因明入正理論疏 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

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Composed by the Śramaṇa Ji of Dacien Temple.

Consider that when the sage of the empty mulberry tree arose, he relied on the six stages to illumine the esoteric; when the immortal of Kulai emerged, he unfolded the two books to display his principles. How could that compare to the one whose wisdom perfected the ten powers, who molded myriad phenomena to establish the standards, and whose compassion reached the extremity of the three wheels, broadening the five vehicles to bestow a paradigm? Therefore, he responded to the capacities of beings beneath the twin trees, his supreme teaching pervading the dusty realms; he entered true tranquility beside the two rivers, his residual brilliance shining throughout the sands of kalpas. How grand indeed! Truly it is difficult to find a name for it. When it came to the twenty-eight views, gathering like ants across the Five Indias, and the sixteen teachers, spreading their wings like birds of prey under the four rulers, there was a bodhisattva named Śaṅkarasvāmin, a disciple of the noble Diṅnāga. Endowed with skillful guidance and truly famed for vast learning, he scooped the ocean of wisdom from the depths of his mind and raised the mountain of doctrine within his innermost heart. Thus he hewed Mount Jing to extract the unpolished jade and wandered Clam Bay to seek pearls. With deep contemplative thought richly gathered, he produced a magnificent treatise. Its purport is abundant yet its phrasing concise; its principles are profound yet easily comprehended. Truly it is the pivot of the Dharma portal and the key to the mysterious barrier. Consequently, he caused the Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhyas to be like a towering peak crushing spring eggs, and the Śabdakāryavāda and Śabdābhivyaktivāda to be like a startling gale sweeping autumn leaves. From that time onward, thoughts on the teaching rippled abroad, noble footsteps first became conspicuous, and those who took pleasure in studying it grew immensely broad.

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Since the golden countenance shone in the dream and the jade tablets illuminated the dawn, although the supreme teaching has flourished, this canon had not yet been fully prepared. Only our preceptor, the Great Master of the Three Baskets, whose path ran through the five sciences and whose fame illuminated a thousand generations, lamented that the departure of the Sage had grown ever more distant and grieved that the ice within the mind remained unmelted. He thereupon shook his monk's staff in the central region to depart from the land of the city of enlightenment; he sought teachers in the western regions and went directly to Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa. Trampling upon what past philosophers had never heard, he embraced the extremes of the mind; soaring over what former worthies had not beheld, he penetrated the pivot of inner thoughts. Thereupon, palm leaves were compiled with subtle words, and he returned to his home country with divine footsteps. Once the local languages were translated, the principles were made thoroughly lucid. Ji, having mistakenly joined the ranks of his disciples, rejoices in hearing the truth in the morning even if dying in the evening. Fearing that this path might not be put into practice, I have briefly related and collated an explanation, setting forth the purport of the main guidelines and expounding the essential tenets of the esoteric, in the hope that those who suspend the bright mirror of wisdom will kindly turn their minds to reflect and illuminate it.

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Now within this treatise, I will analyze it briefly through four portals: first, relating the background causes; second, explaining the title; third, clarifying objections and difficulties; fourth, explaining the main text.

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First, as for relating the background causes: regarding the treatises on hetuvidyā, their source originated solely from the Buddha's preaching, but the text was vast and the meanings scattered, being present across the various sūtras. Thus the Bhūmidhāra says: 'When a bodhisattva seeks the Dharma, where should he seek it? He should seek it in all five sciences.' One seeks hetuvidyā in order to refute heterodox treatises and establish the orthodox path. At the beginning of the kalpa, Akṣapāda first established the genuine and the semblance. Down to Vasubandhu, all laid out the rules and formulas. Although the guidelines were set forth, the profound subtleties had not yet been analyzed; therefore, when opponents and proponents debated, they still doubted the rules of proof and refutation.

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There was the Bodhisattva Diṅnāga, acclaimed as epoch-making, one of the thousand buddhas of the Fortunate Kalpa. Hiding his traces in rocky groves and dwelling on mountain crags in meditative absorption, he observed the advantages and disadvantages of composition and weighed the abundance and conciseness of the texts and their meanings. At that time, the cliffs and valleys roared, the clouds and mists changed their colors, and a mountain spirit held up the Bodhisattva's feet several hundred feet high, proclaiming: 'The Buddha's exposition of hetuvidyā is profound, subtle, and difficult to fathom. After the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa, the great meaning was lost. Now, through your far-reaching merit and wisdom, you have deeply penetrated the sage's intention; we pray that you once again propagate the path of hetuvidyā.' The Bodhisattva then emitted a spiritual light, illuminating those who had the capacity to respond. At that time, the king of the Andhra kingdom in southern India, seeing the light shine, suspected he had entered the vajra-like samādhi and requested him to realize the fruit of no-further-learning. The Bodhisattva said: 'I entered absorption to observe so that I may explain the profound sūtras. My mind aspires to great awakening, not to the small fruit.' The king said: 'The fruit of no-further-learning is that toward which all the sages look up; I ask the venerable one to realize it quickly.' As the Bodhisattva was consoling him and wishing to comply with the king's request, the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī warned him by snapping his fingers, saying: 'Why abandon the great mind and just now give rise to small aspiration? If you wish to bring extensive benefit, you should transmit the Yogācārabhūmi spoken by Maitreya to correct the collapsing guidelines, and you may compose [treatises on] hetuvidyā to reconstruct the rules.' Diṅnāga reverently accepted his guidance and acted in accordance with it. Thereupon, meditating deeply and investigating thoroughly, he composed the Nyāyamukha. 'Nyāya' refers to the fundamental and true substance and meaning of all phenomena. 'Mukha' (gate) refers to that from which the balancing scale illuminates and understands.

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Master Śaṅkarasvāmin was indeed his disciple. How could he be compared to Su Qin and Zhang Yi studying under Guiguzi merely to excel in diplomacy, or Yanzi and Zixia serving Confucius only to listen vainly to rites and music? Furthermore, having skillfully probed the three means of valid cognition, wonderfully exhausted the two kinds of causes, opened up the eight portals, and made effective the two kinds of benefit, he investigated previous philosophers, set a model for later luminaries, and summarized the general guidelines to compose this treatise. When the Great Master traveled to the realm of Kashmir in northern India, at the monastery of Master Dharmatrāta, he met the great master of treatises Saṅghayaśas—translated as 'Renowned by the Assembly'—who was exceptionally skilled in the Sarvāstivāda and the sciences of reasoning and grammar; having initially undergone testing and determination with him, he understood the profound path. Later, in the kingdom of Magadha in central India, he again met Bodhisattva Śīlabhadra and others, repeatedly discussing what is subtle and hidden, and refining its purports even further, opening the branches and leaves to exhaust their roots and following the waves to investigate their sources. Although past scholars had laurel-like awakenings, none equaled the fragrant ease of our master. Turning on his heel, he propagated it and consequently instructed beginners, hoping that when debating the heterodox and orthodox, they would have a compass with clear tracks. This is the origin of this treatise.

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Second, as for explaining the title: in Sanskrit, it is said *hetu-vidyā-nyāya-praveśa-śāstra* (the two syllables above are both pronounced lightly at the tip of the tongue). *Hetu* is called cause; *vidyā* is called science; *nyāya* is termed correct principle; *praveśa* translates as entering; *śāstra* is treatise. In the Tang language, it is *Yinming zhengli ru lun*. Now following the local phrasing, it is called *Yinming ru zhengli lun* (Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa). Based on this designated title, there are five interpretations in total:

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First: 'science' (vidyā) is the general name of the five sciences. 'Cause' (hetu) is the specific name of one science. 'Entering the correct principle' (nyāyapraveśa) is the specific title of this treatise. The substance of cause has two types, namely the kāraka-hetu and the jñāpaka-hetu; each of the two has three varieties, as explained extensively below. Now, because it clarifies the meaning of this cause, it is called hetuvidyā. What is clarified is the cause, and that which clarifies is the teaching; because it is the science of the cause, it is named hetuvidyā, which is a tatpuruṣa compound. 'Entering' is penetrating and understanding. 'Correct principle' is the fundamental truth of all phenomena, their svabhāva and viśeṣa; as eras passed, understanding became dim, and the purports mostly sank into concealment. Although others made explanations, they were heterodox and inaccurate. Now this discusses the true phenomena, hence it is called correct principle. By clarifying these two causes, one enters into the understanding of the true nature of all phenomena; this is the entry into the correct principle, and also the hetuvidyā of entering the correct principle, both being tatpuruṣa compounds. The substance of science is the teaching, and hetuvidyā is itself the treatise, which is a karmadhāraya compound. It takes its name by distinguishing itself from other baskets [of scripture], without the fault of tautology.

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Second: 'hetuvidyā' is the overall name of one science. 'Entering the correct principle' is the specific title of this scroll. 'Cause' refers to the words of the vādin that set forth the grand thread of the fundamental pratijñā. 'Science' (illumination) refers to the praiseworthy condition of the opponent's and arbiter's wisdom illuminating the words and meaning. Without words there is no way to reveal the pratijñā, so it incorporates wisdom and meaning to designate the term 'cause'; without wisdom there is no way to fathom the subtle, so it encompasses words and meaning to raise the term 'illumination'. The profound subtleties of proof and refutation are called the correct principle. The harmonious penetration of wisdom and understanding is termed entering. Due to the vādin setting forth words such as the hetu, the wisdom of the opponent and arbiter arises, understanding the meaning of proof and refutation; because it is the cause belonging to the illumination, it is named hetuvidyā, which is a tatpuruṣa compound. Because words produce wisdom, penetrating and understanding the profound subtleties of phenomena is called entering; this is the entry into the correct principle, and also the hetuvidyā of entering the correct principle, both being tatpuruṣa compounds.

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Third: 'cause' is the śābda-kāraka-hetu. 'Science' (illumination) is the jñāna-jñāpaka-hetu. Because words produce it, wisdom that has not yet arisen is able to arise. Because wisdom makes it known, meaning that was not yet understood is now understood. The pratijñā that is understood is called the correct principle, and the wisdom that is produced is called entering. Cause and illumination are distinct, yet both are designations of the cause. The correct principle and entering are different, yet both are appellations of the effect. Due to the śābda-kāraka-hetu, the opponent enters into understanding the pratijñā. Due to the jñāna-jñāpaka-hetu illumination, the vādin's correct principle is then revealed. One should say the entry into the correct principle, and the hetuvidyā of entering the correct principle, both being tatpuruṣa compounds; although the vādin relies on the production by words before producing the opponent's wisdom, he must depend on wisdom and meaning before production by words exists; although the opponent relies on making known by wisdom before understanding the established pratijñā, he must depend on meaning and words before making known by wisdom exists. Therefore, although it merely designates the śābda-kāraka and the jñāna-jñāpaka, it already encompasses the two jñāpaka and two kāraka causes, comprehending the phenomena fully with nothing omitted.

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Fourth: 'hetuvidyā' is originally the name from the Buddhist sūtras. 'Nyāya' is the designation of Diṅnāga's treatise. Among the more than forty works composed by Diṅnāga, the most essential among them is the Nyāya treatise as the foremost. 'Entering treatise' is the designation of Śaṅkarasvāmin's teaching. 'Cause' refers to making known by wisdom, illuminating and understanding the pratijñā. Or it is production by words, purely establishing the effect of the pratijñā. 'Science' (illumination) refers to being distinct and manifest; the cause is itself the illumination, which is a karmadhāraya compound. Thus the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle fifteen, states: 'What is the realm of hetuvidyā? It refers to all entities in the examined meaning.' The established phenomenon is called the examined meaning, and the conforming phenomena are called all entities. All entities are themselves hetuvidyā, because as causes they illuminate the examined meaning. 'Correct principle' eliminates the heterodox, being the fundamental truth of all phenomena, their svabhāva and viśeṣa. Because non-Buddhists and others made false statements that formed floating veils, Diṅnāga presented the condition for approaching understanding, naming it the *Mukha-śāstra*. Śaṅkarasvāmin, seeing that its purports were subtle and its expressions profound, feared that later students would find it difficult to fathom, so he summarized the guidelines to make this treatise, serving as the steps into hetuvidyā and the origin of the correct principle. Exhaustively approaching both teachings is called entering. Therefore, according to the Sanskrit, *hetuvidyā-nyāya-praveśa-śāstra* is a tatpuruṣa compound.

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Fifth: both 'hetuvidyā' and 'nyāya' are the names of Diṅnāga's root treatise. 'Entering treatise' is only then the designation of this treatise. Because one penetrates this treatise, one is able to enter into the hetuvidyā and nyāya. Or 'hetuvidyā' is itself the name of the entering treatise. 'Nyāya' is the designation of Diṅnāga's teaching. This is because by means of this hetuvidyā treatise, one is able to enter that nyāya. Or 'hetuvidyā' is the general name of both the treatise that enters and the treatise that is entered. 'Entering the correct principle' is the specific title of the treatise that enters and the treatise that is entered. Because of this hetuvidyā being the treatise that enters, one penetrates and understands the hetuvidyā and nyāya that are entered. Or here one should say: the cause is itself the illumination (science), and the correct is itself the principle, both being karmadhāraya compounds.

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Among these five interpretations: the first is the illumination of the cause; the second is the cause of the illumination; the third is that cause and illumination are distinct; the fourth is that the cause is itself the illumination; the fifth is to which teaching they belong. The correct principle also has five: first, the true nature of all phenomena; second, the profound subtleties of proof and refutation; third, the established meaning and pratijñā; fourth, Diṅnāga's root treatise, each of which generally connects to the preceding four; and by distributing them individually, they form five explanations. Interpreting them interchangeably, they make twenty-five interpretations in total; fearing that the text would become overly voluminous, I therefore do not relate them in detail. However, according to the initial explanation, the teaching is also hetuvidyā. According to the latter four interpretations, the teaching is the instrument of that, and is also named hetuvidyā. 'Treatise' (śāstra) means measuring and discussing. Measuring and determining the genuine and semblance, discussing and detailing proof and refutation, resolving nature and characteristics, and instructing disciples is called a treatise. According to the latter four interpretations, since it is that which is expressed and the treatise is the teaching, it is the treatise of entering the correct principle through hetuvidyā, which is a tatpuruṣa compound. Desiring to cause one to follow and realize the illumination produced by the cause and thereby enter the correct principle, he therefore spoke this treatise, like the Madhyamakaśāstra. Or, this discriminates and explains the capacity to enter the correct principle and hetuvidyā, establishing the title of this treatise, like the Daśabhūmika-sūtra. Or, relying on the capacity to enter the correct principle and hetuvidyā, he spoke this treatise, just as flowers are named after water and land; hence it serves as the title.

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Regarding "composed by the Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin": In Sanskrit, Śaṅkarasvāmin-bodhisattva-kṛti. "Śaṅkara" is translated here as "bone-chain" [i.e., Śaṅkara / skeleton-chain]. "Svāmin" is translated here as "master" [svāmin]. "Bodhisattva" has its meaning explained as usual. "Kṛti" means "composed". In the language of Tang, it should be said: "composed by the Bone-Chain Master Bodhisattva". The non-Buddhists say: At the beginning of the kalpa of formation, Maheśvara transformed and guided humanity with twenty-four marks; having completed his work of aiding and benefiting, the Sovereign returned to heaven. His worshippers longed for him with affectionate attachment and thereupon erected his image, depicting his ascetic practices—exhausted, weary, starved and emaciated, with joints interconnected like a chain, his form resembling a chain—and therefore designated this image the "Bone-Chain Deva". Although at the beginning of the kalpa he had a thousand names, as the era declined ten titles still remained, and this Bone-Chain Deva was one of those names. The parents of the Bodhisattva had no sons in their youth; having prayed before this image, they gave birth to this extraordinary spirit. Taking the deva as supreme, they thereupon established his name after him; taking the deva as lord, he was named "Bone-Chain Master" (Śaṅkarasvāmin)—which is an exocentric compound (bahuvrīhi). This treatise is what was composed by him.

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Third, clarifying the objections and difficulties: First question: "Why is it not called 'clarification of the thesis' (pratijñāvidyā) or 'clarification of the example' (dṛṣṭāntavidyā), but solely named hetuvidyā?" Answer: "Because the reason (hetu) has three marks (trairūpya), and its name and meaning are broad. Furthermore, all proof-components (sādhana) are called reasons (hetu), not merely a single mark; since the thesis is established through this, it is collectively named hetuvidyā."

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Second question: "A true reason and true illumination may properly be called hetuvidyā. A fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa) and fallacious illumination should not be hetuvidyā." Answer: "Because mentioning the true encompasses the fallacious; or because it has already subsumed them; or because it illuminates them collaterally, not as primary illumination."

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Third question: "Valid proof and valid refutation may be called hetuvidyā; faulty refutation and fallacious refutation should not be hetuvidyā." Answer: "Because they belong to the class of hetuvidyā; or because both the fallacious and the true are hetuvidyā, the abbreviated name having already subsumed them."

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Fourth question: "Proof and refutation possess verbal cognition, so they may be hetuvidyā. Direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) have no verbal cognition, so they should not be hetuvidyā." Answer: "Observing a reason is also an illumination; observing a reason verifies an illumination; self-verification is also a reason; therefore, all are hetuvidyā."

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Fifth question: "Cognitive productive cause and cognitive illuminating cause may be called hetuvidyā; the other two illuminating causes and the other two productive causes are not cognition, so their reasons should not be illuminations." Answer: "Because they are causes of illumination. Or because all accordantly illuminate to establish the meaning of the thesis."

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Sixth question: "Reason and example are proofs (sādhana), so they can be called hetuvidyā. The thesis is not a proof, so it should not be hetuvidyā." Answer: "Because it is undetermined, what is to be established is not [a proof]. Taking its name from what is determined, there is no fault. Furthermore, what can cause and what can illuminate is properly hetuvidyā; what is caused and what is illuminated is also collaterally hetuvidyā. Furthermore, what is now to be established is solely the thesis, and although the proof is solely the reason and example, in order not to contradict the ancient [usage], the thesis is also hetuvidyā."

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Seventh question: "Why is it not called the illumination of the fruit (phalavidyā), but only named hetuvidyā?" Answer: "A fruit has its illumination of fruit, but not every fruit is itself an illumination. A cause has its illumination of cause, and every [such] cause is itself an illumination. The illumination of the fruit is undetermined and its meaning would also be confused. The illumination of the cause is determined in both respects and its meaning is without confusion; therefore it is named hetuvidyā. This is because one originally intends to use the cause to establish the meaning of the fruit, not to use the fruit to establish the meaning of the cause."

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Fourth, explaining the root text:

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Treatise: / Valid proof and valid refutation, / as well as their fallacies, solely enlighten others. / Direct perception and inference, / as well as their fallacies, solely enlighten oneself.

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The Commentary states: Within this entire work, the main text has two sections: First, the initial verse and the prose text constitute the section presenting the thesis and explaining it in sequence. The final verse constitutes the section indicating the extensive [teachings] by demonstrating the summary.

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The first section has two parts: The preceding verse adduces the classes and sets forth the thesis. The subsequent prose texts follow what was set forth and explain them separately, systematically arranging their meanings and classes, adducing and presenting the thesis of the treatise, and explaining each in accordance with what was presented earlier.

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Within the opening verse, the discussion of the verse has one [unit], the indication of enlightenment has two, the treatise's lines are four, and the meanings clarified are eight. The one verse has four lines, which can be known by looking at the text. Enlightening others and enlightening oneself are each shown separately by the treatise. The four true and the four fallacious constitute the eight meanings.

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First is valid proof (sādhana): the reason and example are completely correct and the meaning of the thesis is fully accomplished; it is expressed to enlighten others, hence it is called valid proof. (In Diṅnāga's valid proof, only the reason and the example are taken; ancient [masters] additionally included the thesis and so forth. Reason and example have two characteristics: first, being complete without deficiency, because they are free of the seven [fallacies] and so on; second, being correct and not erroneous, because they are free of the fourteen [fallacies] and so on. The thesis also has two characteristics: first, its members are complete, because both the dependent and that on which it depends are fulfilled; second, it is accomplished, because both the dependent and that on which it depends are free from faults. By this, the treatise shows what is true without falsehood, and its meaning also concurrently indicates being complete without deficiency. Uttering these truthful words generates correct understanding in another; since the thesis is made manifest through words, it is called valid proof. Because of this, the fallacious proof of "antronomy" (viruddhāvyabhicārin), although free from the fault of deficiency, is not a valid proof, because it cannot cause correct cognition to arise in another.)

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Second is valid refutation (dūṣaṇa): when the opponent presents a faulty argument, skilfully rebuking his errors, or marvelously cross-examining his thesis, is therefore called valid refutation. (This has two aspects: first, exposing the other's faults so that the other's proof is unestablished; second, establishing an argument to negate the other so that the other's thesis cannot stand. The various treatises only indicate the refutation that exposes the other's faults, but in principle it also includes establishing an argument to interrogate. Uttering words to expound the meaning, both the witness and the opponent are clarified; defeating the other is through words, hence it is called valid refutation.)

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Third is fallacious proof (sādhanābhāsa): the three members are mutually deficient, or many words have faults, so that by futile effort one brings about one's own defeat; therefore it is called fallacious proof. (This has two aspects: first, deficiency of members, where thesis, reason, and example are deficient as the case may be; second, having faults, where even if completely set up, various faults arise in their train, falsely establishing and mistakenly presenting, so that an erroneous thesis is wrongly manifested. Uttering words that defeat oneself, it is therefore called fallacious proof.)

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Fourth is fallacious refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa): when the opponent's argument is complete, to censure and cross-examine it falsely, generating faults in what one presents, is therefore called fallacious refutation. (This has two aspects: first, when the opponent's argument is without fault, falsely censuring it with the fourteen kinds of sophistical refutations (jāti) and so forth; second, when one's own argument has faults yet one considers it to refute the other, falsely speaking and considering oneself victorious; hence it is called fallacious refutation.) The word "and" (yu) in the text indicates that the multiple entities are mutually distinct (proof and refutation, true and fallacious, differ in their entity and meaning; using the word "and" shows that their entities are mutually distinct). Putting the words "as well as their fallacies" shows that faults apply commonly to both proof and refutation (indicating that the preceding valid proof has fallacious proof, and also showing that valid refutation has fallacious refutation. Adducing the true and coordinating the fallacious, it therefore says "as well as"). The meanings of the theses are each fixed (what was originally understood), but whether they are erroneous or correct is difficult to know (because they are not yet mutually accepted). Since the grounds and analogies are made manifest (from the reason grounds and from the example analogies; "made manifest" means revealed), right and wrong thereupon become evident (when the thesis is accomplished, it is "right"; when not accomplished, it is "wrong". "Evident" means clarified; through the arising of true and fallacious words, the right and wrong of the thesis are understood). When the victory or defeat is accomplished, both sides are fully clear (valid proof and valid refutation proceed from one's own speech; when success achieves victory, both witness and opponent understand; with fallacious proof and fallacious refutation, one's own effort results in defeat; through the other's pointing it out, both witness and proponent are clarified), and therefore, in the majority of cases, both enlighten others. The Nyāyamukha says: "According to what is appropriate, for the sake of enlightening others, one expounds this valid proof and fallacious proof." Valid proof enlightens the opponent and the witness, because by uttering words oneself, understanding is generated in others. Fallacious proof enlightens the witness and the proponent himself, because through the other exposing oneself, understanding arises in oneself and the witness; therefore it says "according to what is appropriate". Valid refutation and fallacious refutation should be known by analogy to be likewise. In the subsequent text of this treatise, valid proof and valid refutation are both able to enlighten others, while fallacious proof and fallacious refutation cannot enlighten others, which accords directly with that. Therefore, in this verse, relying on the fact that in the majority of cases they enlighten the witness, it says "solely enlighten others", and does not say "enlighten oneself". Furthermore, true proof and refutation solely enlighten others; and though the fallacious also [enlighten] oneself, following the true, it is termed "solely".

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Fifth is direct perception (pratyakṣa): the mental activity is free from wavering, clearly verifying the manifold objects, and directly and imperceptibly attaining their self-substance; therefore it is called direct perception. (The mental mode of the apprehending consciousness is unmoving and unwavering; according with and illuminating the object, it does not deliberate or calculate. Free from conceptualization, it illuminates in conformity with the object before it, clearly restricted to the self-substance; therefore it is called direct perception. However, there are two kinds: first, in the state of meditative absorption; second, in the distracted mind. In the mind of meditative absorption, which is limpid and clear, objects are all clearly verified; whichever dharma it accords with and takes as object, all are called direct perception. For all distracted minds, if they are direct with respect to the object and imperceptibly attain its self-substance, they are also all direct perception.)

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Sixth is inference (anumāna): using what is already widely acknowledged to verify what was not previously admitted, with the determination of cognition regarding common characteristics; therefore it is called inference. (The reason and example are already established, while the thesis was not previously admitted. Using a dharma already admitted to accomplish a thesis not yet admitted, just as a thread strings together flowers, the meaning of the reason universally applies; cognition of the common characteristic arises, confirming and determining the prior thesis, and conceptual understanding is born; therefore it is called inference. Even if one takes what is already admitted to accomplish a thesis not yet admitted, if the cognition that arises is undetermined, it is not subsumed under inference.)

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Seventh is fallacious direct perception (pratyakṣābhāsa): the mental activity involves deliberation, not clearly verifying the object, yet falsely presuming to attain its substance; it is called fallacious direct perception. (Distracted minds are of two kinds: first, conceptual; second, non-conceptual. All fallacious direct perceptions are present throughout both minds: with conceptual mind, one falsely presumes to distinctly attain the object's self-substance; with non-conceptual mind, because it cannot distinctly and imperceptibly verify the object, it is called fallacious direct perception. The treatise, relying on what is definitive, only speaks of conceptual [cognition], because it is not the case that all non-conceptual minds are solely direct perception.)

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Eighth is fallacious inference (anumānābhāsa): falsely raising grounds and analogies, mistakenly establishing an erroneous thesis, so that contradictory cognition arises; it is called fallacious inference. (Falsely raising reason and example, mistakenly establishing an erroneous thesis, compliant cognition does not arise, and contradictory understanding immediately arises. Even if what is to be established were accomplished, this and that would clash, producing divergent conceptualizations; this is called fallacious inference.) The words "as well as their fallacies" and so on are all to be explained according to the preceding.

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Dharmas have the hidden and the manifest (the hidden is subtle; the manifest is prominent. In the case of the object of direct perception, the principle is hidden while the phenomenon is manifest. In the case of the object of inference, what is to be established is hidden while the proof is manifest), and mental activities are divided into the clear and the obscure (mental activity refers to the mental mode of the apprehending mind and so forth. True direct perception and inference are clear with respect to both the hidden and the manifest of their objects. Fallacious direct perception and inference are obscure with respect to both the hidden and the manifest of their objects). Therefore, these two determinations solely enlighten oneself and not others (because the causes and effects of direct perception and inference are solely one's own cognition, these two determinations enlighten oneself and not others). Although without understanding oneself one cannot enlighten others, so that in principle the verse should put oneself first and others second, it is solely because the purpose of establishing a standard was originally to benefit others that it first puts enlightening others and only afterwards enlightening oneself.

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In analyzing these eight meanings, there are briefly three approaches: first, clarifying the agreements and differences between ancient and modern; second, analyzing the agreements and differences among the eight meanings; third, explaining the agreements and differences in their essential marks.

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Regarding explaining the agreements and differences between the ancients and moderns: First, within the valid proof (sādhana), the fifteenth [fascicle] of the Yogācārabhūmi and the eleventh of the Prakaraṇāryavācā state eight types: first, stating the proposition (pratijñā); second, discerning the reason (hetu); third, adducing the example (dṛṣṭānta); fourth, the homogeneous (sādharmya); fifth, the heterogeneous (vaidharmya); sixth, direct perception (pratyakṣa); seventh, inference (anumāna); and eighth, correct scriptural authority (āptāgama). The Abhidharmasamuccaya also states eight: first, stating the proposition; second, stating the reason; third, stating the example; fourth, application (upanaya); fifth, conclusion (nigamana); sixth, direct perception; seventh, inference; and eighth, noble scriptural authority—all taking the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and specific distinction (viśeṣa) as the thesis to be proved (sādhya). Among the eight valid proofs of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the third, 'adducing the example', is general, whereas 'homogeneous' and 'heterogeneous' are particular. Out of the general metaphorical and analogical categories, they separately adduce the concordant and discordant—the sapakṣa and vipakṣa—to serve as the two examples. Because the general and the particular differ, they are divided into three types. Apart from the reason and the example, there are no separate application or conclusion; hence application and conclusion are condensed and not set up separately. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asanga counts eight as valid proofs, following earlier masters: since the reason has no separation or combination of general and particular, why would the general and particular of the example need to be combined or separated? Therefore, he speaks of one in general and does not open up two examples. Since the negative example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta) is lacking, he adds application and conclusion. Although application and conclusion do not exist apart from the reason and example, because they cause the thesis to be established to become increasingly clear, they must be set up separately. Since faults of the example include 'lacking application' and 'inverted application', the establishment of a genuine member conversely requires an application. Since application is separately established, conclusion must also be displayed; hence these are also eight.

1.39

Ancient masters also spoke of four valid proofs: namely, the proposition, the reason, the homogeneous example, and the heterogeneous example. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, in the Vādavidhi and other texts, stated that valid proofs are three: first, the proposition; second, the reason; third, the example. Because a valid proof must consist of multiple statements, and multiple statements are sufficient to make that thesis to be established manifest, he stated only three. Moreover, whether the example is general or particular, it is ultimately a 'known margin' (dṛṣṭānta-paryanta). Thus the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: 'Setting up an example means harmonizing and correctly stating the seen margin alongside the unseen margin.' Buddhasiṃha explained: 'The seen margin refers to the already fully manifested part. The unseen margin refers to the not-yet fully manifested part.' Using the fully manifested part to reveal the not-yet fully manifested part so that their significance becomes equal, whatever correct statement [is made] is called setting up an example. Therefore, speaking of one example in general already brings the thesis to be proved to its seen margin; what need is there to open it up into either three or two? Without application within the example, the meaning would indeed not be clear; inverted application leads to inverted establishment, and hence it is called a fault. Apart from the reason and the example, [application and conclusion] have no superior substance at all; hence they are not spoken of among genuine valid proofs. Merely stating the reason first and the example following it already clarifies the meaning of the application. To restate it with a conclusion—how superfluous and lengthy that would be! Hence they are omitted in general.

1.40

Direct perception and the other two [epistemic instruments] of the proponent (vādin) have an indirect [capacity] to enlighten another, and hence are called valid proofs (sādhana). Direct perception and the other two of the opponent (prativādin) directly only enlighten oneself, and hence are not valid proofs. Now, Diṅnāga takes the reason and the example as valid proofs and the proposition as that which is to be proved (sādhya). The intrinsic nature and the specific distinction are both thoroughly established (prasiddha); they are merely the bases of the proposition (pakṣa-adhikaraṇa) and do not constitute that which is in dispute. Only when combined to form the inseparable nature of the proposition do they become that which is in dispute; how could [the proposition] constitute a valid proof? Therefore, from among the valid proofs, the proposition is definitively excluded. Question: 'However, according to śabdavidyā, a singular term is called sādhanam, a dual term is called sādhane, and a plural term is called sādhanāni. Now, this valid proof is expressed with the word sādhanāni; since it is plural, why state only the two factors of the reason and the example as valid proof?' Answer: 'Diṅnāga explains: The reason has three characteristics (trairūpya)—one reason and two examples; how is that not plural? It is not necessary to have three distinct substances; on this basis, it is definitively said that the proposition is that which is to be proved.' After Diṅnāga, there are roughly three explanations: One says: The referent expressed by the words of the proposition is that which is to be proved; thus the fifteenth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'The thesis to be established is of two kinds: first, the intrinsic nature; second, the specific distinction. The factors that establish it are of eight kinds.' Both the words that express the proposition and the words and referents of the reason and so forth are all called valid proof. Because the words of the proposition are established by the reason and the example, though it is also that which is to be proved, why is the proposition stated first in treatises? In order to display first the thesis favoured by oneself, it is also that which is to be proved, but not definitively so, because it has the function of establishing. Just as, because it is established by the reason and the example, it is called valid proof, so the referent expressed by the proposition is definitively only that which is to be proved, uniquely named the thesis to be established. The second says: The totality of all phenomena—their intrinsic nature and specific distinction, whether in teaching or in principle—are all that which is to be proved; treatises call both of them 'meaning' (artha), present according to circumstance. A single portion within the totality put forward against an opponent, whether words or referents, whether intrinsic nature or specific distinction, is collectively called the proposition, which is immediately called valid proof. Although this proposition put to the opponent is also that which is to be proved, because it can establish the totality, it receives the name valid proof. Therefore, when Diṅnāga and others call the proposition that which is to be proved, this does not contradict the principles of the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts, because the Yogācārabhūmi and others do not say that the proposition is exclusively and unreservedly a valid proof. The third says: The referent which is the combined substratum of the intrinsic nature and specific distinction is called that which is to be proved, while the combined proposition that is supported is called valid proof, because the whole establishes the parts. It is not that this combined proposition is definitively only a valid proof; when put forward as a combination against an opponent, because it is established by the reason and example, it is also that which is to be proved. Because it is not definitively that which is to be proved, it receives the name valid proof. Diṅnāga merely uses commonly accepted reasons and examples to establish what the other has not accepted. What the other has not accepted is solely the combined proposition; the proposition is that which is to be proved, while intrinsic nature and specific distinction are merely bases of the proposition, not that which is to be proved. The instruments of proof and the points of view regarding meaning are different, so they do not contradict each other. Otherwise, could it be that Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu did not understand hetuvidyā, that they spoke of what is proved as a valid proof?

1.41

Next, in explaining the valid refutation (dūṣaṇa): The treatises only have refutations that disclose the opponent's faults, not refutations by formulating an independent syllogism (prayoga), because formulating a syllogism itself exposes their fault. Within refutations that disclose faults, some ancient masters said there are eight valid proofs, so that lacking one yields eight [faults], lacking two yields twenty-eight, up to lacking seven yielding eight, and lacking eight yielding one. There were also those who spoke of four as valid proofs, so that lacking one yields four, lacking two yields six, lacking three yields four, and lacking four yields one. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu's faults of deficiency (nyūnatā) among proposition, reason, and example are: lacking one yields three, lacking two yields three, and lacking three yields one. After Vasubandhu, all eliminated the seventh [fault], taking proposition, reason, and example as the three valid proofs: if all are lacking, it is simply invalid; since there was originally no substance, how could it become a valid proof? What deficiency could there be that it would receive the name of a semblance (ābhāsa)? Bodhisattva Diṅnāga, taking one reason and two examples, stated six faults—which are precisely the six faults of the three characteristics of the reason: lacking one yields three, lacking two yields three, and there is no case of lacking three. Sixty years before the Master [Xuanzang] arrived there, at the Nālandā Monastery (Śīlāditya's Vihāra/Nirgrantha Vihāra) there was a treatise master named Bhadraruci, whose precision and compassion were celebrated throughout the age, peerless in the treatise of hetuvidyā at the time; he also eliminated the seventh. The other masters refused to eliminate it. With one reason and two examples, that is, the three characteristics of the reason, even if one puts forward a proposition without putting forward a reason or an example—as when the Sāṃkhya holds the self to be conscious without putting forward a reason or an example—how is that not a fault? Furthermore, even if there are words, if all three characteristics are lacking—as when a grammarian (Śabdika), against a Buddhist, establishes sound as eternal, 'because it is the locus of qualities, like space (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); whatever is not eternal is not the locus of qualities, like the great elements'—although this reason of being a locus of qualities has been stated, all three characteristics are lacking; how could it not be a semblance? On this basis, the seventh is also a fault of deficiency.

1.42

Among the semblances of valid proof (sādhanābhāsa), regarding the nine semblances of the proposition (pakṣābhāsa): In treatises such as the Nyāyamukha, Bodhisattva Diṅnāga established five kinds and did not mention the latter four, namely: the unestablished predicate (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), the unestablished subject (viśeṣyāsiddha), both being unestablished (ubhayāsiddha), and established by consensus (siddhasādhana). This is because the Nyāyamukha states that the proposition and so forth are multiple statements called valid proof, and herein one only takes what is intended by oneself as the thesis to be proved, which is called the proposition, provided it is not subverted by an incompatible meaning. Since the latter four are not incompatible, they were omitted. The Master Śaṅkarasvāmin's faults of the proposition are not only incompatibilities; hence he sets forth nine kinds.

1.43

The second explanation says: Bodhisattva Diṅnāga considered the unestablished predicate (viśeṣaṇāsiddha) to be identical to faults within the reason such as the uncommon (asādhāraṇa) and inconclusive (anaikāntika), and also identical to faults within the example such as unestablished sādhya (sādhyāsiddha) and the fault of lacking a homogeneous example. The unestablished subject (viśeṣyāsiddha), because the subject (dharmin) does not exist, is identical to the fault of the unestablished substratum (āśrayāsiddha) among the faults of the reason. The unestablished in both (ubhayāsiddha) is the combination of these two faults. As for established by consensus (siddhasādhana): in whatever debate is set up, the name and meaning must be contested; since it is already agreed upon, it is not something to be proved, for it was never a proposition to begin with. On what basis could a fault be established? Just as worldly people who have not received the precepts do not belong to the category of those who have received the precepts, on what basis could one say they maintain or violate the precepts? For this reason, the latter four faults were not mentioned. Now, Śaṅkarasvāmin adds the unestablished predicate, because only when the proposition combines and takes the inseparable nature does it manage to form a proposition. If there is no predicate, what is inseparable? If one were to argue that because within the reason it is uncommon, inconclusive, and so forth, and within the example it is unestablished sādhya, it need not be mentioned for fear of redundancy: within the reason there already exist faults such as lacking sapakṣa and being uncommon, yet within the example one again mentions unestablished sādhana—how emphatic that is! Therefore it is added. Śaṅkarasvāmin further adds the unestablished subject: if one were to argue that because it is the reason's fault of unestablished substratum, it should also be omitted for fear of redundancy: within the reason there are already inconclusive faults such as the reason occurring in all vipakṣa, and the fault of not being entirely absent from vipakṣa; why then would one still need to mention in the negative example that the sādhana is not excluded (sādhanāvyāvṛtta)? What would prevent a fault of the proposition from also being a fault of the reason? The remaining objections are the same as before; therefore it is added.

1.44

The unestablished in both combines the two. There must be two factors whose mutual qualification forms an inseparable nature before a proposition can be constituted. If both of them are non-existent, how could the meaning of the proposition be established? Therefore it is added.

1.45

If these three above were not established as faults, the substrata not being thoroughly established would require further proof. Since the proposition is not genuine, how could it be called that which is to be proved?

1.46

As for established by consensus: if one argues that because consensus is originally not a proposition, on what basis could a fault be established? Both unestablished in both, unestablished in both [factors], and both unexcluded are originally not reasons or examples; on what basis are faults established [for them]? If one argues that because the reason and example have put forward an assertion, how could it not be a fault? The proposition also has an assertion; how could it not be a fault? Therefore it is added. Diṅnāga merely spoke implicitly and concisely, whereas Śaṅkarasvāmin set it out comprehensively and in detail; it is not that master and disciple contradict each other.

1.47

Furthermore, ancient teachers before Diṅnāga also spoke in the thesis (pratijñā) of the fallacy of thesis-reason contradiction (pratijñā-hetu-virodha). Diṅnāga himself refuted this in the Nyāyamukha, stating: 'As for those who say that contradiction between thesis and reason is called thesis contradiction (pratijñā-virodha), this is not a fallacy of the thesis. Because in this [case], when one establishes sound as permanent because everything is impermanent, this is a faulty formulation of a dissimilar instance (vaidharmya) through the device of the example (dṛṣṭānta); since it is shown through synthesis (upanaya) that [sound] is "not everything".' Diṅnāga's meaning is: when, for instance, the Śabdika establishes sound as permanent with the reason 'because everything is impermanent', this is an example used by that non-Buddhist to establish the thesis; through contrivance and deceitful cleverness, it is a faulty formulation of the dissimilar meaning of impermanence, and not that he intends to establish the sound's permanence that was asserted as the thesis. Explaining the reason, he says: 'Since it is shown through synthesis that [sound] is not everything.' Diṅnāga correctly says: 'In establishing sound as permanent, the correct reason ought to say "because it is not everything". For the non-Buddhist holds that impermanent phenomena have many types and diverse distinctions, which are called "everything". Therefore, establishing sound as permanent takes the reason "not being everything".' In the synthesis of the example, it says: 'Whatever is not everything is permanent in essence, like empty space.' How could one instead establish a thesis of permanence with the reason 'because everything is impermanent'? He further states: 'This reason does not exist [in the subject], because sound is subsumed under everything.' Diṅnāga's meaning is: this reason 'because everything is impermanent' cited by the ancients does not exist in the established permanent sound, because sound is subsumed under 'everything is impermanent'; hence it is simply the fallacy of unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha) within the reason, an unaccepted reason for both, since it does not exist in the subject (dharmin). In establishing sound as permanent, the reason is 'not being everything'. Diṅnāga further states: 'Or it is because it is a partial meaning of what is to be established (sādhya).' Only the non-Buddhist accepts that the reason 'not being everything' exists in the subject; the Buddhist does not accept that sound is not everything, so it does not exist in the subject, which constitutes the reason fallacy of unestablished for either party (anyatara-asiddha). Therefore, these two formulations are not fallacies of the thesis; they are called fallacies of the reason, and are also the fallacy of inverted contraposition (viparīta-vyatireka) in the dissimilar example. All contrapositive methods put the thesis first and the reason after; since one establishes the thesis of permanence with the reason of not being everything, the contraposition of the dissimilar example says: 'Whatever is impermanent is everything.' But now it says 'because everything is impermanent'; thus putting the reason first and the thesis after, which constitutes an inverted contraposition and a faulty formulation of the dissimilar meaning of impermanence. For this reason, thesis contradiction is not a fallacy of the thesis; it is a fallacy of the reason and the example. Since Diṅnāga refuted it, Śaṅkarasvāmin conformed to him, and so likewise does not establish it. If it is not established in the thesis because it is a fallacy of the reason, then since [certain reason fallacies] are fallacies of the example, they ought not to be established in the reason; for instance, the contradictory (viruddha), the uncommon (asādhāraṇa), and the inconclusive (anaikāntika) should not be the unestablished probans in an example. The present explanation is that this is not so: the reason has three characteristics (trirūpa) and its substantive meaning is the broadest; simply stating the reason, there are cases where it is contradictory, uncommon, or inconclusive. Before one has even brought up the example, the fallacy is already apparent. But now, in stating the thesis, there is as yet no fallacy; the fallacy only arises when the reason is advanced. How can one ascribe the fallacy to the thesis? It is not like contradiction with inference (anumāna-virodha), where merely stating the thesis has already contradicted the reason; this is not the case here, and therefore it should only be as Diṅnāga stated. Among the four kinds of unestablished reasons in non-Buddhist hetuvidyā, they only state the fallacies of ubhaya[-asiddha] and anyatara[-asiddha], and do not state doubtful (saṃdigdha-asiddha) or unestablished locus (āśraya-asiddha). This unestablished reason also does not establish the thesis, because it is unestablished by either both proponent and opponent, or by one side. Diṅnāga states that although the principle is thus, the reason relies on the thesis; it is either definite or doubtful, and the locus in the thesis either exists or does not exist. Since there are distinctions, combining them together makes them difficult to understand, so he opens them into four. In the Nyāyamukha, ancients also spoke of five kinds of inconclusive [reasons], excluding the uncommon reason because it does not exist in the dissimilar class. Diṅnāga added it because it is uncommon. What are these like?

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因明入正理論疏 — Classical Chinese