因明入正理論疏 1.43

1.43

The second explanation says: Bodhisattva Diṅnāga considered the unestablished predicate (viśeṣaṇāsiddha) to be identical to faults within the reason such as the uncommon (asādhāraṇa) and inconclusive (anaikāntika), and also identical to faults within the example such as unestablished sādhya (sādhyāsiddha) and the fault of lacking a homogeneous example. The unestablished subject (viśeṣyāsiddha), because the subject (dharmin) does not exist, is identical to the fault of the unestablished substratum (āśrayāsiddha) among the faults of the reason. The unestablished in both (ubhayāsiddha) is the combination of these two faults. As for established by consensus (siddhasādhana): in whatever debate is set up, the name and meaning must be contested; since it is already agreed upon, it is not something to be proved, for it was never a proposition to begin with. On what basis could a fault be established? Just as worldly people who have not received the precepts do not belong to the category of those who have received the precepts, on what basis could one say they maintain or violate the precepts? For this reason, the latter four faults were not mentioned. Now, Śaṅkarasvāmin adds the unestablished predicate, because only when the proposition combines and takes the inseparable nature does it manage to form a proposition. If there is no predicate, what is inseparable? If one were to argue that because within the reason it is uncommon, inconclusive, and so forth, and within the example it is unestablished sādhya, it need not be mentioned for fear of redundancy: within the reason there already exist faults such as lacking sapakṣa and being uncommon, yet within the example one again mentions unestablished sādhana—how emphatic that is! Therefore it is added. Śaṅkarasvāmin further adds the unestablished subject: if one were to argue that because it is the reason's fault of unestablished substratum, it should also be omitted for fear of redundancy: within the reason there are already inconclusive faults such as the reason occurring in all vipakṣa, and the fault of not being entirely absent from vipakṣa; why then would one still need to mention in the negative example that the sādhana is not excluded (sādhanāvyāvṛtta)? What would prevent a fault of the proposition from also being a fault of the reason? The remaining objections are the same as before; therefore it is added.