因明義斷 1.36

1.36

有人云：共比量唯他不定，非不定者。其義云何？答：此義應思。所以者何？共量為生他解，因唯自許，尚得成因。以正翻邪唯他不定，何故非過？又如唯立自量，於他不定非過，以自定故。今者共量雖復共定，於他宗中因有不定，何得非過？或可他喻非自所許，是故非過。或可立量欲令他解，喻自雖不許，是他宗所許，故他情疑亦說為過。准此，他共二量之中，三種不定俱說為過。唯自比量，於他不定不說為過，非對於他令他解故。或自共量，唯他不定非不定過，為違於他立自共故。

Someone says: 'In an ubhayānumāna, that which is anaikāntika only for the other is not an anaikāntika.' What is the meaning of this? Answer: This meaning should be pondered. Why is that? An ubhayānumāna is intended to generate understanding in the other; even a hetu accepted only by oneself can still accomplish the hetu. When rectifying the heterodox with the orthodox, why would being anaikāntika only for the other not be a fallacy? Furthermore, as when one establishes an inference only for oneself (svānumāna), its being anaikāntika for the other is not a fallacy, because it is definite for oneself. Now, although an ubhayānumāna is mutually definite, if the hetu has an anaikāntika in the other's school, how could it not be a fallacy? Or perhaps the other's udāharaṇa is not accepted by oneself, and therefore it is not a fallacy. Or perhaps one establishes the inference wishing to make the other understand; although the udāharaṇa is not accepted by oneself, it is accepted by the other's school, and therefore the other's doubt is also called a fallacy. Following this, between the two inferences for the other and for both (parānumāna and ubhayānumāna), all three types of anaikāntika are called fallacies. Only in an anumāna for oneself is being anaikāntika for the other not called a fallacy, because it is not directed toward the other to produce understanding in the other. Or, in an inference for oneself or for both, being anaikāntika only for the other is not the fallacy of anaikāntika, because the inference for oneself or both is established precisely to oppose the other.