因明義斷 1.47

1.47

有人將不成對不定為四句云：有不成因非不定，即四不成。有不定因非不成，即五不定或唯第四。俱句即第六。亦可取初及二三五四相違因。其義云何？答：理全不然。所聞雖不成，而自名不定。又前自云：雖是不成，何妨不定，如不共不定等，故初句非。不共既不定，與所聞何殊？即許非不成，唯是前不定。若言所聞同非有，故得是不成。亦所聞性遍宗，何得不成攝？若言非遍宗，自教等違攝俱句，即第六，所作豈不成？所聞性如前，亦非不成攝，如第四無常因，即唯不定非不成。第三亦是無常因，何故即為俱句攝？又四相違因，如立聲常，所作性故。豈聲非有亦俱句耶？又假問云：缺減過雖七，闕異不成過，何妨作法具初闕後二？就理中即無。即解云：誰言闕異非過？若有不引，理是闕減。若無異濫除，亦名為具。故不相似。此亦不然，前自數立，如緣生因，闕異非過。如何今說無異濫除亦名為具？即緣生因三相具足，破他引之為闕，自立即云具足，如何於法得自在耶？

Someone, pairing asiddha against anaikāntika, formed a tetralemma saying: "There is a hetu that is asiddha but not anaikāntika, namely the four types of asiddha. There is a hetu that is anaikāntika but not asiddha, namely the five types of anaikāntika, or only the fourth. The 'both' category is the sixth. One may also take the first, second, third, and fifth, or the four viruddha hetus." What does this mean?

Answer: In principle this is entirely incorrect. Although audibility is asiddha, it is inherently termed anaikāntika. Furthermore, he himself said earlier: "Although it is asiddha, what prevents it from being anaikāntika, just like asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika and the like?" Therefore the first lemma is invalid. Since the asādhāraṇa is already anaikāntika, how is it different from audibility? Then if one allows that it is not asiddha, it is solely the earlier anaikāntika. If one says that audibility is absent from the sapakṣa and thus can be asiddha, the nature of audibility also pervades the pratijñā; how could it be subsumed under asiddha? If one says it does not pervade the pratijñā, then subsuming contradiction with one's own doctrine and the like into the 'both' category—namely the sixth—how could "being produced" be asiddha? The nature of audibility is as stated before; it also cannot be subsumed under asiddha. Like the fourth, the hetu of impermanence is solely anaikāntika and not asiddha; why then would the third, which is also a hetu of impermanence, be subsumed under the 'both' category? Furthermore, regarding the four viruddha hetus: for example, establishing sound as permanent because of being produced—could it be that sound does not exist, such that it would also belong to the 'both' category?

Furthermore, posing a hypothetical question: "Although the defects of deficiency are seven, lacking the vipakṣa does not constitute a doṣa; what prevents the formulation from possessing the first and lacking the latter two? In principle it does not exist." Then he explains: "Who said that lacking the vipakṣa is not a doṣa? If it exists but is not cited, in principle it is a deficiency. If the absence of the vipakṣa eliminates overextension, it is also called complete. Therefore they are not similar." This is also not so. Previously he himself repeatedly established that, as in the hetu of "arising through conditions," lacking the vipakṣa is not a doṣa. How can he now say that the absence of the vipakṣa eliminating overextension is also called complete? That is, the hetu of "arising through conditions" possesses all three characteristics; when refuting the opponent he cites it as deficient, but when establishing it himself he immediately claims it is complete—how can he exercise such arbitrary license regarding the Dharma?