因明義斷 1.15

1.15

有人釋因中敘舊解云：言義智三，皆通生了，皆名為因。云相傳皆此分別。然汎爾對果辨因，非無此義。若望此中辨因相者，恐非善說。何以知者？今所明因，望所立義，不望智果。又云：若依親生敵智以釋生因，恐為猛浪。能生敵智，非唯因故。其義云何？答：此亦未閑疏中所說。疏中初雖汎說，然亦此因各具三相，闕一即非正取成宗。疏中自簡云「正取言生，正能立故，即是明因。望所立義，此生智了，照解宗故，故正因體。言生智了，兼亦通餘，能建宗果。」故知不是唯望智果。又雖云生，不言唯因能生他智。然因正是勝增上緣，能生他智，如說了因。雖言義智，然意正取智了非餘，以他智生宗方顯故。故知生因雖宗因喻，若言若義正能生因即因喻言。故《理門》云「若爾，既取智為了因者，此即牒言因。難云：是言便失能成立義。釋云：此亦不然。令彼憶念本極成故。」既云令彼憶念本極成，即生彼智。故他智生，勝但因喻。故下復云「唯有共許決定言詞，說名能立。」又云「若所比處，此相定遍，於餘同類，念此定有；於彼無處，念此遍無。是故由此生決定解。」又云「餘所說因生者，謂智是前智，餘從如所說能立因生。」以此故知，望了宗邊，正取智了。望生他智，正取立者詮因喻言。何以故？本意立量，為生他智。何故說因？唯望宗果，故望於宗。即唯依了，望成宗義為生他解，即取生因。不爾，如何言生決定解？又云「能立因生」，又云「開示諸有問者未了義故」，又云「開悟他時說名能立」等。故此因言，定通生了。

Someone, in explaining the reason, relates an old explanation: 'The three—words, meaning, and cognition—all pertain to production and making known, and all are named "reason".' It is said that tradition universally makes this distinction. However, in generally distinguishing the cause relative to the result, this meaning is not absent. Yet if one distinguishes the characteristics of the reason with respect to the present context, it is to be feared that this is not a good statement. How is this known? The reason clarified now is relative to the meaning of the sadhya, not relative to the result of cognition. It also says: 'If one explains the productive cause on the basis of directly producing the opponent's cognition, it is to be feared that this is reckless, because it is not only the reason that can produce the opponent's cognition.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also shows an unfamiliarity with what is stated in the commentary. Although the commentary initially explains generally, nevertheless, each of these reasons possesses the three marks, and if one is lacking, it is not correctly taken to establish the thesis. The commentary itself differentiates: 'Correctly taking the productive [function] of words, because they are the direct sadhana, is precisely clarifying the reason. Relative to the meaning of the sadhya, this produces cognition that makes [it] known, illuminating and understanding the thesis; hence it is the essential substance of the correct reason. The production by words and making known by cognition also generally pertain to the rest, being able to establish the result of the thesis.' Thus we know it is not merely relative to the result of cognition. Moreover, although it speaks of producing, it does not say that only the reason can produce the other's cognition. Rather, the reason is precisely the eminent predominant condition able to produce the other's cognition, just as it speaks of the making-known cause. Although words, meaning, and cognition are spoken of, the intended meaning correctly takes cognition making [it] known and not the rest, because only when the other's cognition is produced is the thesis made manifest. Therefore, we know that although the productive cause pertains to the thesis, reason, and example, whether as words or meaning, that which is the direct productive cause is the words of the reason and example. Thus the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'If so, since cognition is taken as the making-known cause,'—this directly cites the reason in words, and raises an objection:—'then words would lose their meaning of being a sadhana. The explanation says: This also is not so, because they cause him to recollect what was originally well-established.' Since it says that they cause him to recollect what was originally well-established, that is, producing his cognition; therefore, the arising of the other's cognition is superior to merely the reason and example. Therefore, it states further below: 'Only statements that are commonly accepted and definitive are called sadhana.' It also says: 'If, in the locus to be inferred, this mark definitely pervades; in other similar classes, one remembers that this definitely exists; in places where that is absent, one remembers that this is completely absent; therefore, from this, a definitive understanding arises.' It also says: 'The production of the reason spoken of by others means that cognition is the preceding cognition, and the rest arises from the sadhana-reason as spoken of.' By this, we know: relative to making the thesis known, it correctly takes cognition making [it] known; relative to producing the other's cognition, it correctly takes the proponent's words expressing the reason and example. Why is this? The original intention of formulating an inference is to produce the other's cognition. Why does one speak of the reason? Only relative to the result of the thesis; therefore, relative to the thesis, it simply relies on making known; relative to establishing the meaning of the thesis in order to produce the other's understanding, it takes the productive cause. Otherwise, how could it say 'produces definitive understanding'? It also says 'arises from the sadhana-reason', and 'in order to reveal the not-yet-understood meaning to those who inquire', and 'when bringing about understanding in another, it is called a sadhana', and so forth. Therefore, this word 'reason' definitely pertains to both producing and making known.