因明義斷 1.45

1.45

同分異遍轉中作八句云：有唯犯自同一分異遍，非他共者。如小乘對大乘云：極成之聲定非耳識所變，第二三中隨一攝故。以一切色等為共同品，此因不轉。以耳識相分為共異品，此因遍轉者。亦不然。一切色等及以耳根俱共同品，因於耳根轉，乃是共同一分異遍，何名唯自？耳識相分為他異品，小乘不許耳識變相分，理如前說。菩薩不善色聲為自同品，此因分轉不善耳識相分，為自異品，理同前非。又云：他方佛色等為他同品，因不遍轉，以聲為他異品等。此亦不然。以他方佛色及根俱他同品，因即分轉。以聲為異品，因即遍轉，何唯是自？又云：亦是法自相相違過者。亦不然。作相違云：極成之聲定耳識變，以第二三中隨一攝故。同喻如何？設許取耳識相，猶有不定過，為如相分，第二三中隨一攝故，是所變；為如耳根，第二三隨一攝故，非耳識變。況不共許耳識變相。若以成所作智亦緣變耳根，無不定過者。不然。他不許故。若改因喻，便非相違。餘諸句過准例可知，煩不具敘。

Among [the clauses of] operating in a part of the sapakṣa and universally in the vipakṣa (sapakṣaikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpaka), eight clauses are formulated, saying: There is [a case that] incurs operating in a part of one's own sapakṣa and universally in the vipakṣa, and not for the other or commonly. For example, when the Hīnayāna says to the Mahāyāna: "Prasiddha sound is definitely not transformed by auditory consciousness (pratijñā); because of being subsumed under either the second or the third (hetu)." Taking all forms and the like as the common sapakṣa, this reason does not apply [to them]. Taking the nimittabhāga of the auditory consciousness as the common vipakṣa, this reason applies universally to it. This too is not so. All forms and the like, as well as the auditory faculty, are all the common sapakṣa; since the reason applies to the auditory faculty, it is operating in a part of the common sapakṣa and universally in the vipakṣa—how could it be for oneself alone? The nimittabhāga of auditory consciousness is the vipakṣa of the other; the Hīnayāna does not accept that auditory consciousness transforms an object-aspect, as argued before. The unwholesome form and sound of a bodhisattva are one's own sapakṣa, where this reason operates partially; the unwholesome nimittabhāga of auditory consciousness is one's own vipakṣa, which is flawed just as before. Furthermore, it is said: "The form and the like of Buddhas of other directions are the sapakṣa of the other, where the reason does not apply universally; sound is the vipakṣa of the other, and so on." This too is not so. For both the form and faculty of Buddhas of other directions are the sapakṣa of the other, where the reason thus applies partially; taking sound as the vipakṣa, the reason applies universally—how could it be for oneself alone? It is also said: "This is also the fallacy of contradictory to the essence of the predicate (dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana)." This too is not so. If one sets up the contradiction: "Prasiddha sound is definitely transformed by auditory consciousness; because of being subsumed under either the second or the third." What would the similar example (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta) be? Even if one allows taking the aspect of auditory consciousness, there is still the anaikāntika fallacy: Is it like the nimittabhāga, which, being subsumed under either the second or the third, is transformed; or is it like the auditory faculty, which, being subsumed under either the second or the third, is not transformed by auditory consciousness? What is more, transformation of an aspect by auditory consciousness is not mutually accepted. If one says that because the kṛtyanuṣṭhānajñāna also cognizes and transforms the auditory faculty, there is no anaikāntika fallacy—this is not so, because the other does not accept it. If one alters the reason and the example, it will not be contradictory. The fallacies of the remaining clauses can be known by analogy; we will not trouble to narrate them in detail.