因明義斷 1.49

1.49

有人解四相違，敘古人釋，言顯意許為自性差別。云：理恐不然。即申難云：如他用為言顯，真他為意許，因為違差別。亦應有性為言顯，離實大有是意許，應名差別非自相。此既不然，故彼釋非者。其義如何？答：此亦未詳。如有法自相差別，至後當知。且此法差別，若非意許，豈言顯耶？又敘舊通，如軌法師疏，即難云：五頂弟子豈可自難實等不無之宗令成非有也。此乃自違，何成出過者。此亦不然。本立宗云：有性為宗有法，非實等為宗法。今弟子翻難云：汝有應非有，有一實故，如同異。此豈難實等不無耶？既言非實，明離實有。難彼成非有，故不是自違。又難：若云數論他用含真假，真他受用義雖無，眼等他用宗不失者，亦應五頂有性含即離，離實之有宗雖無，即實之有宗不失，應名差別相違非自相者。此亦不然。誰言五頂有性含即離？以五頂有，唯離實等。弟子立有，唯即實等，故言有時。望自望他，俱不得含，以同異性離實等得成非實等，以同異性不名有故成有非有，名俱決定。彼實等雖體不無，而不名有。何故如是？是宗計故。若五頂實等亦名有者，豈成自相相違？返彼量云：有應非有，有一實等故，如同異性。同異性名有，何得成相違？諸過類知。又五頂若許有即實等有，今總成非實等，豈非自違？故知五頂不立即實等，有三解自相、差別。第三云：隨應何法談其自體性者說名自相，即於此法所有別義者名為差別。此解不違古德意云：以爭彼差別，必非言顯，但意所許。不障自相亦有意許，通言顯故。故云言陳者名自相，意所爭者名差別。若云依第三解，以法有法各有自體及以別義者，如立聲無常，有部可有別體，大乘如何無常等各有別體？復俱不離色等自相，何緣名體？何緣名義？何故？有為之上生滅等名有自體，常住無為、不遷不滅等即名別義。

Someone, explaining the four viruddhas, recounted an older interpretation stating that what is verbally expressed and what is implicitly intended constitute svabhāva and viśeṣa. He said: "In principle, this is likely not so." He then raised an objection: "Just as 'use by another' is verbally expressed while 'the true other' is implicitly intended, and the hetu contradicts the viśeṣa; so too, 'existentship' would be verbally expressed while 'great existence distinct from substance' would be implicitly intended, and it ought to be called viśeṣa, not svalakṣaṇa. Since this is not the case, his explanation is wrong." What is the meaning of this?

Answer: This has not yet been clarified either. Such matters as the svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa of the dharmin will be known later. For now, regarding this viśeṣa of the dharma, if it is not implicitly intended, could it be verbally expressed? Furthermore, recounting the older resolution, as in the commentary of Dharma Master Gui, he raised an objection: "How could a disciple of the Pañcaśikha himself refute the thesis that substance and the rest are not non-existent, making them become non-existent? This would be a self-contradiction; how could it constitute pointing out a doṣa?" This is also not so. The originally established pratijñā stated: existentship is the dharmin of the pratijñā, and being non-substance, etc., is the dharma of the pratijñā. Now the disciple turns around and objects: "Your existentship should be non-existent, because it possesses one substance, just like sameness-and-difference (sāmānya-viśeṣa)." How is this refuting that substance and the rest are not non-existent? Since he says "not substance," it clearly exists apart from substance. Objecting that it becomes non-existent is therefore not a self-contradiction.

Furthermore, he objects: "If one says that for the Sāṃkhya, 'use by another' encompasses both the true and the figurative, and although the meaning of use by the 'true other' is absent, the thesis of 'use by another' for the eyes and the rest is not lost; then similarly, for the Pañcaśikha, 'existentship' would encompass both identity and difference, and although the thesis of existence distinct from substance is absent, the thesis of existence identical with substance would not be lost, and it ought to be called dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana rather than dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana." This is also not so. Who says that for the Pañcaśikha, existentship encompasses identity and difference? Because for the Pañcaśikha, existence is solely distinct from substance and the rest. The disciple establishes existence solely as identical with substance and the rest. Therefore, when speaking of "existence," looking at oneself or looking at the other, it cannot encompass both. Because sāmānya-viśeṣa is distinct from substance and the rest, it can be established as not substance and the rest; because sāmānya-viśeṣa is not called existence, establishing existence as non-existent is termed both being decisive. Although those substances and the rest are not non-existent in essence, they are not called existence. Why is it so? Because it is their doctrinal tenet. If substance and the rest were also called existence for the Pañcaśikha, how could it constitute dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana? Reversing their inference: "Existence should be non-existent, because it possesses one substance and the rest, just like sāmānya-viśeṣa." If sāmānya-viśeṣa were called existence, how could it constitute a contradiction? All other doṣas are to be known by analogy.

Furthermore, if the Pañcaśikha accepted that existence is the existence identical with substance and the rest, now generally establishing it as not substance and the rest—would that not be a self-contradiction? Thus we know that the Pañcaśikha does not establish it as identical with substance and the rest.

There are three explanations of svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa. The third says: "Whichever dharma is discussed in terms of its own essential nature is called svalakṣaṇa; the distinct meanings possessed by this very dharma are called viśeṣa." This explanation does not contradict the intention of the ancient masters, which means: because the disputed viśeṣa is definitely not verbally expressed, it is only implicitly intended. This does not prevent the svalakṣaṇa from also being implicitly intended, since it applies to what is verbally expressed. Therefore it is said: that which is verbally stated is called svalakṣaṇa; that which is disputed in intention is called viśeṣa. If one says that according to the third explanation, both dharma and dharmin each have their own essence and distinct meanings: for example, in establishing sound as impermanent, the Sarvāstivādin may have distinct essences, but in Mahāyāna, how could impermanence and the rest each have distinct essences? Furthermore, since they are both not separate from the svalakṣaṇa of rūpa and the like, for what reason are they called essence, and for what reason are they called meaning? Why is it that arising and perishing on conditioned phenomena are called possessing an essential nature, while permanent unconditioned phenomena, non-transmutation, non-perishing, and the like are called distinct meanings?