因明義斷 1.34

1.34

有人云：假立無為常，以非作故。此無同喻，異喻如瓶。此是何過？乃至云：或可龜毛望宗所立無處，名為異品；若望其因，應是同品。此義未詳者。今為詳云：龜毛常無，尚不得為宗同品。雖非所作，亦非因同品。若無所表常體，非宗同品。亦無所表非所作體，非因同品。有人約六不定別，別作八句中，且第一句，有唯犯自共非他俱，云：如大乘師，對小乘云：極成之聲定是識變之聲，自許所知性故，無共同品者。其義云何？答：此理不然。以何故？此對於誰？若對經部，夢所聞聲，彼許識變。若對有部，極苦獄卒等所發之聲，亦許識變。俱為共同，何得云無？若云獄卒許變、聲非許變者，不然，無異品故。設有部宗不許獄卒是識變者，對經部師，終有前過。又復立云：極成之聲定是識變聲。於比量中不見是理，但爭識變非識變。故設救云：極成之聲攝獄卒等所起之聲。理亦不爾，非遍許故。諸空見者不許有故，何得極成？據立敵同許，即名極成。終有前過。《成唯識論》既取為喻，故共同品應云：極成之聲是耳識變，許所知故，如耳識見分等。餘宗不立有三分故，夢中耳識許不行故、獄卒叫聲第六變故。設許耳識變，即極成收，攝入有法故。非耳識變，皆為異品所知故、因皆遍轉故，為自共不定。

Someone says: 'It is nominally posited that the unconditioned is eternal, because of not being produced. This has no sapakṣa-udāharaṇa; the vipakṣa-udāharaṇa is like a pot. What fallacy is this?' and so forth, down to: 'Or perhaps turtle hair, with respect to the locus of the pratijñā's sādhya where it is absent, is called a vipakṣa; with respect to its hetu, it should be a sapakṣa. This meaning is not yet clear.' Now to explain it clearly: turtle hair is perpetually non-existent; it cannot even be a sapakṣa for the pratijñā. Although it is not produced, it is also not a sapakṣa for the hetu. If it lacks an expressed eternal entity, it is not a sapakṣa for the pratijñā; and lacking an expressed non-produced entity, it is not a sapakṣa for the hetu. Someone, differentiating the six anaikāntikas and formulating eight separate alternatives, said regarding the first alternative—that which violates only one's own sāmānya and not the other's ubhaya: 'As when a Mahāyāna master says to a Hīnayāna master: "Prasiddha sound is definitely sound transformed from consciousness, because it is accepted by oneself as cognizable (jñeya)," having no common sapakṣa.' What is the meaning of this? Answer: This reasoning is not correct. Why? Toward whom is this directed? If toward the Sautrāntika, sound heard in a dream is accepted by them as transformed from consciousness. If toward the Sarvāstivādin, sounds uttered by the wardens of extreme torment in hell and the like are also accepted as transformed from consciousness. Both serve as common [sapakṣa]; how can one say there are none? If one says the wardens are accepted as transformations, but sounds are not accepted as transformations, that is not so, because there is no vipakṣa. Even if the Sarvāstivāda school did not accept that the wardens are transformed from consciousness, toward the Sautrāntika master there would still be the previous fallacy. Furthermore, one sets forth: 'Prasiddha sound is definitely sound transformed from consciousness.' In an anumāna, this reasoning is not found; they only dispute whether it is transformed from consciousness or not transformed from consciousness. Therefore, even if one attempts to rescue it by saying: 'Prasiddha sound subsumes the sound produced by the wardens and the like,' the reasoning is still not so, because it is not universally accepted. Since those of nihilistic views do not accept its existence, how could it be prasiddha? When based on what both proponent and opponent mutually accept, it is called prasiddha. In the end, the previous fallacy remains. Since the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra takes it as an example, the common sapakṣa should be stated as: 'Prasiddha sound is transformed from auditory consciousness, because it is accepted as cognizable, like the perceiving part (darśanabhāga) of auditory consciousness, etc.' Because other schools do not posit three parts, because auditory consciousness is accepted as not functioning in dreams, and because the cries of the hell wardens are transformations of the sixth [consciousness]. Even if it is accepted as transformed from auditory consciousness, it is subsumed under prasiddha, being included within the dharmin. Everything that is not transformed from auditory consciousness is a vipakṣa; because it is cognizable, the hetu occurs pervasively in them; thus it is an anaikāntika of one's own sāmānya.