因明入正理論疏 2.22

2.22

Question: "If by stating the absence of the probandum the reason is already nonexistent, why is it necessary to state further that the reason is universally absent? And if by stating that the reason is universally absent the probandum is already absent, why is it necessary to state further the absence of the proposition's probandum?" Answer: "If one only states that the probandum is absent, without the reason being universally nonexistent, then among the nine clauses it is subsumed under presence in the vipakṣa: excluding clauses two, eight, and five, the remaining six clauses are such, and the heterogeneous example also incurs [the fault of] failure to exclude the probans. If one states that the reason is universally nonexistent without stating that the probandum is absent, then among the nine clauses it is subsumed under absence in the sapakṣa: clauses four, six, and five are such, and the homogeneous instance also incurs [the fault of] unestablished probans. If one neither states that the probandum is absent nor that the reason is universally nonexistent, then among the nine clauses it is the clause of presence in the sapakṣa: excluding the middle three clauses, the remaining six clauses are such, and the heterogeneous example also incurs the fault of failing to exclude both. If one states that the probandum is absent and the reason is also universally nonexistent, then among the nine clauses these are clauses two, five, and eight: clauses two and eight are valid, while the fifth is inconclusive, and the homogeneous example may incur the fault of both being unestablished. Because the other clauses have faults, this clause also has faults. Otherwise, this clause would not be subsumed under faulty ones. Among these faults, whether belonging to oneself or the other, or complete or partial, one should reflect and apply them in accordance with what is appropriate as before. A small part of the fourth clause is valid, while the rest all have faults; to prevent these, one must state both: stating that the probandum is absent, and that the reason is universally nonexistent."