因明義斷 1.33

1.33

有人云：有非遍是宗法性，是同品定有、是異品遍無，即聲論相違決定亦是。此亦不然。豈聲論所聞因於聲遍非有，而說闕初相？又云：俱非句者，即法自相相違因是。此亦不爾。聲生論許常聲是所作，如何闕初相？又云：或第五不定，亦是此句。亦為不可。若此論中第五不定，聲常無礙，因許於樂有，明聲亦成。若《理門》第五，不定所聞性，因於異遍無、於聲上有，何得闕三？《理門論》云「一向離故，不云闕二。」若云不能成宗故，不得云遍是宗法性者，即諸不定因皆是此句，何但第五辨相是非句數。得失如前已述，故不重明。

Someone says: 'There is [the alternative of] not being pervasively a property of the pakṣa, but being definitely present in the sapakṣa and pervasively absent in the vipakṣa, which is also the Śabdika's viruddhāvyabhicārin.' This too is not so. Could it be that for the Śabdika the hetu "audibility" is pervasively absent in sound, such that one would say it lacks the first characteristic? They also say: 'The alternative of neither is the dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana hetu.' This too is not so. The Śabdaprabhavavādin accepts that eternal sound is produced; how could it lack the first characteristic? They also say: 'Or the fifth anaikāntika is also this alternative.' This is also inadmissible. If it is the fifth anaikāntika in this treatise—sound is eternal, because of being unobstructed—the hetu is accepted as present in pleasure, which clearly also proves sound. If it is the fifth in the Nyāyamukha—the anaikāntika of audibility—the hetu is pervasively absent in the vipakṣa and present on sound; how could it lack all three? The Nyāyamukha says: 'Because it is exclusively separate, it is not said to lack two.' If one says that because it cannot establish the pratijñā, it cannot be called pervasively a property of the pakṣa, then all anaikāntika hetus would be this alternative; why only the fifth? The analysis of the correctness and count of these alternatives' characteristics has already been stated above, so I will not explain it again.