因明入正理論疏 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Ji of Great Cien Monastery.

2.2

The Treatise: Examples are of two kinds.

The commentary states: The third section from here onward demonstrates the characteristics of the dṛṣṭānta. The text has three parts: first, positing; second, listing the names; third, explaining them in turn. This is the first part. In Sanskrit it is called dṛṣṭānta: dṛṣṭi means 'seeing', and anta means 'boundary' or 'limit'. Because by means of this illustration, the thesis is established, bringing it to completion is called anta. Another person's understanding arises and illuminates this culmination of the thesis; this is called dṛṣṭi. Therefore Asanga says: 'To posit an example means to make a proper statement by combining the seen limit with the unseen limit.' Buddhapālita (Siṃhabhadra) says: 'The seen limit refers to the already fully manifested part. The unseen limit refers to the not-yet fully manifested part. Using the fully manifested part to reveal the not-yet fully manifested part, making their meanings equal, whatever proper statement is made is called positing an example.' Now, following the local idiom, it is called an example (喻). An example is an illustration, a comparison, an illumination; because through this illustration and comparison the posited thesis is illuminated and clarified, it is therefore called an example. Although the reason was previously presented and also illuminated the thesis's meaning, an illustration had not yet been presented to make it extremely clear; now, through this comparison, the thesis's meaning becomes extremely clear, and therefore it is established separately from the reason and given the distinct name of 'example'.

2.4

[The treatise states:] The first is [the example of] similarity; the second is [the example of] dissimilarity.

2.5

The commentary states: The second part lists the names. 'Similar' means resembling; 'dharma' means the distinction (viśeṣa). The mutually agreed-upon subject (svabhāva) is called the possessor of the property (dharmin), and the distinction posited upon it is called the property (dharma). Now, being similar to that posited distinction is called the example of similarity; lacking that distinction is called the example of dissimilarity. 'Dissimilar' means different.

2.6

Question: 'Why are the similarity and dissimilarity of the thesis called classes (pakṣa), while the similarity and dissimilarity of the reason are called properties (dharma)?' Answer: 'If similarity or dissimilarity concerns the general thesis in its aspect of inseparable category, it is called a class (pakṣa). If it is not similarity or dissimilarity with respect to the general thesis, nor is it similarity or dissimilarity with respect to the thesis's subject (dharmin), but only similarity or dissimilarity with respect to the property produced upon the subject, then it is called a dharma. Furthermore, this produced [aspect] is not the general probandum, so it cannot be named a class; it is called a dharma. Because the thesis is the general probandum, it is given the name of class, as the prover and the proved are different. Moreover, the similarity and dissimilarity of both reason and thesis combined are called dharma, while their distinct similarity and dissimilarity are called pakṣa; because these two are combined, they are called dharma. Just below, the similarity and dissimilarity of the two reasons, as well as the similarity and dissimilarity of the thesis above, are both distinct similarities and dissimilarities, and are therefore all called pakṣa.'

2.7

[The treatise states:] The [example of] similarity is where the reason's similar class is shown to definitely possess [the property].

2.8

The commentary states: The third part explains them in turn, with two sections: first, explaining similarity; second, explaining dissimilarity. The Nyāyamukha states: 'Stating that where the reason is, the probandum follows, and where the probandum is absent, the reason does not exist—these two are called examples; anything else merely resembles them.' In explaining the first, there are three parts: first, citing the name; second, presenting it in general; third, pointing it out specifically. 'The [example of] similarity' cites the name; the rest of the text presents it in general. 'Where' means the locus, which is all loci of existing or non-existing things other than the thesis. 'Is shown' means stated. If an existing or non-existing thing is stated to be of a similar class to the previously presented reason, then it definitely possesses the property of the thesis; this existing or non-existing locus is called the example of similarity. The reason is the commonly accepted property upon the subject; if a locus has this, it is called the reason's similar class. The property to be established is the property upon the subject that is not commonly accepted; if a locus that has the common reason definitely has this unaccepted property, it is called definitely having its nature, because the commonly accepted property establishes that which is not commonly accepted. The Nyāyamukha says: 'Stating that the probandum follows the reason' is called the similar example. Because among the aggregates of existing and non-existing things outside the thesis, having these commonly accepted and unaccepted properties constitutes similarity. Because the properties are similar, the prover and proved are similar, and their combination is similar. Here, one primarily takes the reason's similar class; because this is present, the property of the thesis necessarily follows, and therefore it also secondarily takes the thesis's similar class, collectively calling them the example of similarity.

2.9

Question: 'If showing the reason's similar class means that the property of the thesis necessarily follows, why is it necessary to additionally say "definitely possess [the property]"? If one says "definitely possess [the property]", the reason is necessarily present in the thesis, so why is it necessary to additionally say "showing the reason's similar class"?' Answer: 'If one only says the reason's similar class without stating that it definitely possesses [the property], this falls under the presence in dissimilar classes among the nine clauses—excluding the second, fifth, and eighth, the remaining six clauses belong here—and it would be subsumed under the two fallacies of contradictory and inconclusive; the dissimilar example would also commit an error, failing to eliminate the proving [property]. If one says that it definitely possesses [the property] without stating the reason's similar class, this corresponds to absence in the similar class among the nine clauses—namely the fourth, fifth, and sixth—and it would also be subsumed under the two fallacies of contradictory and inconclusive; the similar example would also commit an error, rendering the prover unestablished. If it is neither the reason's similar class nor definitely possesses [the property], this corresponds to absence in the dissimilar class among the nine clauses—namely the second, fifth, and eighth—subsumed under the two kinds: valid reason and inconclusive; the similar example would also commit the error of being unestablished in both. If one shows the reason's similar class and it also definitely possesses [the property], this corresponds to the presence in the similar class among the nine clauses—excluding the fourth, fifth, and sixth, the remaining six clauses belong here—subsumed under valid reason and inconclusive: where there is no fault in the dissimilar class, it is subsumed under valid reason; where there is a fault in the dissimilar class, it is subsumed under inconclusive, and the dissimilar example may have partial or total non-elimination of the prover. These various fallacies committed by the similar and dissimilar examples—whether in regard to oneself or the other, or totally or partially—should all be contemplated as appropriate. In order to ward off the errors stated in the first three clauses and a minor portion of the fourth clause, and to show that a minor portion of the fourth clause is correct, one must state both: showing the reason's similar class and definitely possessing [the property].'

2.10

[The treatise states:] Namely, whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, as in the case of a pot, etc.

2.11

The commentary states: This points out the dharma specifically. As when establishing the thesis that sound is impermanent, with the reason of being produced, and a pot as the similar example. Here, pointing out the dharma makes the characteristics clear, so the application and conclusion are stated together. 'Whatever is produced' is the previously mentioned general demonstration of the reason's similar class. 'Is seen to be impermanent' is also the previously mentioned demonstration of definitely possessing [the property]. Wherever there is origination, there is definitely cessation; wherever the mother cow goes, the calf inevitably follows. Where the reason is present, the thesis inevitably follows; this is the application. If there is something produced, the proponent, opponent, and judges see that it is impermanent. 'As in the case of a pot, etc.' cites the subject that serves as the substrate of the example and draws the conclusion. In the previous thesis, sound was the subject (dharmin), and impermanent and produced were properties (dharma); now in the example, the pot, etc., is the subject, and being produced and impermanent are properties. Properly speaking, being produced and impermanent constitute the example, and additionally citing the pot, etc., as the substrate of the example completes the application. 'Etc.' includes other things such as basins, jars, and the like.

2.12

The Nyāyamukha states: 'If so, the words of the example should not be a separate component, because they illuminate the meaning of the reason.' For the ancient masters of hetuvidyā, the example existed outside the reason, as the Vaiśeṣikas say: 'Thesis: sound is impermanent; reason: because of being produced; similar example: like a pot; dissimilar example: like space.' They did not cite 'whatever is produced is impermanent', etc., to run through both places, and therefore the reason was not the example. The pot was the substance of the similar example, and space was the substance of the dissimilar example. From Diṅnāga onward, it is stated that the three characteristics of the reason include the two examples, and the two examples are the reason itself, because both illuminate the thesis, and being produced, etc., runs through both places. The ancient master objected: 'If the example is also included within the reason, then the words of the example should not be a distinct component outside the reason, because they illuminate the meaning of the reason. There should only be two members; why are two examples needed?' Diṅnāga explained: 'Although this is indeed the case in reality, the statement of the reason is only to make clear that it is a property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva), not to make clear the presence or absence in the similar and dissimilar classes; therefore, it is necessary to state separately the words of the similar and dissimilar examples.' The intention is to answer that the substance of the example is indeed the reason, and thus should not be stated separately. However, when formulating the statement of the reason, its primary purpose is solely to reveal that the property of the subject is the reason of the thesis, not primarily to reveal the presence in the similar and absence in the dissimilar, thereby positively and negatively establishing the posited meaning of the thesis. Therefore, outside the reason, the two examples are stated separately to show that where the reason exists, the thesis inevitably follows, and by establishing it through contraposition, the thesis's meaning is brought to completion.

2.13

He objected again, saying: 'If only the meaning expressed by the statement of the reason is called the reason, what fault is there in this?' The meaning of this objection is: if the meaning expressed by the word 'produced' is solely called the reason, and the pot as similar and space as dissimilar are called examples and not the reason, what fault is there in this? He then asked him: 'What merit is there in that?' The ancient master replied: 'Stating the example as a separate component is precisely what constitutes the merit.' Diṅnāga objected again: 'It would then be like an expedient means taught in the worldly context, entirely discordant with the meaning of its reason.' The meaning of this objection is: just as worldly non-Buddhists also state that there are two examples separate from the reason, your stating the example outside the reason is just the same. Since pervasive presence in the property of the subject is the valid reason, the two examples stated are not the valid reason, but merely expedient means assisting the completion of the reason's meaning. Since this expedient means of the example is distinct from the reason, it is entirely discordant with the meaning of the reason.

2.14

The ancient master said again: 'If so, what is the fault? Even if it is the same as non-Buddhists, what error is there?' Just as non-Buddhists say there are five sense consciousnesses, and the Buddhadharma also has them, this is not a fault. Diṅnāga objected: 'Such a statement can only analogize the probandum; it has no functional efficacy and is not a proving statement. Because they merely state the property of being produced as an analogized similar dharma, without stating the proving and the to-be-proved meanings.' The meaning of the objection here is: I am not saying that being identical to non-Buddhists in stating a mutually established meaning is a fault; rather, it is because of the fault in following their statement of an unestablished meaning. That is, the ancient masters followed the non-Buddhists in stating the unestablished meaning of: thesis: sound is impermanent; reason: because of being produced; similar example: like a pot; dissimilar example: like space. Diṅnāga objected: 'If one states the substance of the pot and the substance of space as examples, one would merely be analogizing the pot to the posited meaning of impermanence. Since the example does not state "whatever is produced is impermanent", citing the pot to prove sound has no functional efficacy, and the example is therefore not a proving statement.' Because when they presented the reason, they only stated the property of being produced and cited the pot to analogize sound as being similarly impermanent, without stating the prover 'whatever is produced' and the proved 'all are impermanent', it has no efficacy and is not a proving statement. Moreover, if the pot itself is the substance of the example, the pot consists of the four sensory elements, and can be burned and seen; sound would then also have to be like this. According to our statement, 'Whatever is produced is impermanent, as in the case of a pot, etc.' Since being produced is the true similar property of the thesis, impermanence following it also definitely occurs; citing the pot as the substrate of the example to illustrate this matter avoids the fault of everything being analogized indiscriminately. Since you do not do this, you incur the aforementioned fault. Diṅnāga further objected: 'Furthermore, the reason and the example being distinct, this [example] has the similar dharma and dissimilar dharma of the probandum, but ultimately cannot demonstrate the inseparability of the reason and the probandum; therefore, it only has the meaning of analogizing the probandum, but lacks functional efficacy.' The meaning of this objection is: since the reason and the example are distinct, the similar example only possesses the probandum 'impermanence', while the dissimilar example lacks this. Your similar example does not state 'whatever is produced is impermanent', nor does your dissimilar example lack both; ultimately, you cannot demonstrate the inseparable connection between the reason of being produced and the probandum of impermanence. Concluding in summary, he says: therefore, it only has the meaning of analogizing the probandum, but lacks functional efficacy and is not a proving statement.

2.15

The ancient master asked again: "Why is it devoid of function?" Diṅnāga objected: "Because in a homogeneous example, the property of the subject and the probandum are not necessarily analogous; and since this would again have to be established by further examples, it would lead to an infinite regress." This explains why the reason and example [as maintained by the ancient master] are devoid of function. Since you do not state that whatever is a product is impermanent, that homogeneous example does not necessarily assimilate the property of the subject [functioning as] the reason with the probandum, impermanence, but merely says, "like a pot." If someone were to ask, "How is a pot impermanent?" you would reply again, "like a lamp." Proceeding successively in this way would lead to an infinite regress; this is the meaning of being devoid of function. If, according to our [formulation], the example states: "Whatever is a product is impermanent, like a pot, etc.," since it assimilates the property of the subject with the probandum and universally covers everything—pots, lamps, and so on—there is no need for further questioning; hence there is no infinite regress, and it is endowed with function. Furthermore, [Diṅnāga] objected to him: "Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that all characteristics are possessed [in common]." If the entity of the pot alone were the homogeneous example, then since burning, visibility, and so forth are not all analogous, this would constitute a fault. If, as I state, one only takes being a product, impermanence, and the like within that locus of the example as analogous, then there is no such fault. Furthermore, he objected: "If the property of the subject alone were the nature of the reason, then that which is inconclusive would also constitute a reason." This objection means: if being the property of the subject alone—[that is, being] a product—constituted the nature of the reason, while presence in the homogeneous and absence in the heterogeneous were merely the example and not the reason, then since the pot and space as examples would not be the reason, an inconclusive reason would also constitute a [valid] reason, because it would possess only presence in the subject and lack the latter two characteristics.

2.16

The ancient [master] retorted in objection: "How could this fault occur when both kinds of examples—possessing the probandum, the probans, and the heterogeneous property—are present?" His objection means: how could there be an inconclusive fault between these two examples when the homogeneous pot possesses the probandum (impermanence) and the probans (being a product), and the heterogeneous property is also present? Diṅnāga objected: "If at that time the heterogeneous instances of the probandum are not of a single kind, then this fault occurs, as in the last examples of the first and last triads." This means that when establishing a thesis, the heterogeneous instances of the probandum may be both existent and nonexistent, not being of a single kind. Since you merely point to a pot as the homogeneous instance and space as the heterogeneous example, even though both examples are present, if the examples were not the reason, then this inconclusiveness would occur. As for "the last examples of the first triad," this refers, among the nine clauses, to the third clause of the first triad: presence in the sapakṣa, and both presence and absence in the vipakṣa. As for "the last examples of the last triad," this refers, among the nine clauses, to the third clause of the last triad: both presence and absence in the sapakṣa, and both presence and absence in the vipakṣa. In these two examples, if the homogeneous takes what is existent and the heterogeneous takes what is nonexistent, the homogeneous example also possesses the probandum and the probans, as well as the heterogeneous example; nevertheless, because it is partially present in the vipakṣa, the reason becomes inconclusive. Because your homogeneous example is "like a pot" and your heterogeneous example is "like space," and because the examples are not the reason, you do not separately specify by saying, "Whatever is permanent is seen to be not a product, like space, etc.," and hence inconclusiveness occurs. If you specify them, then the examples are precisely the reason, and there will be no such fault; for this excludes those two triads from being correct reasons, since it is necessary that [the reason] be universally absent in the heterogeneous to be a correct reason. He further concluded: "Therefore, the three characteristics are established solely to elucidate the reason. For this reason, although all parts are capable of serving as the reason to elucidate the probandum, only one part is provisionally called the reason." Here, the words "therefore established" and "solely to" show that the three characteristics of the reason elucidate the proposition, and that the two examples are precisely the reason. Although both are the reason and elucidate the meaning of the proposition, among the three characteristics, only this one part—pervasion of the subject's property—is provisionally called the reason, while the other two are called examples. This is explained predominantly from the standpoint of preeminence, not as an exhaustive logical account; hence it is called "provisionally." The preceding text relied on this elucidating of the meaning of the proposition, so that stating the three characteristics of the reason is also not contradictory.

2.17

Question: "Why are the mutually accepted property and the not mutually accepted property divided into proposition and reason, while the two [aspects] on the homogeneous example are combined into a single member?" Answer: "In stating a proposition to an opponent, what is not mutually accepted serves as the probandum; because the reason establishes this, that which is mutually accepted is separately established as the probans; and the homogeneous example makes the limit of the meaning visible, both [aspects] together assisting in establishing the preceding [thesis]. Therefore, the reason and proposition are stated separately, while [the two aspects of] the homogeneous example are combined."

2.18

Question: "Since stating 'being a product' as the reason already applies to a pot, is it not redundant to set it forth again in the homogeneous example?" Answer: "Although the reason states it in general terms, the meaning of the proposition is not yet clear; pointing to concrete facts to clarify what precedes is not redundant." The ancient masters combined them, saying: "A pot has the nature of being a product; a pot is impermanent. Sound has the nature of being a product; sound is also impermanent." Now Diṅnāga says, "Whatever is a product is impermanent," which expresses it concisely and eliminates prolixity, applying equally to both example and proposition; why labor over lengthy discussion? Therefore, he amended the earlier masters. The ancient masters concluded: "Therefore it is known that sound is impermanent." Now Diṅnāga says, "for example, a pot, etc.," showing that the meaning is already established; why labor to restate it? Therefore, setting forth both the reason and the proposition together in the example is clear. This should be understood later.

2.19

The treatise [states]: As for heterogeneous [examples]: wherever the absence of the probandum is stated, the reason must be universally nonexistent.

2.20

The commentary states: Below, the explanation of heterogeneity has four parts: first, restating the term; second, general elucidation; third, specific designation; fourth, explanatory justification. This corresponds to the first two. "Place" refers to a locus: the loci of existent and nonexistent things apart from the proposition. That is, whether an entity exists or does not exist, so long as it is stated that the preceding probandum of the proposition is absent, the preceding probans of the reason must also be universally nonexistent; this is called a heterogeneous instance, because the property is different, and because both are different. The verse in the Nyāyamukha states: "Where the proposition is absent, the reason does not exist"—this is called a heterogeneous property. There is an explanation: It primarily takes the heterogeneous instance of the reason, because when this is absent, the proposition is necessarily absent along with it; therefore, it also secondarily takes the absence of the proposition as heterogeneous, and together they are called a heterogeneous property. It then objects to itself: "If mere absence of the reason is called a heterogeneous property, then absence in the homogeneous instance should be a heterogeneous example." If so, with sound as impermanent as the proposition, taking lightning, pots, and so forth as homogeneous examples, the reason "arising from effort" does not exist in lightning, and so lightning would become a heterogeneous instance, and the proposition would necessarily be absent along with it. From this, one should say that because they homogeneously establish the proposition, the reason is the primary homogeneous [factor], and the proposition is the auxiliary homogeneous [factor]. Because heterogeneous instances are separated [from the proposition], the proposition is the primary heterogeneous [factor], and the reason is the auxiliary heterogeneous [factor]; taking only one does not constitute heterogeneity. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states: "Where the proposition is absent, the reason does not exist—this is called a heterogeneous property; it does not say that where the reason is absent, the proposition does not exist, calling that a heterogeneous example." However, here one does not wish to establish a distinct heterogeneous property; therefore, first the proposition is absent, and only thereafter is the reason absent.

2.21

Question: "Why is the probandum not said to be universally absent, while the probans of the reason is said to be universally nonexistent?" Answer: "The proposition does not establish the reason, so it is not said to be universally absent. The reason establishes the proposition, so it is said to be universally nonexistent. If the reason were not universally absent, it would become a heterogeneous property [with faults], and various faults such as inconclusiveness and contradiction would arise. As for the probandum of the proposition, its property is extremely broad: for example, 'sound is non-self,' which is also present in space, etc.; if all heterogeneous [instances] were absent, there would be no heterogeneous instances at all, and statements such as 'like space, etc.' would be posited in vain. Therefore, we know that merely lacking the probandum of the reason according to an appropriate fraction constitutes a heterogeneous proposition; it does not mean that all [properties] must be universally nonexistent."

2.22

Question: "If by stating the absence of the probandum the reason is already nonexistent, why is it necessary to state further that the reason is universally absent? And if by stating that the reason is universally absent the probandum is already absent, why is it necessary to state further the absence of the proposition's probandum?" Answer: "If one only states that the probandum is absent, without the reason being universally nonexistent, then among the nine clauses it is subsumed under presence in the vipakṣa: excluding clauses two, eight, and five, the remaining six clauses are such, and the heterogeneous example also incurs [the fault of] failure to exclude the probans. If one states that the reason is universally nonexistent without stating that the probandum is absent, then among the nine clauses it is subsumed under absence in the sapakṣa: clauses four, six, and five are such, and the homogeneous instance also incurs [the fault of] unestablished probans. If one neither states that the probandum is absent nor that the reason is universally nonexistent, then among the nine clauses it is the clause of presence in the sapakṣa: excluding the middle three clauses, the remaining six clauses are such, and the heterogeneous example also incurs the fault of failing to exclude both. If one states that the probandum is absent and the reason is also universally nonexistent, then among the nine clauses these are clauses two, five, and eight: clauses two and eight are valid, while the fifth is inconclusive, and the homogeneous example may incur the fault of both being unestablished. Because the other clauses have faults, this clause also has faults. Otherwise, this clause would not be subsumed under faulty ones. Among these faults, whether belonging to oneself or the other, or complete or partial, one should reflect and apply them in accordance with what is appropriate as before. A small part of the fourth clause is valid, while the rest all have faults; to prevent these, one must state both: stating that the probandum is absent, and that the reason is universally nonexistent."

2.23

The treatise [states]: That is to say, whatever is permanent is seen to be not a product, like space, etc.

2.24

The commentary states: This specifically designates the property. For instance, in the proposition that [sound is] impermanent, being permanent is the heterogeneous [property]; in the reason of being a product, being not a product is the heterogeneous [property]. To elucidate the meaning conversely: since in the class of permanent things they are seen to be not products, it is clear that what is a product is definitely seen to be impermanent. Because [the homogeneous example] homogeneously establishes the proposition, the reason comes first and the proposition comes second; because the heterogeneous property separates from the preceding, the proposition comes first and the reason comes second. If, in the heterogeneous separation, the reason came first and the proposition came second—as in saying that what is not a product is definitely permanent—it would turn around and establish the original, uncontested permanence of space, rather than separating from the preceding to establish the proposition of impermanence. If it established permanence, it would incur [the fault of] proving what is already accepted, establishing now what was already settled formerly. Since the homogeneous establishes, the reason comes first and the proposition second; since the heterogeneous separates from the preceding, it follows the sequence of the proposition, with the intention of conversely elucidating the previously established meaning. Now, when the proposition is absent, since the reason does not occur, it is clear that where the reason exists, the proposition must definitely follow. The heterogeneous merely states separation; if separation is achieved, that suffices, and it must put the absence of the proposition first and the absence of the reason second. Therefore the Nyāyamukha states: "It is stated that the proposition follows the reason, and that where the proposition is absent, the reason does not exist." As for "like space, etc.," this adduces the locus of the example to illustrate the entity of the example, indicating the subject that serves as the locus to demonstrate that the property that relies upon it does not exist. "Etc." includes, in accordance with the proposition as appropriate, things such as nirvāṇa.

2.25

The treatise [states]: Here, the word "permanent" expresses not being impermanent, and the words "not a product" express the absence of being a product.

2.26

The Commentary says: Below, he explains and establishes the meaning, showing that even if the vipakṣa lacks an ontological reality, it still fulfills the three characteristics [of a correct hetu] and is subsumed under a correct hetu. According to the method of hetuvidyā, when nonexistence is made the thesis (pratijñā), there is no [existent] capable of proving it, and both existence and nonexistence serve as the dissimilar. This is just like what the treatise says: "Inherence (samavāya) is not real, because it is admitted to be subsumed under any one of the six categories, like the preceding five categories." In refuting the first five categories, their ontological entity is not really existent, and hence they can serve as an example (dṛṣṭānta). In this case, because one establishes nonexistence by means of nonexistence, one ought to take an existent phenomenon as the dissimilar class (vipakṣa); yet because it lacks real being, one conversely takes a nonexistent phenomenon as the dissimilar, saying: "Whatever is real is not subsumed under the six categories," for which there is no separate dissimilar entity. If nonexistence is the thesis, existence cannot establish it: the hetu would have nothing to reside upon, and the dṛṣṭānta would have nothing to establish; hence an existent can serve as the dissimilar, because it is dissimilar to nonexistence. If existence is the thesis, an existent is capable of establishing it, because it is in concordance with establishing existence, while a nonexistent is incapable of establishing it, so the hetu could not establish it and the dṛṣṭānta would have nothing to establish; thus both existence and nonexistence are dissimilar, since both serve to preclude overextension. Since the thesis of "impermanence" has real entity, [things having] existence such as the productness of a jar and so forth can establish it. Therefore, regarding the dissimilar class, whether the Sarvāstivāda posits an existing space as the dissimilar, or the Sautrāntika and others posit a non-existing space as the dissimilar, it only serves to preclude all overextensions regarding the thesis and hetu; it is not required that the dissimilar example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta) must have an ontological substratum. As for the similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) which proves, establishing existence requires an existent, and establishing nonexistence requires a nonexistent; both affirmative designation (vidhi) and negative exclusion (apoha) are admissible. The dissimilar example is not so: whether having entity or lacking entity, it is uniformly and exclusively exclusionary, because its nature is to preclude overextension. Therefore, the word "eternal" excludes the thesis of non-impermanence; the words "non-product" express the exclusion of the hetu of productness—it does not require that "eternal" and "non-product" separately designate two existent entities, the intention being to show that the dissimilar example applies even to what lacks entity. The Nyāyamukha says: "The former involves exclusion and affirmative designation; the latter solely precludes overextension, because the meaning is inferred through application (anvaya) and negative exclusion (vyatireka)." The former similar example is both exclusionary and affirmational, because it establishes nonexistence by nonexistence, and establishes existence by existence. The latter dissimilar example is uniformly for precluding overextension, being exclusionary and not affirmational, because the meaning is inferred by the application of the similar example, and the meaning is inferred by the negative exclusion of the dissimilar example. That [treatise] further concludes: "Therefore, even when directed against [one who] does not accept absolute space and the like as real entities, it can still demonstrate that where the thesis is absent, the absence of the hetu is established." The ancients said: "Sound is impermanent; the dissimilar example is like empty space." The Nyāyamukha objected: "It is not that in the dissimilar class, without showing the absence of the nature, it could serve as an example having qualification." That is to say, regarding the dissimilar class to impermanence, one ought to say: "Whatever is eternal is seen to be non-produced, like empty space and so forth." Precisely taking "eternal" as the dissimilar class and combining it with "non-produced," space serves as the substratum of the example. This qualification is required to reveal the absence of the dissimilar class, which inversely reveals that where there is the hetu of being produced, the thesis of impermanence necessarily follows. As for your merely saying "like space," he now inversely objects: "It is not the case that in the dissimilar class one does not show the absence of the thesis and the absence of the hetu." That is to say, having qualification, it is therefore able to serve as a dissimilar example. When read with an extended syntax, the path of its meaning is profound.

2.27

He further objected to the ancients, saying: "The worldly merely show the coexistence of the dissimilar classes of the thesis and the hetu in the same locus as the example of dissimilar quality, but not the nonexistence of the hetu where the thesis is absent; therefore, it definitely lacks capability." The first four lines formulate the opponent's view; the latter three lines refute it. "The worldly" here refers to the non-Buddhists, who merely show that the dissimilar classes of the thesis and the hetu—namely, eternal and non-produced—coexist upon empty space, and therefore speak of this empty space as the substance of the dissimilar example. This formulates their doctrine. Then he presents the objection, saying: "It is not the nonexistence of the hetu where the thesis is absent; therefore, it definitely lacks capability." In the dissimilar class, they do not say: "Where the thesis is absent, such that if something is eternal, it is seen to be non-produced, which is the nonexistence of the hetu," so as to inversely show through negative exclusion of thesis and hetu that wherever the hetu is present, the thesis must definitely be present. Therefore, the dissimilar class of the ancients is definitely devoid of capability; on this basis, one should only follow what I have stated.

2.28

[Nyāyapraveśa:] As nonexistence of existence is called nonexistence.

2.29

The Commentary says: Fearing that in explaining the dissimilar example, the meaning of exclusion (vyatireka) might not be clear, he points to a fact as an instance. There are two interpretations of this. The first says: As the Vaiśeṣikas, for the sake of the Pañcaśikha who did not believe that existence-ness (bhāva) exists outside substance and the rest, thereupon formulated the inference: "Existence-ness is neither substance, nor quality, nor action, because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses qualities and actions, like the universal-particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa)." Diṅnāga refuted this, saying: "This hetu contradicts the very essence of the subject (dharmin)." That is to say, existence-ness should be non-existent, because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses qualities and actions, like the universal-particular. This cites Diṅnāga's phrase "nonexistence of existence." How could the statement "non-existent" point to some separate object? It exclusively excludes existence, and hence is called "non-existent"; "eternal" and the like are also like this: they exclusively exclude impermanence and productness, and thus do not point to anything existent. The second says: This statement "nonexistence" is not a quotation of Diṅnāga's "nonexistence." In general, speaking of nonexistence has broadly two meanings: First, for the Vaiśeṣika, excluding the category of existence, the other five categories are all nonexistence; this is affirmative designation (vidhi). Second, "nonexistence" simply negates existence, and does not point to an object. If one wishes to show that the similar example establishes an existent thesis, it can be like affirming the five [categories]; if the dissimilar example precludes overextension, it can be like excluding existence. However, in the Great Vehicle of the Middle Way, the nature of all dharmas is free from conceptual cognition and verbal designation; both words and conceptual cognition fail to attain reality; they are exclusively negative exclusions (apoha) and do not affirmatively designate anything at all, operating solely upon the common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. The method of hetuvidyā is not identical to that; however, within the common characteristics, there can be the sense of affirmative designation. The similar example establishes the two dharmas of existence and nonexistence: when establishing existence by existence, affirmation may be accepted; when establishing nonexistence by nonexistence, it is just exclusion. The dissimilar example must be exclusionary, and therefore it is said that this exclusion does not affirmatively designate anything. That the dissimilar differs from the similar is justified as explained before.

2.30

In the Nyāyamukha, an objection was raised concerning these two examples: "Furthermore, for what reason does the first state that the hetu is followed by the thesis, while the second states that where the thesis is absent the hetu does not exist, rather than saying that where the hetu is absent the thesis does not exist?" The meaning of the objection here is: The preceding verse states: "Stating that the hetu is followed by the thesis, and that where the thesis is absent the hetu does not exist—these two are called examples." Why not analogize the dissimilar by the similar, putting the thesis first and the hetu second, saying that whatever is impermanent is produced, instead of saying that all that is produced is impermanent, stating that where the hetu is present the thesis follows? Why not analogize the similar by the dissimilar, putting the hetu first and the thesis second, saying that whatever is non-produced is seen to be eternal, instead of saying that if anything is eternal it is seen to be non-produced, stating that where the thesis is absent the hetu is likewise absent? That treatise answers: "Because stating it in this way can demonstrate that the hetu is definitely present in the similar class and completely absent in the dissimilar class, and it is not a reversed statement." That is the verse saying: "One would then prove its eternality by non-productness, / Or establish being produced by impermanence; / If so, it would establish what was not stated, / Because of non-pervasion and an undesired [thesis], etc., in the application and negative exclusion." The first three lines answer the pervasive hetu of "being produced"; the last line answers the narrow hetu of "arising from effort." Putting the thesis first and the hetu second in the first similar example, and putting the hetu first and the thesis second in the second dissimilar example—analogizing them reversely in either case is inadmissible. If one analogizes the negative exclusion to the application, putting the hetu first and the thesis second, and says that all that is non-produced is eternal, then one would be using the hetu of non-produced to self-prove eternality, rather than negatively excluding what was previously established by putting the thesis first and the hetu second. If one permits this, one would also be establishing an eternal thesis that was not originally stated. Moreover, that space is eternal is originally established by both the proponent and opponent; if one establishes it again now, it commits the fault of establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Since it was not originally in dispute, one would conversely establish eternality. Therefore it is said: "If so, it would establish what was not originally stated." If one analogizes the application to the negative exclusion, putting the thesis first and the hetu second, and says: "Whatever is impermanent is produced," then one would be establishing productness by impermanence, rather than establishing the thesis of impermanence by productness. If one permits this, then one would be establishing the thesis of impermanence which was not originally in dispute. Furthermore, the impermanence of sound is not accepted by both sides, whereas the productness of sound was originally accepted by both sides; if one uses the unshared impermanence to establish the shared productness, then the thesis would be already accepted, and the hetu would also be unestablished for one side (anyatarāsiddha). Thus it is said: "If so, one would establish what was not originally in dispute."

2.31

Question: "Both sound and a jar are impermanent, and whatever is produced is impermanent; the impermanence of sound and the jar are both established. Both sound and a jar are produced, and whatever is impermanent is produced; what prevents the productness of sound and the jar from both being established?" Answer: "The productness of that sound is not impermanence, while the jar is accepted to be produced and also impermanent. Since citing the productness of the jar shows it to be impermanent, by analogy the productness of sound is also impermanent. One does not intend to establish the impermanence of the jar's productness, so how could one separately establish productness by impermanence?"

2.32

The fourth line explains the hetu of arising from effort, which is likewise inadmissible. As for "non-pervasion": If one analogizes negative exclusion to application, stating first that whatever does not arise immediately from effort is definitely eternal, lightning does not arise from effort, yet is not eternal. The hetu of non-effort is broad, while the thesis of eternality is narrow; the narrow thesis does not pervade the broad hetu of eternality, so one would be establishing eternality by non-arising from effort. If so, it would establish what was not originally stated. If one analogizes application to negative exclusion, stating first that whatever is impermanent arises from effort, lightning and the like are impermanent but do not arise from effort. The hetu of impermanence is broad, while the thesis of arising from effort is narrow; when the thesis is narrow and the hetu is broad, this is also non-pervasion. If one also permits this, it would establish what was not originally in dispute. Since this hetu of arising from effort is identical to productness, it should say "also non-pervasive"; for brevity, the word "also" is omitted. As for "an undesired [thesis]": this non-pervasive hetu would separately establish an undesirable thesis. That is, if one analogizes negative exclusion to application, saying that all that do not arise from effort are eternal, space does not arise from effort and can be eternal, but how could lightning, which does not arise from effort, be eternal in all cases? Since this hetu exists in the dissimilar class, it becomes inconclusive (anaikāntika), thereby establishing the undesired thesis that lightning and the like are eternal. Furthermore, if one analogizes application to negative exclusion, saying that whatever is impermanent arises from effort, a jar and the like are impermanent and indeed arise from effort, but how could lightning and the like, which are impermanent, arise from effort? This hetu of arising from effort also exists in the dissimilar class, and likewise becomes inconclusive. Since one uses impermanence to establish that lightning and the like arise from effort, this is again not desired. Therefore, analogizing both application and negative exclusion to each other is entirely inadmissible; hence, application and negative exclusion, similarity and dissimilarity, should only be as I have stated.

2.33

He further asked: "Must one be equipped with the expressions of both examples to constitute a proof? Or, like the hetu, is it that whichever one is stated suffices?" This asks regarding the two examples: must one state both fully to constitute a proof and establish the thesis to be established? Or, like the two hetus of being produced and arising from effort, does stating whichever one of them suffice to constitute a proof and establish the thesis to be established? He answers himself: "According to correct logic, one should state both fully; because by being complete, they show that what is to be established is not separated from its hetu, and because by fully showing that it definitely exists in the similar class and is completely absent in the dissimilar class, they can properly counteract the contradictory (viruddha) and the inconclusive (anaikāntika)." Because both are fully shown, they can show that the thesis is inseparable from the hetu, and also show that the hetu definitely exists in the similar class and is completely absent in the dissimilar class. Since both examples are complete, they can properly eliminate the contradictory and the inconclusive. The contradictory and the inconclusive are the faults of the [second and third] characteristics: the contradictory hetu is absent from the similar and present in the dissimilar, while the inconclusive hetu is present in both or absent in both; therefore, stating both examples completely eliminates both faults.

2.34

He further stated: "If for someone one part is already established, stating whichever one part also constitutes a proof." This means that regarding the two examples, for someone who already understands similarity, one should only state dissimilarity; for someone who already understands dissimilarity, one should only state similarity. Even without stating both fully, it also constitutes a proof.

2.35

That treatise also says: 'If, as in the case of sound, both meanings are mutually accepted, neither need be stated; or, through implication, one can reveal both.' 'Sound' refers to the subject (dharmin), and the reason (hetu) of being produced exists based on this sound. If the opponent and the witness, upon hearing this thesis and reason, mutually accept both meanings upon sound, they will immediately understand the meaning of the two examples on the reason, and neither the affirmative nor the negative example need be stated. Alternatively, if the proponent has already stated one example, and by implication it reveals both so that the opponent and the witness give rise to understanding, one states only one. The meaning of the above is: not stating either, or stating either one, or stating both completely—all are acceptable according to the capacity of the audience at the time.

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因明入正理論疏 — Classical Chinese