因明義斷 1.4

1.4

有人云：然舊來相傳，皆作解云：無著、世親已前說八為能立，自性、差別二為所立。乃至即牒先疏，依於聲明為難，并疏解云：因有三相，因一喻二皆名多言。由此定知，宗是所立。世親已前，顯諸所諍不過自性、差別二種，故是所立宗為能立，立此二故。陳那已後，以此二種未互差別，成不相離，不是所諍。此意云：先德一向定判，陳那已後宗為所立，已前宗為能立，不許互通。故云今依自解者，乃至云：古師亦說宗為所立，廣教理成。陳那宗亦能成多理教立，其義云何？答：此乃廣前所釋，何云唯自新知？故本疏云：陳那已後略有三釋。一云宗言所詮義為所立。故《瑜伽論》第十五云「所成立義有二種：一自性、二差別。能成立法有八種。其宗能詮之言，及因等言義，皆名能立。」其宗之言，因喻成故。雖亦所立，彼於次說。何故先立宗耶？為先顯示自所愛樂宗義，故亦所立，非定所立，能成義故。猶如於因喻，對所成故，但名能立。宗所詮義，定唯所立，獨名所成。此即具釋宗通能所成，何言先不說？二云：總聚自性差別教理，俱是所立。論俱名義。總中一分，對敵所申若言若義、自性差別，俱名為宗，即名能立。雖此對宗亦是所立，能立總故，得能立名。故陳那等宗名所立，與《瑜伽》等理不相違，《瑜伽》等不說宗非一向唯能立故。此亦俱通，豈不明說？三云：自性差別合所依義，名為所立。能依合宗，說為能立。總立別故，非此總宗定唯能立。對敵合申，因喻成故，亦是所立。由非定所立，故得能立名。陳那但以共許因喻，成他未許。他未許者，唯是合宗，宗為所立。自性差別但是宗依，非正所立所立之具。所望義殊，不相違也。不爾，慈氏、無著、天親豈不解因明，說所為能立（此亦明說）。此即撮諸幾要、提彼宏綱，足悉不違，何勞煩重？諸論互申異義，並不相違。若言陳那文義盡同舊師，天親豈不解因明，許令乖異？又復陳那立宗因喻，即說皆同古師能立。現比等支，何故即許除簡？又如《瑜伽》八支之內，開喻無合結支。《雜集》能立八中，合喻加於合結。若云合結，即同類異類，名目何不相當，如實論亦五支合結。云何即別獨許陳那遮五能立，說彼唯言，不聽遮於八支，唯三外有能立。若云如實非真道理，此語未是誠言。若亦許解因明，何故開遮不等？又如古師立量，即加聖教為三。陳那為自悟門，量中但唯二種。故知諸論開合親疎不倫，取捨異途各據一義。其中會釋，具本疏辨。由此更廣以理教徵，即為徒設。

Someone says: "However, it has been traditionally transmitted from old that all interpret it thus: before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, eight were stated to be sādhana, while the two—svabhāva and viśeṣa—were stated to be sādhya. And then they cite the previous commentary, presenting a challenge based on vyākaraṇa, and the commentary explains: 'The hetu has three aspects; the one hetu and two udāharaṇas are all called multiple words. From this it is definitively known that the pratijñā is the sādhya. Before Vasubandhu, it was shown that all disputes did not exceed two kinds, svabhāva and viśeṣa, and therefore these are the sādhya, while the pratijñā is the sādhana, because it establishes these two. After Dignāga, because these two have not yet qualified each other and formed an inseparable relation, they are not the matter in dispute.' The intention here is: The former virtuous ones determined definitively without exception that after Dignāga the pratijñā is the sādhya, and before him the pratijñā was the sādhana, not allowing mutual interchange. Therefore it is said that now relying on my own interpretation..." up to "...the ancient masters also said that the pratijñā is the sādhya, which is established by extensive scriptural authority and reasoning. Dignāga's pratijñā can also establish many points of reasoning and scriptural authority. What is the meaning of this?" Answer: This merely expands upon what was explained before; why say it is only one's own new understanding? Therefore the basic commentary states: After Dignāga there are briefly three explanations. The first says that the meant object of the words of the pratijñā is the sādhya. Therefore the fifteenth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: "There are two kinds of objects to be established: first, svabhāva; second, viśeṣa. There are eight kinds of factors that establish. The words expressing the pratijñā, as well as the words and meanings of the hetu and so forth, are all called sādhana." The words of the pratijñā, because they are established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, are although also a sādhya, that is explained subsequently. Why is the pratijñā established first? It is to display first the thesis meaning of one's own preference; therefore it is also a sādhya, but not definitively a sādhya, because it can establish the meaning. Just as with the hetu and udāharaṇa, in relation to the sādhya they are only called sādhana. The meant object of the pratijñā is definitively and exclusively the sādhya, solely called the object to be established. This fully explains that the pratijñā pertains to both that which establishes and that which is established; how can one say it was not spoken of before? The second says: The aggregate collection of svabhāva and viśeṣa in both teaching and reasoning is all the sādhya; the treatise calls both "meaning." A component part within the aggregate, whether words or meaning, svabhāva or viśeṣa, as presented to the opponent, is all called the pratijñā, which is immediately called a sādhana. Although this, relative to the pratijñā, is also a sādhya, because it can establish the aggregate, it obtains the name sādhana. Therefore, that Dignāga and others call the pratijñā a sādhya does not conflict with the reasoning of the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth, because the Yogācārabhūmi and others do not say that the pratijñā is definitively and exclusively a sādhana. This also applies to both; how is it not clearly stated? The third says: The combined referent of svabhāva and viśeṣa is called the sādhya. The combination of the pratijñā that depends on it is called a sādhana. Because the aggregate establishes the particulars, it is not the case that this aggregate pratijñā is definitively and exclusively a sādhana. When presented in combination to an opponent, because it is established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, it is also a sādhya. Because it is not definitively a sādhya, it obtains the name sādhana. Dignāga merely uses the commonly conceded hetu and udāharaṇa to establish what the other has not conceded. What the other has not conceded is solely the combined pratijñā; the pratijñā is the sādhya. Svabhāva and viśeṣa are merely the basis of the pratijñā, not the primary sādhya, but the instruments of the sādhya. Because the perspectives of meaning differ, they do not conflict. If it were not so, did Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu not understand hetuvidyā, when they spoke of that which is to be established as the sādhana (this too is clearly explained)? This gathers the essentials and raises the grand guidelines, being fully consistent without conflict; why labor redundantly? The different meanings presented reciprocally across the treatises do not conflict with one another. If one says that Dignāga's text and meaning are entirely identical to the old masters, did Vasubandhu not understand hetuvidyā, that one allows them to diverge? Furthermore, when Dignāga establishes the pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa, he says that they are all the same as the ancient masters' sādhana. Why then are members such as pratyakṣa and anumāna allowed to be eliminated and selected out? Moreover, as within the eight members of the Yogācārabhūmi, unfolding the udāharaṇa has no upanaya or nigamana members; among the eight sādhanas in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, combining the udāharaṇa adds the upanaya and nigamana. If it is said that upanaya and nigamana are just sādharmya and vaidharmya, why are the names not equivalent? The Tarkaśāstra also has the five members of upanaya and nigamana. Why is it distinctively and uniquely conceded that Dignāga refutes the five sādhanas and states the word "only," but one does not allow refuting the eight members, asserting that there are sādhanas outside the three? If it is said that the Tarkaśāstra is not the true principle, this statement is not yet truthful discourse. If they are also conceded to understand hetuvidyā, why are their expansions and restrictions unequal? Furthermore, as when the ancient masters established pramāṇas, they added sacred teaching to make three; whereas Dignāga, for the portal of self-awakening, held only two kinds among pramāṇas. Therefore, one knows that across the various treatises, expanding and contracting, close and distant, are not uniform; their adoptions and rejections take different paths, each relying on a distinct principle. The reconciliation and explanation among them is completely discerned in the basic commentary. Consequently, inquiring more broadly by means of reasoning and scriptural authority would simply be an empty exercise.