因明義斷 1.52

1.52

解有法自相中云：有人云，既違意許，應是差別，何名自相？答：言有性者，意詮離實等有為，有法自相。然以有法須極成故，不可別云離實等有。故雖意許，而是言顯自相宗不同作有緣性。是離實等有差別之義，為意所許差別宗也。難云：此解不然。若以今言有性，意許離實有為有法。有法須極成，不言離實有。雖是意許，而名為言顯者，亦應意詮真他用，能別須極成。不言真他用，雖是意許而名言顯，亦應是自相非差別。故約言顯意許解自相差別者，未為當理（上他敘難）。今共詳云：若彼大有意許離實，今言有時，不即詮彼大有者，豈詮即實等有？若詮即實等有，五頂成非實等，亦違自弟子成非有，亦自違。若非言所顯，何故尋言難？又五頂不許即實等有，弟子不許離實等有，今者言中恐有法不成，不言大有，但總云有。有言雖通，豈顯即實有？設若五頂，許即實有。今言即實有，云非實等，是自違過。況復本意爭大有句，何須詮即實？以五頂不許有即實有，故言有時即顯大有句。若直言大有，有法不成，為此但言有性。汎爾言有，彼此俱成，以為有法，不須分別即離。言非實等為法，以弟子有即實，今言非實，違他順己，故得為宗。由此故知，離實等有雖是意許，言有之時即言所顯。離言所顯有，外更無別有，不同他用離真他外有假他用。真他他雖不成，假他他自同許，故成真他不用眼等，假他用在不違言顯，故違差別。

In explaining dharmin-svalakṣaṇa, it is stated: Someone said, "Since it contradicts what is intended, it should be viśeṣa; why call it svalakṣaṇa?" The reply: "The term 'the nature of existence' is intended to express existence distinct from substance and the rest, which is the dharmin-svalakṣaṇa. However, because the dharmin must be prasiddha, one cannot separately say 'existence distinct from substance and the rest'. Therefore, although it is intended, it is the verbally expressed svalakṣaṇa-pratijñā, unlike 'serving as an object-condition', which is the distinct property of existence distinct from substance, being the intended viśeṣa-pratijñā." An objection states: "This explanation is incorrect. If by the present word 'nature of existence' one intends existence distinct from substance as the dharmin—and because the dharmin must be prasiddha, one does not state 'existence distinct from substance', so that although intended it is called verbally expressed—then similarly, when intending the 'real other's use', the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) must be prasiddha; and not stating 'real other's use', although intended, should be called verbally expressed, and it should also be svalakṣaṇa and not viśeṣa. Therefore, explaining svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa by means of verbal expression versus mental intention is not logically sound." (The above records another's objection.) Now let us examine this together: If that Great Existence is intended as distinct from substance, when one now says "existence", if it does not express that Great Existence, does it express existence identical with substance? If it expresses existence identical with substance, then Pañcaśikha proving non-substance would also contradict his own disciple's proving non-existence, which would be a contradiction with oneself. If it were not verbally expressed, why would [the opponent] pursue the words to raise objections? Furthermore, Pañcaśikha does not accept existence identical with substance, and the disciple does not accept existence distinct from substance. In the present verbal expression, fearing that the dharmin would be unestablished (asiddha), one does not say "Great Existence", but generally says "existence". Although the word "existence" is generic, how does it express existence identical with substance? Even if Pañcaśikha accepted existence identical with substance, to now say it is identical with substance and assert that it is not substance would be the fallacy of self-contradiction. How much more so when the original intention was to dispute the category of Great Existence—why would one need to express being identical with substance? Because Pañcaśikha does not accept existence as identical with substance, when "existence" is spoken, it directly indicates the category of Great Existence. If one directly stated "Great Existence", the dharmin would be unestablished; for this reason one merely says "the nature of existence". Speaking generically of "existence", it is established for both sides, serving as the dharmin without needing to distinguish identical or distinct. Stating "non-substance, etc." is the dharma: because the disciple takes existence as identical with substance, now stating "non-substance" contradicts the opponent and accords with oneself, so it can form the pratijñā. From this we know that although existence distinct from substance is intended, when "existence" is spoken it is verbally expressed. Outside of the existence verbally expressed, there is no other distinct existence, unlike "use for another" where besides the "real other" there is also the "nominal other". Although the real other is unestablished for the other party, the nominal other is mutually accepted by them; thus establishing that the real other does not use the eyes and so forth leaves the nominal other's use intact without contradicting the verbal expression, and therefore it contradicts the viśeṣa.