因明入正理論疏 2.26

2.26

The Commentary says: Below, he explains and establishes the meaning, showing that even if the vipakṣa lacks an ontological reality, it still fulfills the three characteristics [of a correct hetu] and is subsumed under a correct hetu. According to the method of hetuvidyā, when nonexistence is made the thesis (pratijñā), there is no [existent] capable of proving it, and both existence and nonexistence serve as the dissimilar. This is just like what the treatise says: "Inherence (samavāya) is not real, because it is admitted to be subsumed under any one of the six categories, like the preceding five categories." In refuting the first five categories, their ontological entity is not really existent, and hence they can serve as an example (dṛṣṭānta). In this case, because one establishes nonexistence by means of nonexistence, one ought to take an existent phenomenon as the dissimilar class (vipakṣa); yet because it lacks real being, one conversely takes a nonexistent phenomenon as the dissimilar, saying: "Whatever is real is not subsumed under the six categories," for which there is no separate dissimilar entity. If nonexistence is the thesis, existence cannot establish it: the hetu would have nothing to reside upon, and the dṛṣṭānta would have nothing to establish; hence an existent can serve as the dissimilar, because it is dissimilar to nonexistence. If existence is the thesis, an existent is capable of establishing it, because it is in concordance with establishing existence, while a nonexistent is incapable of establishing it, so the hetu could not establish it and the dṛṣṭānta would have nothing to establish; thus both existence and nonexistence are dissimilar, since both serve to preclude overextension. Since the thesis of "impermanence" has real entity, [things having] existence such as the productness of a jar and so forth can establish it. Therefore, regarding the dissimilar class, whether the Sarvāstivāda posits an existing space as the dissimilar, or the Sautrāntika and others posit a non-existing space as the dissimilar, it only serves to preclude all overextensions regarding the thesis and hetu; it is not required that the dissimilar example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta) must have an ontological substratum. As for the similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) which proves, establishing existence requires an existent, and establishing nonexistence requires a nonexistent; both affirmative designation (vidhi) and negative exclusion (apoha) are admissible. The dissimilar example is not so: whether having entity or lacking entity, it is uniformly and exclusively exclusionary, because its nature is to preclude overextension. Therefore, the word "eternal" excludes the thesis of non-impermanence; the words "non-product" express the exclusion of the hetu of productness—it does not require that "eternal" and "non-product" separately designate two existent entities, the intention being to show that the dissimilar example applies even to what lacks entity. The Nyāyamukha says: "The former involves exclusion and affirmative designation; the latter solely precludes overextension, because the meaning is inferred through application (anvaya) and negative exclusion (vyatireka)." The former similar example is both exclusionary and affirmational, because it establishes nonexistence by nonexistence, and establishes existence by existence. The latter dissimilar example is uniformly for precluding overextension, being exclusionary and not affirmational, because the meaning is inferred by the application of the similar example, and the meaning is inferred by the negative exclusion of the dissimilar example. That [treatise] further concludes: "Therefore, even when directed against [one who] does not accept absolute space and the like as real entities, it can still demonstrate that where the thesis is absent, the absence of the hetu is established." The ancients said: "Sound is impermanent; the dissimilar example is like empty space." The Nyāyamukha objected: "It is not that in the dissimilar class, without showing the absence of the nature, it could serve as an example having qualification." That is to say, regarding the dissimilar class to impermanence, one ought to say: "Whatever is eternal is seen to be non-produced, like empty space and so forth." Precisely taking "eternal" as the dissimilar class and combining it with "non-produced," space serves as the substratum of the example. This qualification is required to reveal the absence of the dissimilar class, which inversely reveals that where there is the hetu of being produced, the thesis of impermanence necessarily follows. As for your merely saying "like space," he now inversely objects: "It is not the case that in the dissimilar class one does not show the absence of the thesis and the absence of the hetu." That is to say, having qualification, it is therefore able to serve as a dissimilar example. When read with an extended syntax, the path of its meaning is profound.