faults, as repeatedly explained before. Therefore, according to what is appropriate, within the thesis established by the reason, from one up to four disputed meanings, the locus containing this property is called sapakṣa.