因明入正理論疏 3.99

3.99

又云：若唯遮，喻無能立者，亦應小乘對大乘立虛空是常，以非作故。立者許有遮表，敵者唯遮，望自應有隨一不成過。故知能立不成者，不約具遮、表。此意以立對敵，敵但許有遮，亦得成喻，全不許者方是喻過，故將此量為不定過。此量亦非，誰言無過？對大乘立，即無空論，所別不成，宗無簡故。因有隨一，并闕所依及不定過，為如擇滅？為類龜毛？又擇滅喻，常與非作共許遮、表，非是不成，故所引非。設若救云：聲空俱取於遮，不取於表，可非能立闕不成過。然有破云：若聲取遮不取表者，因喻亦爾，即有二過，違理及教。以陳那菩薩《理門論》云：「若法有遮、表，不得唯取遮而不取於表。」此難亦非，以彼外道不以此教為定量故。今云：此約虛空辯無二立者，據彼本計言，常無質礙，定有遮、表，不唯取遮，故是喻過。

It is also said: If an example having only exclusion lacks the proof, then when Hīnayāna establishes against Mahāyāna that 'empty space is permanent, because it is unproduced,' the proponent accepts both exclusion and affirmation while the opponent accepts only exclusion, so in reference to oneself there should be the fault of 'either unestablished.' Therefore, one knows that 'proof unestablished' does not depend on possessing both exclusion and affirmation. This idea holds that when the proponent faces the opponent, if the opponent accepts only exclusion, it can still form an example; only when it is entirely unaccepted is it a fault of the example; hence this inference is taken to be the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). This inference is also incorrect; who says it is without fault? Establishing it against Mahāyāna is [establishing it against] one who maintains that empty space does not exist, so it is 'the qualificand is unestablished' (viśeṣyāsiddha), because the thesis lacks qualification. The reason has 'either unestablished,' together with lacking a substratum, as well as the fault of inconclusiveness: is it like analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), or is it analogous to a turtle's hair? Furthermore, in the example of analytical cessation, permanence and being unproduced are mutually accepted as having both exclusion and affirmation, and are not unestablished; hence what was adduced is incorrect. Even if one defends it by saying: 'Sound and empty space both take exclusion and do not take affirmation, so it may not be the fault of the proof lacking establishment'—yet someone refutes this saying: 'If sound takes exclusion and does not take affirmation, and the reason and example are also like this, then there are two faults: contravening reason and contravening scripture. For Bodhisattva Diṅnāga's Nyāyamukha states: "If a phenomenon has both exclusion and affirmation, one must not take only exclusion without taking affirmation."' This objection is also incorrect, because that outsider does not take this teaching as authoritative (pramāṇa). Now we say: discussing the absence of both establishments here with respect to empty space is based on their fundamental doctrine stating that permanence and unobstructedness definitely possess both exclusion and affirmation, not taking only exclusion; therefore it is a fault of the example.