因明義斷 1.37

1.37

有人云：有犯自他共不定，非俱共不定者。如大乘對小乘云：極成之聲是識所變，所知性故，如相分。無共異品。其義云何？答：此亦不然。以諸無為為共異品，俱許無為有非所變，故獄卒、夢聲為共同品。設聲入有法，猶有色等為共同品，俱識變故。何得云自他不是俱共過？又以菩薩不善心相分為他同品者，亦復不然。豈諸小乘許心別變作相分耶？若許心變相分，為能所緣。若云所緣，小乘不許；若非所緣，如何變相？准小乘釋，心上行相是能緣心行解相狀，非是變起心上相分。《成唯識論》第二卷云「執有識外所緣境者，外境是所緣，行相是能緣見分名事故。」此廣推徵，如俱舍法師《俱舍疏》述「此句應云：如薩婆多對大乘師立第六識能為諸法因緣，以所知性故、或法所攝故，亦得無共同品、有共異品。大乘以第六識能熏諸法種故為因緣，以第八等為自同品。薩婆多師以俱有因等皆因緣性，即第六相應諸心所等皆為彼自同品，因俱遍轉無為共同，故自他共，非共共也。」二宗因緣，互非所許。故或可無此；若有自他同品，即共許故。

Someone says: There is [a case that] incurs an anaikāntika that is [sādhāraṇa to] oneself and the other, but is not a universally common [ubhayasādhāraṇa] anaikāntika. For example, when the Mahāyāna says to the Hīnayāna: "Prasiddha sound is transformed by consciousness (pratijñā); because of being cognizable (hetu); like an object-aspect (nimittabhāga) (udāharaṇa)." There is no common vipakṣa. What is the meaning of this? Answer: This too is not so. Taking the unconditioned [dharmas] as the common vipakṣa, both accept that the unconditioned exists and is not [a consciousness-]transformation; hence hell wardens and dream-sounds serve as the common sapakṣa. Even if sound were included in the dharmin, there would still be form and the like as the common sapakṣa, because both [parties accept that they are] transformed by consciousness. How could one say this is a flaw of oneself and the other and not universally common? Furthermore, taking the nimittabhāga of a bodhisattva's unwholesome mind as the sapakṣa of the other is also not correct. Would the Hīnayāna ever accept that the mind separately transforms into an object-aspect? If one accepts that the mind transforms into an object-aspect, is it the grāhaka or the grāhya? If it is said to be the grāhya, the Hīnayāna does not accept it; if it is not the grāhya, how could it transform an aspect? According to the Hīnayāna explanation, the mental mode (ākāra) on the mind is the subjective form of cognitive comprehension belonging to the apprehending mind, not a nimittabhāga transformed and arisen on the mind. As the second fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "For those who cling to objects of cognition existing outside of consciousness, the external object is the object of cognition (ālambana), and the mental mode (ākāra) is the subjective apprehending aspect (darśanabhāga), which is called the 'fact' (vastu)." This is broadly investigated. As Master Kuśa states in his Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa: "This sentence should say: For example, the Sarvāstivādin sets up against the Mahāyāna that the sixth consciousness can be the primary cause (hetupratyaya) of all dharmas, because of being cognizable, or because of being subsumed under dharmas; thus one can have no common sapakṣa, yet have a common vipakṣa. The Mahāyāna holds that because the sixth consciousness perfumed the seeds of all dharmas, it is the primary cause, taking the eighth [consciousness] and so forth as its own sapakṣa. The Sarvāstivādin holds that co-existent causes (sahabhūhetu) and the like are all of the nature of primary causes, so the mental factors associated with the sixth consciousness are all its own sapakṣa. Since the hetu applies universally to both, while the unconditioned is the common [vipakṣa], this is [a case of being sādhāraṇa to] oneself and the other, but not universally common." However, the primary causes of the two schools are not mutually accepted. Therefore, perhaps this [position] does not exist; if there were sapakṣas for both oneself and the other, they would just be mutually accepted.