因明義斷 1.53

1.53

解有一實因廣事云云，無一可取，如破他立。以同異性含於實等，名有實等。是彼性故，名有實等。出何典據？勝論但云同異是實等性，不云有故。又自云：戒賢師解「應云有實故」。言一者相從故來，此從何聞耶？游夏不聞斯說，張禹何因謾談？乃至云今更解云：由虛空等不與諸法同聚，故約空等辨其有性。未詳此釋。虛空不遍，可不同聚。既許體遍，何處別居？設言非聚類，可非同法處等。又復解云：一切諸法有，他不自有。乃至云：空不用他所成，故名一實。自體不自有，為大有所有故，名有一實。若依此解，大有能有五全四小分，名有一實。此亦不然。自體不自有，別為大有有。乃師主之義，非弟子許。若弟子許別為有，有便立已成，何須云大有非實等？若弟子不許，一一實上不無之有能有實等，名有一實。即有一實因，犯隨一不成過，何能成比量？問：若取有二實等為因，有不定。許一一實自能有體云有一實，取此為因，亦不定過。答：不例。子微有二實，彼此俱成，別有子體。實上不無之有，弟子自許，故無不定。因不分別，但云有一實等。又問云：何故不名無實、二實、多實耶？有人簡云：若言有無實及有二實為因者，有兩俱不成過。若言有多實，有不成過者，恐未研覈。何以知者？難若望五頂意許所立，可說不成。今望弟子所許，敵論何得不成者。此亦未可。今言有者，實德業上同許能有之有，不分即離。豈許此有能有和合句耶？但自有故，故是不成。何分師弟？二俱爾故。若云以和合句既和合實等，何故不得言實德業等不無之有有於和合名有無實者。此亦不然。此亦師弟同許，何得云師不成、弟子得成？又若取此為因，即喻無能立，同異不能同異和合性，和合性復非同異和合性故，故不得云若言有無實故亦得成因。又本簡云：若云有二多實為因，有不定；有無實為因，有不成。不言有二實為因不成，文外加諸，故應如本簡過成因。又云：若唯望意許離實有說者，以無實及有二實為因，此乃是隨一所依不成，及兩俱不成過。此亦不然，隨一所依不成可爾。弟子不許離實等有故，何得云俱不成？師主豈可不許大有，有於空等無實之實、有於子微有二實之實？又云：若以多實為因者，亦有隨一所依不成及不定過者。亦不必然。不成可爾，不定須思。不共不定可爾，以有多實因，於孫微上有故。為不定者不然，若望師主，孫微雖有多實，不是大有，復非彼性，不同同異故，有多實因於子微上無。談師主意，說彼大有，有於多實故。然不得云是大有有多實，無同法故。以因不應分別，為大有有、為不無有，故同異性得為同喻。不爾，望師主即不共不定，同異非大有故。望於弟子，即隨一不成，弟子不許故。故知所判，更成疎略。又云：若以無實為因，即不定過。為如和合非實，為如時等是實耶者。亦未盡理。若其不云有無實故，但云無實故，因俱不成過，何名不定？若言有無實故，望和合性分不成過；望時方上不無之有即不定過，有無實因非和合有。又非同喻，何得望彼為不定過？又云：以有二實故為因，是一分兩俱不成過，亦犯似同喻中能立不成過。以同異性雖是非實，不名有二實故。此亦不然，無俱不成相故。又豈不許同異，同異於父母耶？同異於空等，有一實因成；同異合父母，有二何不許？准此，有不定，不言有二實。故知云不得作不定者非。又云：若二實為因者，是法自相相違過。過云：有性是實，有二實故，如子微。為有此過，不立為因。此不必然。因同喻有，義如前說。但不定過，非是相違。又云：若實句不名有德業者，如何得說共許不無之有名有德業耶？故知依彼實句不無之有，說名有德業也。如同異性者，舉喻，此未善釋。若成實句之上不無之有，云非德業，此立已成。如立量云：有非德業，有德業故，如同異性。何以能顯離德業之大有？故知各成三句之上不無之有，為三比量，顯有離三。若望成實句上不無之有云非德業，如何作有法自相相違之因？若望其意許離實大有，豈可師主不立離德業之大有，但立離實之大有耶？問：若成德業上不無之有云非德業，以有德業因於實亦轉。豈無過耶？答：亦無過。立非德業，實亦同喻，論中且舉別因通喻。不爾，言非德業宗，實句是何收？又解云：有德業言，意說彼性實雖有德業，非彼性故。望義別故，此有令彼體性不無，名之為有實德業等。實名有德業，以相依故名之為有，不能令彼成其不無。有言雖同，詮義各別。若爾，同異性即非同喻。答；爾。若爾，云何俱得決定？答：望為性成非實等，望能有有即是相違。若成有非實有德業因，此不定過，以彼實句有德業故。有一實因成非德業，不定亦爾。然待撿彼勝論方知。又云：五頂但據三因別成三宗，故無有過。問：若爾，無過何名相違？答：若望言顯無過；今望意許，故犯相違。此亦未詳。既言非實非德業宗，明即大有。若非大有，更有何有非實等耶？雖不言大，言有已顯。故彼弟子望立非實德業之有，得作相違。又云：問同異二品，豈可得約有法立耶。解云：夫同異品，但隨有法及法中意所立者，即望此為同異品。今既意立有性離實等外別有其體，故得望離實等有性為同異品。此釋未善。若以有法是所爭故，意所立者即應名法，何名有法？故《理門》云「又於此中，觀所成故立法有法。」非如德有德，故無有過。若爾如何？今解：意立實等上不無之有為有法，定非是實等。言非實等者，是離實等有義為法，望此即為所立。故《理門論》云「此中若品與所立法隣近均等，說名同品。」此論亦云「云何名為同品異品？謂所立法均等義品說名同品，不望有法名同異品。」如是方便成立有法，因喻既返，故成相違。若爾，何名有法自相相違因耶？答：望不加言，名有法自相。若加言已，即名為法。不爾相違。又云古人云：問五頂信有有不？若信有性，難令非有，便違共許。豈是相違？如言聲非聲也。若不信有，此即宗闕有法，因無所依。何容依此競其即離作相違過？乃至廣敘云云言。今解：應知加汝字即無有失。謂汝執有性，應非有性。又無義宗法，許得依無。今言非有，但非彼所立，更無所表，但牒彼計，何用極成？如佛法破外道云：汝我應非我。亦得成破。此釋未善。無義宗法，可許依無，有一實等因。豈無義宗法，但可隨他，與作相違即無有過？不勞分別有義宗法、無義宗法。

Regarding the explanation of the reason 'possessing one substance' (ekadravya-vat), the elaborate statements made there are entirely unacceptable, just like his refutations of others' formulations. To claim that because the universal-particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa) encompasses substances and the like, it is called 'possessing substance,' etc., and that because it is their nature, it is called 'possessing substance,' etc.—from what textual authority does this derive? The Vaiśeṣikas merely state that the universal-particular is the nature of substance and so forth; they do not state that it 'possesses' them. Furthermore, he himself says: Master Śīlabhadra explained, 'It should say "because it possesses substance" (dravya-vat-tvāt).' The word 'one' (eka) comes along merely by association. From whom did he hear this? Even You and Xia did not hear of such an explanation; on what basis does Zhang Yu chatter recklessly? And then it is stated: 'Now it is further explained: because space and the like do not co-reside in an aggregate with other phenomena, existence-ness (bhāvatva) is distinguished in relation to space and the like.' This explanation is not well thought out. If space were not all-pervading, it might not co-reside in an aggregate; but since its substance is accepted to be all-pervading, where could it reside separately? Granted, if one says it is not in the class of aggregates, it might not be a common dharmāyatana, and so forth. Again, it is explained: 'All phenomena exist; others do not exist by themselves.' And so on, until: 'Space is not produced by others, hence it is called "one substance." Its self-nature does not exist by itself; being possessed by the Great Existence, it is called "possessing one substance." If one relies on this explanation, the Great Existence can possess five wholes and four small fractions, which is called "possessing one substance."' This too is incorrect. That self-nature does not exist by itself but is separately possessed by the Great Existence is the doctrine of the teacher (Ulūka), not what the disciple admits. If the disciple admitted that it is possessed by a separate existence, the thesis would already be established (siddhasādhana); why would it be necessary to state that the Great Existence is not a substance, and so forth? If the disciple does not admit it, then the non-absent existence on each individual substance can possess substance and the like, and is termed 'possessing one substance.' Thus the reason 'possessing one substance' incurs the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha); how could it establish an inference? Question: If one takes 'possessing two substances' and so forth as the reason, it is inconclusive (anaikāntika). If one admits that each individual substance can itself possess an entity and calls it 'possessing one substance,' taking this as the reason also incurs the fault of being inconclusive. Answer: They are not analogous. A secondary atom (dvyaṇuka) has two substances; both parties accept that it has a separate secondary entity. The existence non-absent on substance is accepted by the disciple himself, hence there is no inconclusiveness. The reason does not differentiate; it merely states 'possessing one substance,' and so forth. Again, the question is asked: Why is it not called 'devoid of substance' (adravya), 'possessing two substances' (dvidravya-vat), or 'possessing many substances' (bahu-dravya-vat)? Someone distinguishes: 'If one states "possessing no substance" and "possessing two substances" as the reason, there is the fault of being unestablished for both (ubhayāsiddha). If one states "possessing many substances," there is the fault of being unestablished.' This, I fear, has not been thoroughly examined. How is this known? If the objection were raised against the intention of Ulūka's thesis, it could be said to be unestablished. But now, in view of what the disciple accepts, how could it be unestablished for the opponent? This too is unacceptable. What is here called 'existence' is the existence commonly accepted on substance, quality, and motion as capable of possessing them, without differentiating whether it is identical or distinct. How could one accept that this existence can possess the category of inherence (samavāya)? It merely exists by itself, hence it is unestablished. Why distinguish teacher and disciple? For both are alike in this. If it is said, 'Since the category of inherence inheres in substance and the like, why could one not say that the non-absent existence of substance, quality, motion, etc., possesses inherence, calling it "possessing no substance"?' This too is incorrect. This also is accepted by both teacher and disciple; how could one say it is unestablished for the teacher yet established for the disciple? Furthermore, if this is taken as the reason, the example would lack the sādhana: the universal-particular cannot make the nature of inherence universal or particular, nor is the nature of inherence the universal-particular nature of inherence; therefore, one cannot say that stating 'because of possessing no substance' can also form a valid reason. Moreover, the original distinction states: 'If one states "possessing two or many substances" as the reason, it is inconclusive; if one states "possessing no substance" as the reason, it is unestablished.' It does not say that having 'possessing two substances' as the reason is unestablished. Adding words outside the text is improper; one should determine the fault and form the reason in accordance with the original distinction. It is also said: 'If one speaks purely in view of the intended existence distinct from substance, taking "devoid of substance" and "possessing two substances" as reasons would be the faults of being unestablished in its substratum for one party (anyatarāśrayāsiddha) and unestablished for both (ubhayāsiddha).' This too is not so. Unestablished in its substratum for one party may be so. Because the disciple does not accept an existence distinct from substance and the like, how could it be called unestablished for both? Could the teacher not accept that the Great Existence possesses the substanceless substances such as space, and possesses the substances with two substances such as secondary atoms? It is also said: 'If one takes "possessing many substances" as the reason, there are also the faults of being unestablished in its substratum for one party and being inconclusive.' This too is not necessarily so. Unestablished may be so; inconclusiveness must be reconsidered. An uncommon inconclusive (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika) may be possible, because the reason 'possessing many substances' is present in tertiary atoms (tryaṇuka). But to say it is [generally] inconclusive is incorrect: in view of the teacher, although tertiary atoms have many substances, they are not the Great Existence, nor are they its nature; unlike the universal-particular, the reason 'possessing many substances' is absent in secondary atoms. Speaking of the teacher's intention, he states that the Great Existence possesses many substances. However, one cannot say that it is the Great Existence that possesses many substances, for there is no similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Because the reason should not be differentiated into being possessed by the Great Existence or being a non-absent existence, the universal-particular nature can serve as the similar example. Otherwise, in view of the teacher it would be an uncommon inconclusive, because the universal-particular is not the Great Existence. In view of the disciple, it would be unestablished for one party, because the disciple does not accept it. Therefore we know that his judgment is even more careless. It is also said: 'If one takes "possessing no substance" as the reason, it incurs the fault of being inconclusive: is it like inherence, which is not a substance, or like time and the like, which are substances?' This too does not fully reach the principle. If it does not say 'because of possessing no substance' but merely says 'because of being devoid of substance,' the reason has the fault of being unestablished for both; how could it be called inconclusive? If it says 'because of possessing no substance,' in view of the nature of inherence it has the fault of being partially unestablished; in view of the non-absent existence on time and space, it is an inconclusive fault, for the reason 'possessing no substance' is not present in inherence. Furthermore, it is not a similar example; how could it be considered inconclusive in view of that? It is also said: 'Taking "possessing two substances" as the reason is the fault of being partially unestablished for both (bhāgāsiddha for both), and it also incurs the fault of the absence of the sādhana in a pseudo-similar example (sādhya-vikala in sapakṣābhāsa). For although the universal-particular nature is non-substance, it is not called "possessing two substances."' This too is not so, because there is no characteristic of being unestablished for both. Furthermore, how could one not accept that the universal-particular generalizes and differentiates parents [i.e., causes]? If the universal-particular applies to space, etc., the reason 'possessing one substance' is established; if the universal-particular combines parents, why not accept that it has two? Based on this, it is inconclusive; it is not that it does not state 'possessing two substances.' Therefore we know that the claim that it cannot be inconclusive is wrong. It is also said: 'If two substances are taken as the reason, it is the fault of contradicting the essential nature of the predicate (dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana). The fault is: "existence-ness is a substance, because it possesses two substances, like a secondary atom." Because of this fault, it is not formulated as the reason.' This is not necessarily so. The reason is present in the similar example, whose meaning is as stated before. It is merely the fault of inconclusiveness, not contradiction (viruddha). It is also said: 'If the category of substance is not called "possessing quality and motion," how can the commonly accepted non-absent existence be called "possessing quality and motion"? Therefore, we know that based on the non-absent existence of that category of substance, it is called "possessing quality and motion," just like the universal-particular nature.' In citing the example, this has not been properly explained. If one establishes that the non-absent existence upon the category of substance is non-quality and non-motion, this is proving what is already established (siddhasādhana). As in formulating the inference: 'Existence is not quality or motion, because it possesses quality and motion, like the universal-particular nature.' How could this reveal the Great Existence distinct from quality and motion? Therefore, we know that each establishes the non-absent existence upon the three categories, making three inferences to reveal that existence is distinct from the three. If it is viewed as establishing that the non-absent existence upon the category of substance is non-quality and non-motion, how could it serve as a reason that contradicts the essential nature of the subject (dharmin)? If it is viewed in terms of the intended Great Existence distinct from substance, could the teacher not establish a Great Existence distinct from quality and motion, but only establish a Great Existence distinct from substance? Question: If one establishes that the non-absent existence upon quality and motion is not quality and motion, since the reason 'possessing quality and motion' also applies to substance, would it not incur a fault? Answer: There is also no fault. In establishing 'not quality and motion,' substance is also a similar example; in the treatise, a specific reason and a general example are provisionally cited. Otherwise, in the thesis 'not quality and motion,' under what would the category of substance be subsumed? Another explanation says: 'The phrase "possessing quality and motion" intends to say that although substance inherently possesses quality and motion, it is not their nature. Because their meanings differ, this existence makes their entity non-absent, hence it is called "possessing substance, quality, and motion." Substance is called "possessing quality and motion" because of mutual dependence, not because it can make them non-absent. Although the word "possessing" is the same, the meanings expressed are distinct.' If so, the universal-particular nature would not be a similar example. Answer: Indeed. If so, how could both be determined? Answer: Viewed as the nature, it establishes non-substance, etc.; viewed as capable of possessing existence, it is contradictory. If one establishes that existence is non-substance using the reason 'possessing quality and motion,' this is the fault of inconclusiveness, because that category of substance possesses quality and motion. Using the reason 'possessing one substance' to establish 'not quality and motion' is similarly inconclusive. However, one must wait to examine that Vaiśeṣika text to know for certain. It is also said: 'Ulūka merely relied on three reasons to separately establish three theses, hence there is no fault.' Question: If so, having no fault, why is it called contradictory? Answer: In view of what is explicitly stated in words, there is no fault; now, in view of what is intended, it incurs contradiction. This too is not thoroughly examined. Since it states the thesis 'not substance, not quality or motion,' it clearly means the Great Existence. If it is not the Great Existence, what other existence is non-substance, etc.? Although the word 'great' is not spoken, the word 'existence' already reveals it. Therefore, that disciple, in view of establishing the existence that is not substance, quality, or motion, can formulate it as contradictory. It is also said: 'Question: How could the two classes of sapakṣa and vipakṣa be established in reference to the subject (dharmin)? Explanation: Sapakṣa and vipakṣa are viewed merely in accordance with whatever is intended to be established among the subject and the predicate. Now, since it is intended to establish that existence-ness has a separate entity distinct from substance and the like, one can take the existence-ness distinct from substance and the like as sapakṣa and vipakṣa.' This explanation is not good. If because the subject is what is contested, what is intended to be established should be called the predicate (dharma), why call it the subject (dharmin)? Hence the Nyāyamukha states: 'Furthermore, herein, because of observing what is to be established, predicate and subject are established.' It is not like quality and the possessor of quality, hence there is no fault. If so, how is it? Our present explanation: It is intended to establish the non-absent existence on substance and the like as the subject, which is definitely not substance, etc. The phrase 'not substance, etc.' means the existence distinct from substance, which serves as the predicate; in view of this, it is the sādhya. Hence the Nyāyamukha states: 'Herein, if a class is adjacent and equal to the established predicate, it is called sapakṣa.' This treatise also states: 'What are called sapakṣa and vipakṣa? A class of meanings equal to the established predicate is called sapakṣa; they are not called sapakṣa and vipakṣa in reference to the subject.' In this way, by expediently establishing the subject, since the reason and example are reversed, it becomes contradictory. If so, why is it called the reason that contradicts the essential nature of the subject (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana)? Answer: In view of not adding words, it is called the essential nature of the subject. If words have been added, it is called the predicate. Otherwise, it would be contradictory. It is also said: An ancient said: 'Question: Does Ulūka believe in existence or not? If he believes in existence-ness, arguing that it is non-existence would contradict what is commonly accepted; how could it be contradictory? Just like saying "sound is non-sound." If he does not believe in existence, then the thesis lacks a subject, and the reason has no substratum. How could one rely on this to dispute its identity or difference and produce the fault of contradiction?' And so forth, setting out elaborate arguments. Now it is explained: 'One should know that adding the word "your" avoids any error. That is: "The existence-ness you cling to should be non-existence-ness." Furthermore, a predicate of the thesis without referent (artha-śūnya-dharma) is permitted to rely on a non-entity. Now, saying "non-existence" merely negates what he establishes and expresses nothing else; it merely recites his doctrine, so why require it to be commonly established? Just as when Buddhism refutes the non-Buddhists by saying: "Your self should be non-self," this can also form a refutation.' This explanation is not good. A predicate of the thesis without referent may be permitted to rely on a non-entity, but how could reasons like 'possessing one substance' be predicates without referent? One can simply follow the opponent and formulate a contradiction against him, which incurs no fault; there is no need to laboriously differentiate predicates with referents from predicates without referents.