因明義斷 1.42

1.42

有人云：有唯犯自不共不定，非他俱。云如大乘對小乘云：極成之聲定是識變之聲，有漏性故，因。其義云何？答：此亦不然。非是所變聲即自異品，第七八識俱不是所變聲，第八所變聲為自同品，因二遍轉，何得云唯自不共過？又云：唯犯自不共非過，以不能壞共量道理，亦不損自義，故非過也。此亦不然。如佛法立聲是無常，所作性故。彼立聲常，所聞性故。無共同品。以大乘宗不立虛空，真如他宗非有。既不壞共量，又不能損自他，亦應非過。應解云：因於同品有非有、異品非有，望彼同一分非有立自不共，同一分有得是正因，故不有過。若作斯解，得成無過。若如所解，共亦非過。又雖唯自不共不定，雖不壞共量，亦不能立自，何得非過？

Someone says: There is [a case that] incurs an asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika only for oneself, and not for the other or universally. For example, when the Mahāyāna says to the Hīnayāna: "Prasiddha sound is definitely sound transformed by consciousness (pratijñā); because of being of a defiled nature (hetu)." What is the meaning of this? Answer: This too is not so. Sound that is not transformed is one's own vipakṣa; the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are both not transformed sound, while sound transformed by the eighth is one's own sapakṣa. Since the reason applies universally to both, how can one call it the fallacy of being asādhāraṇa only for oneself? Furthermore, it is said: "Incurring an asādhāraṇa only for oneself is not a fallacy, because it cannot undermine the validity of a common inference, nor does it damage one's own position; therefore it is not a fallacy." This too is not so. For example, when the Buddhist establishes: "Sound is impermanent, because of being produced"; and the opponent establishes: "Sound is permanent, because of being audible." There is no common sapakṣa. Since the Mahāyāna school does not establish space, and true suchness does not exist in the other school. Since it neither destroys the common inference nor harms oneself or the other, it should also not be a fallacy. One should explain: When the reason exists and does not exist in the sapakṣa, and does not exist in the vipakṣa, by regarding it as partially absent in that sapakṣa one establishes an asādhāraṇa for oneself; by regarding it as partially present in that sapakṣa it can be a valid reason, and so there is no fallacy. If one offers this explanation, it can be without fallacy. If it were as [they] explained, then the sādhāraṇa would also not be a fallacy. Moreover, although it is an asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika only for oneself, and although it does not undermine a common inference, it cannot establish one's own [thesis] either; how could it not be a fallacy?