因明義斷 1.46

1.46

又有人解決定相違，問云：此與比量相違何別？解云：比量相違，但有立宗因，喻未必得成。如立瓶等，即違共比量，因喻皆闕。相違決定，宗因喻皆成。未詳此釋，既因法皆闕，何成比量而言相違？又既無因，宗不違因，即與自教相違何別？第二解云：望違宗邊，亦不望違因，望違因是比量相違者。若違他宗立是比量，若違自宗，亦與自教相違何別？第三解難中云：若闕初相，但後二相。由後二相，令前立因成不定者，即唯相違決定，不是比量相違。若爾，與兩俱隨一不成何別？俱闕初相，有後二相。若云初二不成，或有後二相、或無後二相故有別者。不然。若闕初相，與不成無別；若具三相，與比量相違不殊。前二不攝，可立別過；離二更無別相違相，何須別立？由彼自云：闕初具後二，即相違決定。准此意許具三相者，即亦名比量相違，故有此難。又復所作因具三相，可得名決定。所聞闕初相，如何稱決定？故不可以闕相之因，與具相因，能作相違。應更細思，所聞之因何以闕初？若以不能成宗故闕初相，即所聞因亦闕後二，皆不能成所立宗故。若云：同有異無不闕後二。所聞聲有，何即闕初？如云眼見，彼此不成。聲是所聞，一切同許。定有初相，不得言闕。故《理門》云「唯彼有性，彼所攝故、一向離故。」既言一向離，明有初相。若云：不共不定，闕第二相。相違決定，即闕二相。俱是所聞，更有何別不許聲有。故具三相方名相違，俱決定故。又自下文難他不定，元不成因，何得云具後二相也。此所聞因既闕初相，如何具後？又云：雖闕於初相，二喻證決定。亦應具足後二相無違宗得立。問：既爾破他自解，相違決定與比量相違何別？答：如本疏釋，今更助解。相違決定是因過，比量相違是宗過。又比量相違前邪後正，相違決定前後俱邪。此比量相違後必破前，相違決定則不如是。為正量違故，名比量相違，如違現等。此釋極妙，窮至理也。故二差別。問：若爾，比量相違與自教相違有何別？答：自教相違，宗違自教。如勝論教說常無常，今立為常，故違自教，不違因故。比量相違，非但違教，亦違於因。故二差別。問，若爾，如勝論師許聲所作，教說無常，今立為常。自違宗因，何名自教？答：勝論師立順所聞因，同喻證成，非全違因。偏違所作立瓶常，宗遍違因故。故二過別。又違自教，不必違因；有雖違因，必違自教。如聲生立內聲無常，此雖違宗，不違因義，以許其聲是所作故。若遍違因，即比聲相違。

Furthermore, someone explained the viruddhāvyabhicārin, asking: "What is the difference between this and anumānaviruddha?" He explained: "In anumānaviruddha, there is only an established pratijñā and hetu, but the udāharaṇa is not necessarily established. For example, when establishing that a jar [is permanent], this contradicts a valid anumāna accepted by both parties, and both the hetu and udāharaṇa are absent. In viruddhāvyabhicārin, the pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa are all established." I have not yet comprehended this explanation: since both the hetu and the dharma are absent, how could it constitute an anumāna so as to be called a contradiction? Furthermore, since there is no hetu, the pratijñā does not contradict a hetu; then what is the difference between this and contradiction with one's own doctrine (āgamaviruddha)?

A second explanation states: "From the perspective of contradicting the pratijñā, it does not look toward contradicting the hetu; looking toward contradicting the hetu is anumānaviruddha." If contradicting the opponent's pratijñā constitutes an anumāna, then if it contradicts one's own pratijñā, what is the difference between this and āgamaviruddha?

In a third explanation, responding to objections, it is said: "If it lacks the first characteristic and possesses only the latter two characteristics, and because of the latter two characteristics the previously established hetu is rendered anaikāntika, then it is solely viruddhāvyabhicārin and not anumānaviruddha." If so, what is the difference between this and either the ubhayāsiddha or the anyatarāsiddha? Both lack the first characteristic and possess the latter two characteristics. If one argues that in the first two types of asiddha, they either have or lack the latter two characteristics, and thus there is a difference—this is not so. If it lacks the first characteristic, it is not different from asiddha; if it possesses all three characteristics, it is no different from anumānaviruddha. If it were not subsumed by the former two, a separate doṣa could be established; but apart from the two, there is no separate characteristic of contradiction, so why should it be established separately? Because he himself says: "Lacking the first and possessing the latter two is precisely viruddhāvyabhicārin." Following this intended meaning, one who possesses all three characteristics is also called anumānaviruddha, which is why this objection arises.

Furthermore, when the hetu of "being produced" possesses all three characteristics, it can properly be called "decisive" (vyabhicāra-free). But when "audibility" lacks the first characteristic, how can it be called decisive? Therefore, an incomplete hetu lacking a characteristic cannot serve as a contradiction against a hetu possessing all characteristics. One should reflect more closely: why would the hetu of audibility lack the first [characteristic]? If it lacks the first characteristic because it cannot establish the pratijñā, then the hetu of audibility would also lack the latter two, since in all respects it cannot establish the sādhya pratijñā. If one argues: "It exists in the sapakṣa and is absent from the vipakṣa, and therefore does not lack the latter two"—then since the audibility of sound exists, why would it lack the first? Just as when one says "seen by the eye," it is not established for either party. But that sound is audible is accepted by everyone alike; it definitely possesses the first characteristic, and it cannot be said to be lacking. Thus the Nyāyamukha states: "Only because it exists in that, is subsumed by that, and is strictly excluded [from the opposite]." Since it says "strictly excluded," this clarifies that it possesses the first characteristic. If one says: "The asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika lacks the second characteristic; the viruddhāvyabhicārin lacks two characteristics"—both are audibility; what other difference is there, such that one would not accept sound as possessing it? Therefore, only when possessing all three characteristics is it called a contradiction, because both are decisive. Furthermore, his own text below objects to the other's anaikāntika as fundamentally not constituting a hetu, so how can he say it possesses the latter two characteristics? Since this hetu of audibility lacks the first characteristic, how could it possess the latter two? Again, he says: "Although it lacks the first characteristic, the two udāharaṇas prove it to be decisive." In that case, it should also be fully endowed with the latter two characteristics, so that it could be established without contradicting the pratijñā.

Question: If that is so, and you have refuted the other's explanation, how do you yourself explain the difference between viruddhāvyabhicārin and anumānaviruddha?

Answer: As explained in the original commentary, I shall now add further explanation. Viruddhāvyabhicārin is a doṣa of the hetu; anumānaviruddha is a doṣa of the pratijñā. Furthermore, in anumānaviruddha the earlier is invalid and the latter is valid; in viruddhāvyabhicārin, both earlier and latter are invalid. In this anumānaviruddha, the latter necessarily refutes the earlier; viruddhāvyabhicārin is not like this. Because it contradicts a valid pramāṇa, it is called anumānaviruddha, just as in contradiction with pratyakṣa and the like. This explanation is extremely wonderful and reaches the ultimate principle. Thus there is a difference between the two.

Question: If that is so, what is the difference between anumānaviruddha and āgamaviruddha?

Answer: In āgamaviruddha, the pratijñā contradicts one's own doctrine. For instance, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine teaches permanence and impermanence; if one now establishes it as permanent, it contradicts one's own doctrine, not the hetu. Anumānaviruddha not only contradicts the doctrine, but also contradicts the hetu. Therefore there is a difference between the two.

Question: If that is so, consider a Vaiśeṣika who accepts sound as produced and whose doctrine teaches impermanence, yet now establishes it as permanent. He contradicts his own pratijñā and hetu; why is this called āgamaviruddha?

Answer: The Vaiśeṣika establishes it in accordance with the hetu of audibility and proves it by a sapakṣa udāharaṇa, so it does not entirely contradict the hetu. By partially contradicting "being produced" and establishing that a jar is permanent, the pratijñā pervadingly contradicts the hetu. Therefore the two doṣas are distinct. Furthermore, contradicting one's own doctrine does not necessarily contradict the hetu; while some contradict the hetu, they necessarily contradict one's own doctrine. For instance, when a Śabdika establishes internal sound as impermanent, although this contradicts his pratijñā, it does not contradict the meaning of the hetu, because he accepts that sound is produced. If it pervadingly contradicts the hetu, then it is anumānaviruddha.