因明入正理論疏 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.1

Composed by Śramaṇa Ji of the Great Cien Monastery.

Śāstra: Contradictory (viruddha) is of four kinds: namely, the hetu contradictory to the dharma-svarūpa, the hetu contradictory to the dharma-viśeṣa, the hetu contradictory to the dharmi-svarūpa, and the hetu contradictory to the dharmi-viśeṣa, and so forth.

3.3

Commentary: Below is the third part, explaining viruddha, which has three parts: first, marking out; next, enumerating; finally, explaining. These are the first two.

3.4

As for the meaning of viruddha-hetu: it means that two pratijñās are mutually opposed. These four faults, without changing the other's hetu, can cause the proponent's pratijñā to become contradicted; because it acts as the hetu for the contradictory dharma, it is named viruddha-hetu. The hetu receives the name of its result, hence it is called 'contradictory'; it is not that the hetu contradicts the pratijñā and is therefore called contradictory, so there is no objection by parity that the pratijñā also contradicts the hetu. The Nyāyamukha states: 'If a dharma is capable of establishing the contradictory sādhya, it is the viruddha fault and is named a fallacious hetu (hetv-ābhāsa), just like an uncontradicted dharma. A contradictory one is likewise, because where the dharma to be established is absent, it is definitely absent.' On account of what it states, the hetu remains fixed as before, while the dṛṣṭānta may be changed and relied upon; therefore, of the four faults below, the first one changes the dṛṣṭānta, while the latter three remain as before.

3.5

Question: 'If the hetu opposes the pratijñā and does not conform to the meaning of the hetu, the hetu is called viruddha; then if the pratijñā also opposes the hetu and does not conform to the meaning of the pratijñā, it should also be called viruddha.' Answer: 'Because the hetu establishes the pratijñā and causes the pratijñā to be opposed, the hetu is called viruddha; it is not that the pratijñā establishes the hetu and causes the hetu to be opposed, so it is not called viruddha. Furthermore, the hetu is called viruddha to the dharma-svarūpa, whereas the pratijñā is called anumāna-bādhita. The hetu's distinctions are branched out, and viruddha is expanded into four; the contradiction of the pratijñā is spoken of collectively, being called only anumāna-bādhita. By taking the pratijñā by analogy with the hetu, we know that there are also dharma-viśeṣa-, dharmi-svarūpa-, and dharmi-viśeṣa-anumāna-bādhita. Otherwise, why would one only speak of dharmi-svarūpa-anumāna-bādhita, while viruddha-avyabhicārin and viruddha-hetu each have four kinds?'

3.6

The Dharma stated in this thesis (pratijñā) is briefly of two kinds: first, own-nature (svabhāva); second, particular property (viśeṣa). This has three levels: First, limited versus pervasive. As stated in texts such as the Abhidharma, the "own-nature to be established" refers to the own-nature of self and the own-nature of dharmas, whether existent or nonexistent, because they are what is to be established, owing to their respective individual natures. The "particular property" refers to the particular properties of self and particular properties of dharmas: whether all-pervasive or not all-pervasive, whether permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya), whether having form (rūpa) or lacking form, and so on—boundless particular properties like these. According to their respective applications, space (ākāśa) and the like are all-pervasively existent, whereas form and the like are not pervasive. The former is limited and the latter is pervasive; hence the two are differentiated. Second, prior versus subsequent. Within a composite aggregate, that which is stated first is called "own-nature", and that which is stated later is called "particular property", because what is stated later qualifies that which came before. The Buddhabhūmi[-sūtra]-śāstra states: "The individual characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) and common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) in that hetuvidyā treatise differ from those here. That [treatise] says that the respective distinct properties of phenomena, being limited to and adhering to their own-nature, are called svalakṣaṇa; while that which runs through other [phenomena], like a thread stringing flowers, is called sāmānyalakṣaṇa." Therefore, relying on this, the limited substance of sound and the like is called own-nature, and impermanence, which runs through others, is called particular property, although their designations are not fixed. If one establishes that "the five aggregates (skandha) are all non-self," the five aggregates are called svalakṣaṇa, while self, non-self, and so forth are called particular properties. If one says that "the self is cogitation (cetanā)," cogitation is the particular property, and the self is the own-nature. Therefore it is not fixed. Deducting this logically, although this is identical with the former, yet the teaching is slightly different and the meaning also distinct; hence it is divided into two approaches. Third, stated versus intended. In what is stated in words, both the preceding limited [subject] and the subsequent pervasive [predicate] are called own-nature; thus both the property (dharma) and the subject (dharmin) have own-nature. The distinct meaning intended by one's own mind, which can be established, is called particular property; thus both dharma and dharmin have particular properties, though it does not take all [meanings], the sense being as explained above. Now it is said that there are reasons (hetu) which cause these four kinds of thesis-propositions to turn out contradictory; hence they are named "the reason contradictory to the own-nature of the property (dharma-svabhāva-viparīta-sādhana)", and so forth.

3.7

When the treatise says "and so forth", the meaning is to indicate other reasons. The contradictory theses do not exceed these four; hence the treatise states only four contradictions. The contradicting reasons comprise fifteen varieties: those contradicting one are four, namely contradicting each individually; those contradicting two are six, namely contradicting the first and second, the first and third, the first and fourth, the second and third, the second and fourth, and the third and fourth; those contradicting three are four, namely each excluding one; that which contradicts four is one. Thus they make fifteen. The treatise only shows the first and second as two reasons each contradicting one [thesis], and the latter two as two reasons each contradicting two, adducing these three kinds [of examples] to stand for the remaining twelve; therefore it says "and so forth".

3.8

Treatise: Among these, the reason contradictory to the own-nature of the property is: for example, stating that "Sound is permanent (nitya), because of being produced (kṛtakatva)," or "because of arising immediately after an effort (prayatnānantarīyaka)."

3.9

Commentary: Below, the four are explained separately. The first text has three parts: first, identifying and citing the name; next, displaying the thesis and reason; and finally, establishing the sense of contradiction. This is the first two.

3.10

Question: "There are four contradictions; why state first the reason [contradicting] the own-nature of the property?" Answer: "Because it is what is directly in dispute. In the inference-contradiction (anumāna-bādha) and the inconclusive through contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārin) above, both state only that own-nature of the property; hence it is stated first following them. Here there are two masters: as when the Śabdakāryavāda establishes the thesis that sound is permanent with the reason 'because of being produced', and the Śabdābhivyaktivāda establishes it with the reason 'because of arising immediately after an effort'."

3.11

Treatise: This reason is present only in the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa); therefore it is contradictory (viruddha).

3.12

Commentary: This establishes the meaning of contradiction. In the first thesis of permanence, space and the like are the similar instances (sapakṣa), and pots and the like are the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). The reason 'because of being produced' is universally absent from the similar instances and universally present in the dissimilar instances, which is the fourth clause among the nine clauses of the reason. The counter-inference should be made: 'Sound is impermanent, because of being produced, like a pot, etc.' In the second thesis, space is the similar instance, while lightning, pots, and the like are the dissimilar instances. The reason 'because of arising from effort' is universally absent from the similar instances, and in the dissimilar instances is absent from lightning and present on pots and the like, which is the sixth clause among the nine clauses of the reason. These two reasons turn out to establish impermanence, contradicting the own-nature of the property stated in the thesis; hence they are named contradictory reasons (viruddha-hetu). Therefore the Nyāyamukha states: 'Being present in the similar [instances] and in both, and absent in the dissimilar, is the reason; the reverse of this is called contradictory, and all the rest are inconclusive (anaikāntika).' This reason 'because of being produced' reverses the second valid reason among the nine clauses: that one is present in similar instances and absent in dissimilar instances, whereas this one is absent in similar instances and present in dissimilar instances. This reason 'because of arising from effort' reverses the eighth valid reason among the nine clauses: that one is present and absent in similar instances, and absent in dissimilar instances, whereas this one is absent in similar instances, and present and absent in dissimilar instances. Having already been discussed several times above, it is briefly passed over without verbosity.

3.13

In this single fallacious reason, the reason still uses the old one, but the example is altered from what was previously established; in the latter three reasons, both reason and example are the old ones. Because these four are reasons, the reason must remain the old one, whereas the example may be altered to a similar one at will. Were it not so, there would certainly be no case where the own-nature of the property could combine with any one of the rest to form a reason contradicting two, since it is accepted that the first alters the example, while the latter three do not alter it. Furthermore, the fourth and sixth among the nine reasons are named contradictory reasons, requiring non-existence in similar instances and presence in or both [presence and absence in] dissimilar instances. If according to what is established, in the latter three contradictions, looking directly at the proponent's reason, it exists in the similar instances; how then could it again be objected to as being contradictory? The Nyāyamukha merely says: 'If a factor can establish the opposite of what is to be established, it is a contradictory fault, namely called a fallacious reason.' It does not say that the similar example also still uses the old one. The presentation of the method in this treatise—the first one altering the example and the latter three keeping the old one—is intended to let learners know that the reason is decisive and not that the example had the previous fault. Although the latter three reasons are established when viewed from the proponent's standpoint, they turn out to be contradictory: when investigated one by one, all are likewise only absent from similar instances and present in dissimilar instances, thereby becoming contradictory, as will be understood below.

3.14

Question: "As the Grammarian (Śabdika) says: 'Your sound's impermanence should not be sound's impermanence, because of being produced, like a pot, a basin, etc.' Is not this second valid reason contradictory to the own-nature of the subject (dharmin-svabhāva-viparīta-sādhana)?" Answer: "That is not included as a fault. As when establishing that sound is impermanent, impermanence is the own-nature of the property; if the established reason turns out to establish that sound is permanent, it can be this fault. Now, citing both subject and property as property and subject, it is therefore not this fault; this is merely the category of futile objections through differentiation (jāti). The reason commits the fallacy of being unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha), because the reason 'being produced' is not accepted by either proponent or opponent to reside in impermanence, due to the difference between arising and ceasing. Even if they accepted it to reside therein, it would also commit the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (anyatara-asiddha). Furthermore, impermanence has no 'being produced' as something residing upon it; hence it also commits the fault of having an unestablished substratum (āśraya-asiddha). If someone were to object: 'Your sound's impermanence should not be sound's impermanence, because impermanence is accepted, like the impermanence of a pot.' This is also not a fault, because fallacious proofs do not possess this mark of fault. That sound has impermanence is the fundamental dispute; sound is the subject, not the intended meaning upon the property, so it cannot be called the fault of the particular property of the property. Nor is it included under the inconclusive through contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārin), because it is not the fundamental dispute. If it were admitted that all the above statements were faults, then in all inferences there would be no valid reason; therefore, no fault is seen in the fallacious thesis, but all are fallacious refutations (dūṣaṇābhāsa), as will be understood below."

3.15

Treatise: The reason contradictory to the particular property of the property is: for example, stating that "The eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another, because of being composite, like bedding, seats, etc."

3.16

Commentary: Following the preceding, this also has three parts; this is the first two. Whenever two particular properties are termed contradictory, it is not that all meanings apart from what is stated in words upon the property and the subject are particular properties. It must be that which is respectively to be established by the reason according to the two schools, what is intended in thought, the distinct meaning in dispute—only then is it called a particular property; and when the reason causes it to be contradicted, it is called a contradictory reason. Were it not so, then as in establishing the thesis that 'sound is impermanent', meanings such as audible or inaudible upon sound, or being a condition for that or not being a condition for that upon impermanence—if all such were deemed contradictory, and the reason causing contradiction were named that reason, then there would be no meaning to a contradictory reason. Inference-contradiction and the like are all explained following this. The intended meaning here is: if the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhist intends, against a Buddhist disciple, to establish that the self is the experiencer (bhoktṛ) who enjoys the eyes and so forth—if the self were made the subject that enjoys the eyes and so forth, there would be the fallacy of the qualificand being unestablished in the thesis (viśeṣyāsiddha), the reason 'being composite' would be unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha), and like the bedding example, what is to be established would be unestablished (sādhyavikala). If he says that 'the eyes and so forth are necessarily for my use,' the qualifier would be unestablished (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), lacking a similar example. The reason 'being composite' would contradict the own-nature of the property, and the bedding example would have the fault of what is to be established being unestablished. If he establishes that 'the eyes and so forth are for the use of a conventional other,' that would be establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Therefore, through this expedient, he deceitfully establishes the thesis: 'The eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another.' The eyes and so forth are the subject (dharmin), explicitly stated by pointing to the facts. 'For the use of another' is the property (dharma), shown through expedient means, intending to establish what is the particular property of the property: enjoyment by a real self that is an incomposite other. If he were to establish explicitly that 'it is for the use of an incomposite other,' the qualifier would be unestablished, what is to be established would also be unestablished, and there would also be a lack of similar examples. Because the reason would contradict the own-nature of the property, he must establish it through expedient means: using the reason 'because of being composite', since the accumulation of many subtle atoms constitutes the eyes and so forth; like the example of bedding, where beds, seats, and the like are composite, and both parties accept that they are used by another; hence it can serve as a similar example. The properties of reason and example should not be differentiated, so they are established in general terms.

3.17

Treatise: Just as this reason can establish that the eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another, so too it can establish what is contradictory to the particular property of the property to be established: namely, use by a composite other.

3.18

Commentary: This establishes the meaning of contradiction and has two parts: first, adducing the reason contradictory to the particular property of the property; next, explaining the ground. This is the first.

3.19

The first text has two parts: 'Just as this reason can establish that the eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another'—this cites the former reason's capacity to establish the own-nature of the property to be established. 'So too it can...' onward further shows that this reason can also serve as a contradictory reason against that particular property of the property. For the Sāṃkhya master, the five things such as the eyes are the five sense faculties (buddhīndriya). Bedding and seats are things compounded from the five subtle elements (tanmātra). The 'incomposite other' refers to the real spiritual self (puruṣa), whose substance is permanent and inherently existent. The 'composite other' is the conventional self established based on the eyes and so forth, which is impermanent and undergoes transformation. However, for the faculties such as the eyes, the incomposite other—the real self—has superior utility, directly using them to experience the five subtle elements. Because the conventional self is only established based on the eyes and so forth, the composite self's use of the eyes and so forth is inferior. As for bedding and the like, the spiritual self must necessarily deliberate and experience them, so they are sequentially produced starting from the Great (mahat). If judged by what is deliberated upon, the real self's use is superior, and the conventional self's use is inferior. But because the conventional self requires a resting place and only then receives the bed and seat, for bedding the conventional other's use is superior, and the real self's use is inferior. Now, Diṅnāga uses that very reason to contradict the superior versus inferior particular properties of the property to be established, not the own-nature of the property, nor all particular properties upon the property; therefore the treatise merely says that it is contradictory to the particular property of the property to be established.

3.20

First, citing the preceding reason as establishing the property's own nature to be proved, he says: Just as the previously stated reason, 'because of being composite,' can establish the thesis that the subject, the eyes and so forth, as posited by the Sāṃkhya, are definitely for the use of another—and 'the property's own nature' refers precisely to this reason—it can also establish the thesis of 'being for the use of a composite other,' which is the contradictory of the intended specific property on the property's own nature to be proved in the thesis. Because 'being for the use of another' is the property's own nature, and what is intended upon this own nature is 'being for the use of a composite other.' 'Being for the use of a non-composite other' is the specific property. That reason of 'being composite' is now left unchanged, and precisely by means of it one conversely establishes the intended specific property of the property: 'being for the use of a composite other.' Since beddings and the like are composite, they are primarily used by a composite nominal self; and since the eyes and so forth are also composite, like beddings, they should also be primarily used by a composite nominal self. If one does not formulate this objection in terms of primary use, then the thesis will suffer from proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), because the other school also accepts that the eyes and so forth are used by a composite nominal other. One may only object that 'the use by a nominal other is primary'; one must not object that 'the use by the real self is secondary,' for that would contradict one's own school, and in a shared inference (ubhayānumāna) there would be no homologous example. If it were an inference for the other (parānumāna), there would be no restriction whatsoever. Some unskillful masters in the Western Regions directly stated the fault of contradicting the specific property in this way: 'The eyes and so forth must be for the use of a composite other; reason and example are as before.' The Sāṃkhya objected: 'Your thesis proves what is already accepted! Who says the composite other does not use the eyes and so forth?' The Western masters also explained: 'According to the Sāṃkhya, the eyes and so forth are used exclusively by a non-composite other, whereas seats and beds serve the use of both others; therefore, by drawing an analogy with beddings, we compel the eyes and so forth to be also used by a composite other, so there is no fault of proving what is already accepted.' The Sāṃkhya objected: 'Diṅnāga's disciples do not understand our school! The spiritual self enjoys the twenty-three principles produced from the three qualities (guṇas); how could it have no capacity to enjoy the eyes and so forth?' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also states: 'They grasp the self as consciousness, which enjoys the twenty-three phenomena, mahat and the rest, produced from sattva, rajas, and tamas.' For this reason, the real self also uses the eyes and so forth. Therefore, one should only distinguish it as explained before, and one should not conceive the different notion: that the eyes and so forth are exclusively for the enjoyment of the real other and beddings for the nominal [other], or that the eyes and so forth serve both while beddings serve exclusively the nominal [other]. The Paramārthasaptatikā, in response to the Sāṃkhyasaptati, also questioned them thus: '"Must be for the use of another"—what is this other? If you mean a composite other, you commit the fault of proving what is already accepted. If you mean a non-composite other, the qualifier is not established (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), it lacks a homologous example, and with beddings as the example the probandum is unestablished.' This is precisely the fault regarding the specific property of the predicate here.

3.21

Question: 'Regarding the three characteristics of the reason, what fault is it?' Answer: 'His intention in putting forward the reason is to establish that the use by a non-composite other is primary. The primary use by a composite other is the heterologue (vipakṣa); the thesis has no homologous example (sapakṣa). In the Buddha's teaching there is no non-composite other whatsoever; therefore, the reason "being composite" is present in the heterologue. This shows that it still belongs to the case among the nine types of reason where it is present in the heterologue and absent from the homologue; hence it becomes contradictory, lacking the second characteristic, definitive presence in the homologue, and also lacking the third characteristic, pervasive absence from the heterologue.'

3.22

[Nyāyapraveśa:] Because beds, seats, and the like are enjoyed by a composite other.

3.23

Commentary: This explains the reason. Formulating the inference, one says: The eyes and so forth must primarily be for the use of a composite other; because of being composite; like beddings and the like. Whatever is not primarily for the use of a composite other is definitely not composite; like a tortoise's hair and so forth. Therefore, he now objects: Because beddings and the like are accepted by both schools as being primarily enjoyed by a composite other. Although the treatise does not contain the word "primarily", the intent of the inference's meaning is definitely so; one need not seek otherwise, and it should be understood in this way.

3.24

[Nyāyapraveśa:] As for the reason that contradicts the subject's own nature (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana): for instance, stating, 'Existence (bhāva) is neither substance (dravya), nor quality (guṇa), nor action (karma); because it possesses one substance; because it possesses quality and action; like commonality-particularity (sāmānyaviśeṣa).'

3.25

Commentary: Following the previous pattern, this is divided into three parts; this comprises the first two, stating the name and adducing the thesis and reason. The background of Ulūka has already been told before. At that time, that ṛṣi, having realized the dharma of the six categories (padārthas) that he had attained, thought he had realized bodhi and gladly wished to enter extinction; but he lamented that there was no successor to transmit what he had realized. For a transmitter must possess seven virtues: 1. born in the Middle Country; 2. of high caste; 3. possessing the cause of quiescence; 4. possessing complete physical marks; 5. intelligent, discerning, and quick-witted; 6. gentle in disposition and conduct; 7. endowed with great compassion. For immeasurable time he watched for one, but none possessed them. Later, after many kalpas, in the country of Vārāṇasī there was a brahmin named Māṇavaka, translated here as "Confucian youth" [young brahmin]. Māṇavaka had a son named Pañcaśikha, translated here as "Five Crests", who had five whorls of hair on his crest and five horns on his head. Though he possessed the seven virtues, the maturation of his faculties was somewhat slow; being attached to wife and children, he was hard to convert quickly. For immeasurable years the ṛṣi waited for his faculties to mature. After three thousand years, when Pañcaśikha was roaming playfully in a park competing with his wife for flowers and came to resent her on that account, Ulūka tried to use supernormal powers to guide and convert Pañcaśikha, but he would not comply. After another three thousand years, conversion was still impossible. After yet another three thousand years, the two competed even more fiercely; having grown utterly sick of her, he looked up and longed for the sky-faring ṛṣi. The ṛṣi immediately used supernormal power to transform and guide him, soaring through the sky to welcome him to the mountain where he dwelt. Slowly he explained the dharma of the six categories he had previously realized. When he spoke of substance, quality, and action, Pañcaśikha believed all of them; but when it came to the category of Great Existence (mahā-bhāva), he became doubtful. The ṛṣi said: 'Existence is that which can have substance and the rest; it exists separately outside the three—substance, quality, and action—and its substance is permanent and one.' The disciple did not comply, saying: 'The fact that substance, quality, and action are not non-existent is precisely their "capacity to have"; how could there be a "capacity to have" that exists separately outside the three?' The ṛṣi then explained the category of commonality-particularity, which can homogenize and differentiate those three—substance, quality, and action. Upon these three there is in each case a universal commonality-particularity, and according to the case, each has specific commonality-particularities. Thus, within the three, corresponding to their distinct classes, there are further universal and specific commonality-particularities, whose substances are permanent and manifold. Furthermore, there is a permanent category of inherence (samavāya), which inheres substance, quality, and action so that they are not separated and mutually pertain to one another. Although Pañcaśikha believed in commonality-particularity and inherence, he still did not believe that there was a separate Great Existence. Ulūka then formulated the inferences presented in the treatise. These inferences are three, because substance, quality, and action are each treated separately.

3.26

Now referring to that treatise, it says, 'for instance, stating'. 'Existence' is the subject (dharmin), and 'is not a substance' is the predicate (dharma); combined, they are called the thesis (pratijñā). This word 'existence' (bhāva) is accepted by both the ṛṣi and Pañcaśikha as the capacity to not be non-existent upon substance, quality, and action; hence it serves as the subject. If he had said 'Great Existence', the subject would not be established, and the reason would commit the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha). This existence is not intrinsically substance, because the reason says: 'because it possesses one substance'. The six categories of the Vaiśeṣika are condensed into four classes: first, having no substance; second, having one substance; third, having two substances; fourth, having many substances. Earth, water, fire, wind, parent permanent subtle atoms, space, time, direction, self, and mind, together with quality, action, and inherence, are all called 'having no substance'. Although the four primary subtle atoms are multiple in nature, the five—space, time, and so forth—are each unique in substance, and none of them has a substance as its cause. Although quality, action, and inherence reside in substance and inhere in substance, they do not take substance as their cause; hence these classes are all called 'having no substance'. Great Existence and commonality-particularity are called 'having one substance', because both can have each individual substance. When the initial stage of cosmic formation is reached, two permanent subtle atoms combine to produce a third, a daughter atom; although it is impermanent in substance, because its dimension quality combines, it does not exceed the causal dimension; this is called 'having two substances'. Its own kind being manifold, each has that, because it is produced from two subtle atoms. From this point on, three initial atoms combine to produce a seventh daughter atom, and seven of these combine to produce a fifteenth daughter atom, and proceeding in this manner an entire great earth is produced; all of these are called 'having many substances', because they are produced from many substantial causes. Great Existence and commonality-particularity can have various substances, and thus may also be called 'having one substance', 'having two substances', or 'having many substances'. However, although these three kinds—substance and so forth—exist, their functions are distinct: they all have Great Existence causing their nature to not be non-existent, and they all have commonality-particularity causing the three classes to be distinct. When it is said 'possesses one substance' and 'possesses quality and action', this also refers to non-Great-Existence, not to Great Existence. If it were Great Existence, the reason would be unestablished for one party, commonality-particularity would not serve as an example, and the probans would be unestablished. Just as in the Buddha's teaching one says 'possessing form' (rūpin) or 'possessing defilements' (sāsrava): the 'possession' of defilements is the possessing dharma that possesses all the entities of defilement and outflows, just as Great Existence possesses substance and so forth. The expression 'possessing form' is like 'possessing one substance' and 'possessing quality and so forth'; there is no separate possessing entity that possesses form. Upon the substance of this form there is its meaning of form, just as space has sound; it is not that outside space there is a separate possessing entity, but it is merely an expression of pertenence to the entity of the phenomenon. Therefore, there is no fault of being unestablished for one party in the reason. Because it possesses each individual substance, there is no need to question further whether 'possessing one substance' is identical with substance or separate from substance. Furthermore, this reason should not be qualified; if it were qualified, there would be no homologous example.

3.27

Question: 'Why does he not say "possessing no substance, two substances, or many substances"?' Answer: 'If he said "possessing two substances or many substances", how could he take "not substance" as the thesis? The reason would then incur the fault of being inconclusive (anaikāntika): Is it that, just as commonality-particularity possesses two or many substances, therefore that existence is not a substance; or is it that, just as daughter atoms and so forth possess two or many substances, therefore that existence is a substance? For this reason, he does not say "two substances or many substances". If he said "possessing no substance", the category of inherence is also called "having no substance". If it possessed that absence of substance, it would commit the fault of being unestablished for both parties (ubhayāsiddha), because upon the possessing entity of substance and so forth there is no possessing of "having no substance". Its example would also commit the fault of the probans being unestablished (sādhanāsiddha), and the reason would also not be pervasive, appearing at first glance as if it could only possess the "having no substance" of the category of substance. He also wishes to show that each of the nine substances is possessed individually; therefore he says "one substance", because it can possess each individual substance.'

3.28

Question: 'The subject "existence" and the reason "possessing one substance" are unrelated; why is this not unestablished for both parties (ubhayāsiddha)?' Answer: 'The subject "existence" is the possessing nature of substance, quality, and action; and the reason "possessing one substance" means being able to possess each individual substance; therefore, it is a property of the subject (pakṣadharmatā), so there is no fault of being unestablished for both. This category "not substance" having formed one thesis, in the latter two theses, "not quality" and "not action", the predicate and the subject are as before. The reasons for these two say: "because it possesses quality and action", meaning being able to possess that quality and that action, just as saying "possessing form" also has the meaning of pertenence.'

3.29

Question: 'Since it possesses each quality and action individually, why does he not say "possessing one quality and action"?' Answer: 'Substance has many classes; if he did not say "one" and merely said "possessing substance", he would commit the fault of being inconclusive, for daughter atoms and so forth all possess substance. Quality and action require no qualification, so the word "one" is not needed.'

3.30

The two reasons share one example: 'like commonality-particularity'. Since this exists in each of the three preceding categories individually, just as existence does, it is used as the example. Once the ṛṣi had presented the three inferences, Pañcaśikha came to believe. The dharma now having a successor to transmit it, the ṛṣi entered extinction, and the tenets of the Vaiśeṣika school were thereby spread completely. Bodhisattva Diṅnāga served as the standard for hetuvidyā and the balance for establishing and refuting; he recapitulated their school's tenets and set forth the faulty objections again; therefore, he first relates their inferences now.

3.31

[Nyāyapraveśa:] Just as this reason can establish the negation of substance and the like, so it can also establish the negation of existence, because both are equally conclusive.

3.32

The Commentary says: This establishment of a contradictory meaning has two [parts]: the first two lines recap [the opponent's argument]. That [opponent] previously established a reason to negate that existence is substance, saying that it possesses one substance and possesses quality and action as its reason, which as said before can establish existence-ness and negate that it is substance or the like—'or the like' includes qualities and actions. The subsequent three lines show that this reason is also capable of making the own-character of that subject contradictory. That is, pointing to the previous [reason], such a reason as this can also establish the negation of that existence-ness such that it is not existence-ness. That is to say, the previous thesis stated, 'Existence-ness is not a substance'; existence-ness is the own-character of the preceding subject. Now, an inference is advanced, saying: 'The so-called existence-ness ought not to be existence-ness; because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses quality and action; like commonality-particularity.' Commonality-particularity can exist in one substance and so forth, yet commonality-particularity is not existence-ness. Existence-ness can exist in one substance and so forth, so existence-ness is not existence-ness. Explaining the reason, it says: since this reason can negate that existence-ness is substance and so forth, it can also negate that existence-ness is the Great Existence; because both are equally determined.

3.33

Question: 'Now, objecting that existence-ness ought not to be existence-ness, how does this not commit the fallacy of contradiction with one's own words?' Answer: 'If the opponent had not previously established that existence-ness is not substance, and one now objected that that which can possess substance and so forth is non-existent, these words would indeed commit the fallacy of contradiction with one's own words, and would also contradict one's own teaching. But since that opponent previously established an existence that is non-substance, now one simply objects against that, refuting the other and contradicting the other; it does not commit those fallacies.'

3.34

Question: 'Among the three characteristics of the reason, what fault is it?' Answer: 'The opponent advances the thesis, saying, "Existence-ness is not substance"; the word "existence-ness" is the own-character of the subject. They state that apart from substance there is an entity, the Great Existence, which can possess substance. Although commonality-particularity has an entity apart from substance and so forth and can possess [them], it is not the Great Existence; so although it shares the property of the reason, it is precisely a dissimilar instance (vipakṣa) of the thesis to be established. For the Great Existence separate from substance, although there is no similar instance (sapakṣa), the reason "possessing one substance" is absent from the similar instance, while pervading and being present in its dissimilar instance, commonality-particularity. This is also a fault regarding the latter two characteristics of the reason: because it is absent from the similar instance and present in the dissimilar instance.'

3.35

Question: 'If so, when advancing the thesis that sound is impermanent, the entity of sound is audible while a pot is seen when fired; the pot and sound should become dissimilar instances. If one permits them to be dissimilar, not only does it contradict the treatises, but all theses would lack similar instances.' Answer: 'Has it not already been stated that the entity of sound is not the point in dispute? Impermanence upon sound is what is to be established; since a pot likewise possesses it, it is a similar instance. That opponent asserts that an existence-ness having an entity apart from substance is the subject of the thesis, which is established by the reason "possessing one substance"; since commonality-particularity is not an existence-ness having an entity apart from substance, it constitutes a dissimilar instance.'

3.36

Question: 'The earlier treatise says: "Instances possessing meanings equal to the property to be established are called similar instances." It only says that possessing equality with the property to be established is called similar; it does not say that being equal with the subject is called a similar instance. How can you say there is contradiction with the own-character of the subject?' Answer: 'If one now only took existence-ness and commonality-particularity to be similar instances, it might be as you charge, contradicting the earlier treatise text. But since we take existence-ness apart from substance to be the similar instance, it is also an equal possession of the property to be established in the thesis; therefore this is precisely the fault, with no contradiction of treatise reasoning.'

3.37

Question: 'Since existence-ness is the own-character of the subject, and existence-ness apart from substance is its qualification, the reason "possessing one substance" is then a reason for the qualification of the subject. How can it now be called a fault against the own-character?' Answer: 'That school intends existence-ness apart from substance, which is truly a qualification; but since the explicitly uttered existence-ness is the own-character, now negating this explicit utterance is precisely contradicting the own-character. Therefore it is a fault against the own-character, not a reason regarding a qualification. Were it not so, universally established subjects would all lack this fault, because of contradicting one's own school.'

3.38

Question: 'If one objects to the Great Existence-ness apart from substance, the subject and its substratum commit the fallacy of being unestablished for oneself (svayam-asiddha), and also commit the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha) by contradicting one's school. If one objects to the Great Existence that is not separate from substance and so forth as not being existence-ness, it both commits the fault of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana) and contradicts one's own teaching; for how could that not exist?' Answer: 'The opponent previously stated it generally, and now we also object generally. Since they established an existence separate from substance, we now object to existence to make it not be this existence. The words are the same while the meanings differ, so there are none of these faults.'

3.39

Treatise: A reason contradictory to the qualification of the subject (dharmi-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana) is, for instance, this very reason [employed] in regard to the qualification of the subject of the previous thesis: "acting as the object of cognitive apprehension (kāryatva / upalabdhi-hetutva)."

3.40

The Commentary says: The text below also has three [parts]; this is the first two, indicating the name and presenting the thesis and reason. The meaning of this statement is: that Vaiśeṣika posits that the category of the Great Existence possesses substance, quality, and action; when the three—substance, quality, and action—combine, they jointly give rise to the expressing word that designates the three as existent, and jointly give rise to the cognitive apprehension that cognizes the three as existent. Substance, quality, and action act as causes capable of producing [them]; the cause of the designation and cognition of existence is precisely the Great Existence, because the Great Existence can possess substance, quality, and action. The Daśapadārthī states: "What is the category of commonality? It refers to existence-ness. What is existence-ness? It refers to that which inheres in all categories of substance, quality, and action, is apprehended by all sense faculties, and is the cause of the designation and cognition of existence in regard to substance, quality, and action; this is called existence-ness." Cognition refers to cognitive apprehension. It further states below: "Such existence-ness is definitely not produced, is eternal, lacks qualities, lacks action, and likewise lacks subtle parts. Possessing substance, quality, and action, excluding inherence in commonality, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonality-particularity, and particularity, it is single existence, the cause of common designation and cognition." Because Pañcaśikha did not believe that there is an existence separate from substance, quality, and action, that sage Ulūka used the previous reason to establish the previous thesis: the explicitly uttered existence-ness is the own-character of the subject, and the intended qualification is "acting as the object of cognitive apprehension." Existence-ness and commonality-particularity are identical in acting as objects of cognitive apprehension, but their expressing words are distinct, so he did not adopt them. The mind and mental factors are that which cognizes; "having an object of cognition" refers to the cognitive object, because there is that which cognizes. That is, the entity of the cognitive object serves as the cause, capable of producing the property of having an object of cognition. If it had no entity, how could the mind arise? Because without a cause, there is no arising when cognizing non-existence. Like commonality-particularity, because it possesses one substance, it acts as an object of cognitive apprehension, while its entity is not substance and so forth. Existence-ness possesses one substance and also acts as an object of cognitive apprehension; therefore we know its entity is also not substance, quality, or action. The "existence" spoken of here is the existence of existence-and-non-existence; it does not act as the cause of an objective domain having cognitive apprehension, so it is not the Great Existence. If it acted as the object of cognitive apprehension of the Great Existence, the predicate would be unestablished, lacking a similar example. Taking commonality-particularity as an example, the probandum would be unestablished. Existence-ness is the explicitly uttered own-character of the subject; "acting as the object of cognitive apprehension" or "not acting as the object of cognitive apprehension" is an intended qualification upon the own-character. Therefore, the previous reason is also a reason [contradictory to] the qualification of the subject, because it originally established it.

3.41

Treatise: It is also capable of establishing the contradictory of this, [namely] "acting as not the object of cognitive apprehension"; because, just as with negating substance and so forth, both are equally determined.

3.42

The Commentary says: This establishment of a contradictory meaning has two [parts]: the first three lines show that this reason is also capable of creating a contradiction against the qualification of that subject; the latter two lines explain the reason. "Acting as not the object of cognitive apprehension" means acting as not the object of cognitive apprehension of their intended category of the Great Existence. That is to say, this very reason can also establish the contradictory to the qualification intended by what they established—"acting as an object of cognitive apprehension"—by acting as not the object of cognitive apprehension of the Great Existence. Commonality-particularity possesses one substance, yet acts as not the object of cognitive apprehension of the Great Existence; existence-ness possesses one substance, so it ought to act as not the object of cognitive apprehension of the Great Existence. It does not negate acting as an object of cognitive apprehension in general, but only negates acting as the object of cognitive apprehension of the Great Existence. Therefore it contradicts the intended qualification. Otherwise, it would contradict the thesis that existence-ness can act as an object of cognitive apprehension. Although the phrasing is brief, an examination of the meaning confirms this. Explaining the reason, it says: "Because, just as with negating substance and so forth, both are equally determined." Since this reason of the Vaiśeṣikas establishes existence-ness, negating that it is substance and so forth while acting as an object of cognitive apprehension; this reason also negates that existence-ness acts as an object of cognitive apprehension of existence-ness. Just as with their negation, both are equally determined; therefore it constitutes a reason contradictory to their qualification. In this school, own-character and qualification are not fixed, as was already explained before. Here, we briefly take the explicit utterance as the own-character and what is intended as the qualification, so there is no flaw or objection.

3.43

Question: 'Among the three characteristics of the reason, what fault is it?' Answer: 'The existence-ness acting as an object of cognitive apprehension, originally established by the reason as the qualification of the subject, lacks a similar instance in the thesis, and the reason is entirely absent from it. Commonality-particularity not being the object of cognitive apprehension of existence-ness is the dissimilar instance of the thesis, and the reason is entirely present in it. The reason "possessing one substance" is absent from the similar and present in the dissimilar, which is a fault regarding the latter two characteristics; therefore it constitutes a contradiction.'

3.44

Question: 'Just as the Grammarian says: "Sound should not act as an object of cognitive apprehension of sound; because of being produced; like a pot and so forth"—should this also be called contradictory to the qualification of the subject?' Answer: 'They themselves contradict their own thesis, so it is not that fault. Originally there was also no dispute that sound does not act as an object of cognitive apprehension of sound; so this is subsumed under pseudo-refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa). Just as with not being an object of cognitive apprehension of sound, so too with "ought not to be produced by striking," and so forth—all should be understood according to this.'

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因明入正理論疏 — Classical Chinese