因明義斷 1.43

1.43

有云：有唯犯共不共，非自他者。如大乘對小乘欲立七八識。云：六種識身離自體外更有餘識，宗。是識攝故，因。以色等為共同品。此因不轉，無共異品。以自許第七為自同品，總以八識為自異品。此意以無共異品，即是異品遍無相。何故前與他相違決定量作不定過，云：為如緣生故，後二相中闕一相故非不定。即許無異喻闕第三相，不共不定但闕第二、不闕第三。准前無異，闕後二相是相違因，何名不共不定？若許無異，亦異品無，但闕第二。判緣生因闕一即非，前後相違，故定一過。

Someone says: There is [a case that] incurs only a universally common asādhāraṇa, and not one for oneself or the other alone. For example, when the Mahāyāna wishes to establish the seventh and eighth consciousnesses against the Hīnayāna, saying: "The six classes of consciousness have other consciousnesses apart from their own entities (pratijñā); because of being subsumed under consciousness (hetu)." Taking form and the like as the common sapakṣa, this reason does not apply [to them], and there is no common vipakṣa. One accepts the seventh [consciousness] as one's own sapakṣa, and aggregates the eight consciousnesses as one's own vipakṣa. The idea here is that the absence of a common vipakṣa is itself the characteristic of complete absence in the vipakṣa (vipakṣe 'sattva). Why did the earlier viruddhāvyabhicārin inference against the other incur an anaikāntika fallacy, saying: "Like 'because of being dependently arisen', it is not anaikāntika because it lacks one of the latter two characteristics"? That would mean accepting that lacking a dissimilar example lacks the third characteristic, whereas asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika lacks only the second and not the third. Following the above, lacking a dissimilar [example] and lacking the latter two characteristics is a viruddha reason; how could it be called asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika? If one admits that having no dissimilar [example] also means absence in the vipakṣa, it lacks only the second. But to judge the reason 'because of being dependently arisen' as lacking one and thus not [anaikāntika] is contradictory between earlier and later; therefore, it definitely has one fallacy.