因明入正理論疏 3.26

3.26

Now referring to that treatise, it says, 'for instance, stating'. 'Existence' is the subject (dharmin), and 'is not a substance' is the predicate (dharma); combined, they are called the thesis (pratijñā). This word 'existence' (bhāva) is accepted by both the ṛṣi and Pañcaśikha as the capacity to not be non-existent upon substance, quality, and action; hence it serves as the subject. If he had said 'Great Existence', the subject would not be established, and the reason would commit the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha). This existence is not intrinsically substance, because the reason says: 'because it possesses one substance'. The six categories of the Vaiśeṣika are condensed into four classes: first, having no substance; second, having one substance; third, having two substances; fourth, having many substances. Earth, water, fire, wind, parent permanent subtle atoms, space, time, direction, self, and mind, together with quality, action, and inherence, are all called 'having no substance'. Although the four primary subtle atoms are multiple in nature, the five—space, time, and so forth—are each unique in substance, and none of them has a substance as its cause. Although quality, action, and inherence reside in substance and inhere in substance, they do not take substance as their cause; hence these classes are all called 'having no substance'. Great Existence and commonality-particularity are called 'having one substance', because both can have each individual substance. When the initial stage of cosmic formation is reached, two permanent subtle atoms combine to produce a third, a daughter atom; although it is impermanent in substance, because its dimension quality combines, it does not exceed the causal dimension; this is called 'having two substances'. Its own kind being manifold, each has that, because it is produced from two subtle atoms. From this point on, three initial atoms combine to produce a seventh daughter atom, and seven of these combine to produce a fifteenth daughter atom, and proceeding in this manner an entire great earth is produced; all of these are called 'having many substances', because they are produced from many substantial causes. Great Existence and commonality-particularity can have various substances, and thus may also be called 'having one substance', 'having two substances', or 'having many substances'. However, although these three kinds—substance and so forth—exist, their functions are distinct: they all have Great Existence causing their nature to not be non-existent, and they all have commonality-particularity causing the three classes to be distinct. When it is said 'possesses one substance' and 'possesses quality and action', this also refers to non-Great-Existence, not to Great Existence. If it were Great Existence, the reason would be unestablished for one party, commonality-particularity would not serve as an example, and the probans would be unestablished. Just as in the Buddha's teaching one says 'possessing form' (rūpin) or 'possessing defilements' (sāsrava): the 'possession' of defilements is the possessing dharma that possesses all the entities of defilement and outflows, just as Great Existence possesses substance and so forth. The expression 'possessing form' is like 'possessing one substance' and 'possessing quality and so forth'; there is no separate possessing entity that possesses form. Upon the substance of this form there is its meaning of form, just as space has sound; it is not that outside space there is a separate possessing entity, but it is merely an expression of pertenence to the entity of the phenomenon. Therefore, there is no fault of being unestablished for one party in the reason. Because it possesses each individual substance, there is no need to question further whether 'possessing one substance' is identical with substance or separate from substance. Furthermore, this reason should not be qualified; if it were qualified, there would be no homologous example.