因明義斷 1.50

1.50

又釋自性差別有三重，初二如舊，第三云：談其自性名自相，談其別義名差別。復云法與有法各有自體及以別義。既稱別義，何得云有法？即差別等義屬於體，應說之差別。若言即有法，故不得說之。云何言此之別義亦有自體？既許有多義，故應依主，應可更思。若以聲瓶等異為差別，不得云別義。若即聲等體上有別義，不應云各有體。又云：相違有三，一自體相違，如言常非常等。二形待相違，如言真假等。三性別相違，如言色心等。又云：言詮有二，一遮、二表。如立有非有，即自體相違，第一遮詮。如言真他假他，即但表真假、不非真假，此即義別相形，名差別相違。乃至自問云：若義別相違名差別相違者，即如論中作非有緣性，亦非有緣性之自體，應名自相，非差別也（上自問也）。此問元非有緣性是別義，作非有緣性，即義相違，何名自相？若此亦名自相，自相差別有何殊異？又論云差別，何得稱自相？若云此之別義亦有別體。既有自體，何名談自性、談別義？又如聲瓶可燒可見等，豈離聲瓶外有別體？然自解云：不然。若言非作有緣性者，即是正非有緣性之自體。論中既說作非有緣性，作非有緣性言此乃別表緣餘也。此釋不然。此中為爭作所緣境？為爭能緣有心？若言爭能緣心，自是別法，豈名有法差別？若言大有，是緣大有心境性，不是緣有心之境性，此是有法差別。今爭大有與能緣有心作境性，不作緣有心境性。因與作緣有心之境性，相違作非緣有之心境性，為因名差別相違因，何得云此乃別表緣餘性？若言別表緣餘性，便是難能緣心，不難有法之上差別義。又更解云：或可不成自違。緣有之心，應非緣有心，但非有緣心，不表緣餘性，故名自相非差別。今論說言：作非有緣性。雖非緣有之自體，緣餘之義心不失。此即緣有緣餘，是別義故，故非自相名差別。此亦不然。論云：即於前宗之上作有緣性，即是許有是緣有心所取境性。豈成於心能緣於有名差別？若云成緣有心，豈得云以有一實故等因，成心為能緣有。即翻彼云：緣非有，如同異性。同異性豈是能緣？云緣餘之義心不失耶？又解：三相違中，第三性別相違，與初自體相違何別？又云：一遮詮如言非有非無、非人非天、無我無常等，但遮有等，不表非有之體。若爾，如立聲無常，豈但遮常，不表無常之體耶？既許無常亦遮亦表，何得言非但是遮？非之與無義相似故，既許詮中亦有遮，如何得言真詮？只應言：有表必遮詮，有遮非表詮。又釋云：若但言非有，不言非無，即是唯遮。即自引《佛地》等為難云：如來功德非有非無。自通云：般若雙言方有其表者，此與《唯識》亦有相違。第一中云「若言是表，應不雙非」，故相違也。又云：今但約自體相違名自相相違，不據言顯。豈立有時言中不顯有耶？若云：元不說大有，但詮不無有。此有相符，又因同有，豈是名相違？又言既不申大有，元不立大有為有法。云何因望於彼名相違？若既言陳，如何得言不據言顯？

Again, [a commentator] explains that svabhāva and viśeṣa have three levels. The first two are as of old; the third states: "Discussing its own svabhāva is called svalakṣaṇa; discussing its distinct properties is called viśeṣa." He further states that both dharma and dharmin have their own individual substances as well as distinct properties. But since they are called "distinct properties," how can one speak of the dharmin? That is to say, the meaning of viśeṣa and so forth belongs to the substance, and it should be spoken of as its viśeṣa. If one says it is identical with the dharmin, it cannot be spoken of in this way. How could he say that this distinct property also has its own substance? Since multiple properties are accepted, it should be a genitive relation (tatpuruṣa); this should be further reflected upon. If differences such as sound, pot, and so forth are taken as viśeṣa, one cannot call them "distinct properties." If there are distinct properties on the substance of sound and so forth, one should not say that each has an independent substance. He also states: "There are three kinds of contradiction: first, contradiction in own substance, as in saying permanent and impermanent; second, contradiction in relative contrast, as in saying real and nominal; third, contradiction in distinct nature, as in saying form (rūpa) and mind (citta)." He also states: "Expository expression has two kinds: first, exclusion (apoha); second, positive designation (vidhi). Stating 'existent' and 'non-existent' is contradiction in own substance, which is the first type, exclusion. Saying 'real other' and 'nominal other' merely designates real and nominal without excluding real and nominal; these are mutually relative distinct properties, termed contradiction in the property (viśeṣa-viruddha)." Coming even to posing his own question: "If contradiction in distinct properties is called contradiction in the viśeṣa, then as in the treatise, 'serving as the object-condition for existence' is the own substance of 'non-existence of serving as an object-condition'; should it not be called svalakṣaṇa rather than viśeṣa?" (The above is his own question.) This question [is flawed]: originally, "serving as an object-condition" is a distinct property (viśeṣa); "serving as an object-condition for non-existence" is a contradiction in property—how could it be called svalakṣaṇa? If this were also called svalakṣaṇa, what difference would there be between svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa? Furthermore, since the treatise says viśeṣa, how could it be called svalakṣaṇa? If it is said that this distinct property also has a distinct substance, since it has its own substance, how can one speak of "discussing svabhāva" versus "discussing distinct properties"? Moreover, as with the combustibility, visibility, etc., of sound and a pot, could they have separate substances apart from sound and the pot? However, he resolves it himself, saying: "Not so. If one says 'not serving as an object-condition for existence', that is precisely the own substance of not serving as an object-condition for existence. Since the treatise says 'serving as an object-condition for non-existence', the expression 'serving as an object-condition for non-existence' specifically designates being an object for something else." This explanation is incorrect. Here, are they disputing about serving as the objective cognitive domain? Or are they disputing about the cognising mind that apprehends existence? If you say they are disputing about the cognising mind, that is naturally a distinct dharma; how could it be called a viśeṣa of the dharmin? If you say Great Existence is the property of being the domain of the mind cognising Great Existence, and not the domain of a mind cognising existence, this is a viśeṣa of the dharmin. Now they dispute whether Great Existence serves as the property of being the domain for the mind cognising existence, or does not serve as the property of being the domain for the mind cognising existence. Because the hetu contradicts the property of serving as the domain of the mind cognising existence and proves the property of serving as the domain of a mind cognising non-existence, the hetu is called a hetu contradictory to the viśeṣa. How can one say that this specifically designates the property of cognising something else? If one says it specifically designates the property of cognising something else, that would be refuting the cognising mind, not refuting the distinct property on the dharmin. He provides yet another explanation: "Or perhaps it does not constitute a contradiction with oneself. The mind cognising existence should not be a mind cognising existence; it is merely not a mind cognising existence, and does not designate the property of cognising something else; therefore it is named svalakṣaṇa and not viśeṣa. Now the treatise states: 'serving as the object-condition for non-existence.' Although it is not the own substance of cognising existence, the mind's property of cognising something else is not lost. Because cognising existence and cognising something else are distinct properties, this is not svalakṣaṇa but named viśeṣa." This is also incorrect. The treatise states: "serving as the object-condition on the preceding pratijñā," which means admitting that existence is the property of being an object grasped by the mind cognising existence. How does that establish that the mind's ability to cognise existence is a viśeṣa? If you say it establishes the mind cognising existence, how could one use a hetu like "because of possessing one substance, etc." to prove that the mind is the cogniser of existence? Then inverting that against them: "cognising non-existence, like commonality-particularity." Could commonality-particularity be an active cogniser, such that one could say "the mind's property of cognising something else is not lost"? Furthermore, concerning the explanation of the three contradictions: how does the third, "contradiction in distinct nature," differ from the first, "contradiction in own substance"? He also says: "The first, exclusion, as in saying non-existent and non-non-existent, non-human and non-divine, non-self and impermanent, etc., merely excludes existence and so on, without designating the substance of non-existence." If so, when establishing that sound is impermanent, does it merely exclude permanence without designating the substance of impermanence? Since impermanence is accepted as both excluding and designating, how can one say it is merely exclusionary? Because the meanings of "non-" (fei) and "without" (wu) are similar, since exclusion is accepted within designation, how can one call it a real designation? One should only say: where there is positive designation, there is necessarily exclusion, but there is exclusion that is not positive designation. He also explains: "If one only says 'non-existent' without saying 'not non-existent', it is purely exclusionary." He then cites the Buddhabhūmi[-sūtra-śāstra] to raise an objection: "The Tathāgata's virtues are neither existent nor non-existent." He resolves it himself by saying: "Only when prajñā asserts both is there positive designation." This also contradicts the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. In the first fascicle it says: "If it were positive designation, it would not negate both"; hence they contradict each other. He also says: "Now we designate contradiction of svalakṣaṇa solely in terms of contradiction in own substance, not based on verbal expression." Could it be that when asserting existence, existence is not expressed in words? If you say: "Originally Great Existence is not stated, but only non-non-existence is expressed," this existence would be siddhasādhana, and the hetu would be present in the sapakṣa—how could it be called contradictory? Furthermore, if words do not put forward Great Existence, one does not originally establish Great Existence as the dharmin. How could the hetu be called contradictory with respect to it? Since it is stated in words, how can one say it is not based on verbal expression?