因明義斷 1.3

1.3

有人解能立云：若立三支，令他解悟，故名能立。若望因喻先成、宗支未許，為成未信必藉能成。因喻既為能成，能成必有所立，即以宗為所立。因喻為能立，其義云何？答：若以一向望於敵論，宗他未許，必因喻成故。所立中者，共量可爾，他自如何？豈可宗支自生不信？又前說在能立之時，宗豈他家已許？若他已許，舉即相符極成；若他不許，恒在所立之內。何故前說宗在能立之中？若云前望生他智解，宗居能立之中，若為因喻所成，故在所立之內者，此亦不然。《瑜伽》、《對法》俱云「所立有二，謂自性、差別。能立有八，謂宗因等。」《理門》亦云「由宗因喻，辨說他未了義，說名能立。」不說他智在所立中。何故今者說宗望他即為能立？又宗他既不許，何得說為能立？故《理門論》云「唯有共許決定言詞，說名能立。宗不共許，故非望他說為能立。」說能立者，即是言宗望所詮義，名為能立。為所立者，宗言雖說，義未顯決，假因喻成，言義方顯，故名所立。若望敵者，宗名所立。以他不許，今成立故。雖本立義為生他解，不望他智說為能立。然此論云「已說宗等如是多言開悟他時，說名能立」者，此據因果合說。以由因喻成宗顯決，他智得生。若其不能成彼所立，令其顯決，他智不起。故比量為因，他智為果。能立所成離過圓滿，能為因故。由此《理門》云「今此唯依證了因故」。宗生他智，豈名證了？又云「辨說他未了義，說名能立。說他智為所立，曾無教故。」若會今古能所立殊，如本疏說。

Someone explained sādhana by saying: "If one sets up the three members to cause another to understand, it is therefore called sādhana. If one looks from the perspective that the hetu and udāharaṇa are already accepted beforehand while the pratijñā member is not yet conceded, then in order to establish what is not yet believed, one must rely on the sādhaka. Since the hetu and udāharaṇa are the sādhaka, that which proves must necessarily have a sādhya; thus, the pratijñā is taken as the sādhya, and the hetu and udāharaṇa as the sādhana." What is the meaning of this? Answer: If one looks solely toward the opponent, the pratijñā is not conceded by the other, and it must be established by the hetu and udāharaṇa. As for being within the sādhya, this may be so for an ubhayānumāna, but how could it be so for an inference for the other or for oneself? How could disbelief arise for oneself concerning the pratijñā member? Moreover, at the time previously stated to be within the sādhana, how could the pratijñā have already been conceded by the other party? If the other has already conceded it, then presenting it is just a siddhasādhana; if the other does not concede it, it is perpetually within the sādhya. Why was it previously said that the pratijñā is within the sādhana? If it is said that, previously looking toward generating knowledge and understanding in the other, the pratijñā resides within the sādhana, whereas because it is established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, it is within the sādhya, this too is not so. Both the Yogācārabhūmi and the Abhidharmasamuccaya state: "The sādhya is twofold, namely svabhāva and viśeṣa. The sādhana is eightfold, namely pratijñā, hetu, and so forth." The Nyāyamukha also states: "By means of the pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa, explaining to another a meaning not yet understood is called sādhana." It does not say that the other's knowledge is within the sādhya. Why is it now said that looking toward the other, the pratijñā is itself a sādhana? Furthermore, since the pratijñā is not conceded by the other, how can it be called a sādhana? Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states: "Only commonly conceded, definitive words are called sādhana. The pratijñā is not commonly conceded, and therefore, looking toward the other, it is not called a sādhana." When it is called a sādhana, it is the words of the pratijñā looking toward the meant object that are called a sādhana. As for being a sādhya, although the words of the pratijñā have been spoken, the meaning is not yet clear and decisive; relying on the hetu and udāharaṇa for establishment, the verbal meaning only then becomes clear, and therefore it is called a sādhya. If looking toward the opponent, the pratijñā is called the sādhya, because the other does not concede it and it is now being established. Although the fundamental establishment of a thesis is to generate understanding in the other, it is not called a sādhana with respect to the other's knowledge. However, when this treatise states, "When such multiple words as the previously explained pratijñā and so forth awaken another, they are called sādhana," this is stated in terms of combining cause and effect. Because the pratijñā is established and rendered clear and decisive through the hetu and udāharaṇa, the other's knowledge is able to arise. If they cannot establish that sādhya and cause it to be clear and decisive, the other's knowledge will not arise. Therefore, the anumāna is the cause, and the other's knowledge is the effect. The sādhana and sādhya are free from flaws and complete because they can serve as the cause. For this reason the Nyāyamukha states: "Now this is based solely on the jñāpakahetu." How could the pratijñā generating another's knowledge be called a jñāpakahetu? Furthermore, it states: "Explaining to another a meaning not yet understood is called a sādhana. As for stating that the other's knowledge is the sādhya, there has never been such a scriptural authority." As for reconciling the differences between the modern and ancient sādhana and sādhya, it is as stated in the basic commentary.