因明義斷 1.14

1.14

有人云：法性法爾必然之理者，方是正因。其事云何？答：此釋未為盡理。如所作性因，立聲無常，對聲顯論，隨一不成。豈作必然之理？又《理門論》云「是故此中唯取彼此俱定許義則為善說。」由是，若有彼此不同許，定非宗法。又云「唯有共許決定言詞，說名能立。」又《方便心論》云「凡聖同解，方得為喻。喻則因相。」故知不定唯取法爾必然之理皆為正因。若唯取者，應云法爾道理言論即為善說，及能立言詞。何須共許？由此故知，雖非法爾，但諸過無違，能立宗義。俱共許者，即得為因。如見自鷺，表水有無。見燈火處，表知熱觸。非於此處，法爾有火及以白鷺。此例非一，故知不定唯取法爾。

Someone says: 'Only that which is the necessary principle of natural phenomena is a correct reason.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This explanation does not exhaust the principle. For instance, the reason 'product-hood' in establishing that 'sound is impermanent', with respect to the proponent of sound-manifestation, is [a fallacy of] being unestablished for one party. How could it be made into a necessary principle? Furthermore, the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'Therefore, here, only that meaning which is definitively accepted by both parties is a good statement.' From this [it follows that] if there is something not mutually accepted, it is definitely not a property of the subject. It also says: 'Only statements that are commonly accepted and definitive are called sadhana.' Furthermore, the *Upāyahṛdaya* says: 'Only when ordinary people and noble ones have the same understanding can it serve as an example. The example is the mark of the reason.' Thus we know that one does not determinately take only the necessary principle of natural phenomena to always be a correct reason. If one only took that, one should say that discourses on the natural principle are precisely the good statements and the expressions of a sadhana; why would common acceptance be needed? From this, therefore, we know that although it is not a natural [law], as long as it is free from all fallacies and does not contradict, being able to establish the meaning of the thesis, whatever is mutually and commonly accepted can serve as a reason. For example, seeing a white heron indicates the presence or absence of water; seeing a place with a lamp or fire indicates knowledge of hot touch. It is not that at these places fire and white herons exist by natural necessity. Instances like this are more than one; hence we know that one does not determinately take only what is natural.