因明義斷 1.54

1.54

釋有法差別相違因中云：如即此因，即於前宗，不但能成有法差別作有緣性，亦能成立與有法差別相違作非有緣性。此釋不然。若爾，應成不定因性，非相違因。既無大有有緣性之同喻，何理能成作大有有緣性？論云「如遮實等，俱決定故，不云成作有緣性，亦得決定。」下又正釋俱決定文，過亦同此。又自云：因唯異轉，故非不定。既爾，如何云俱決定？同品無故。問：既言不以意許為差別，此作有緣性，為是言顯？為當意許？若云言陳者，如何立宗云大有作有緣性。言大有時，他許不許？若許，立已成；不許，闕所別。作有緣性，為言大有？為不無有？言作大有有緣性，他許立已成。不許闕能別，故他不許。即俱不成，何成立量？若云言有意含，作有緣性亦含，此即意許，何得云言顯？不得云如汝立。彼云：言有非實雖是意許，即言已顯作有緣性，何不許然者。不然。何以故？前量云：非實故言有時，即言顯實上之有。云非實，除大有外更有何有？故言有時即言顯。今作有緣性不云非實，以有為有法作有緣性為法故。俱是不無之有作有緣性中，意作大有有緣性、作非大有有緣性，是其差別。今據意許，難令成過，故非言顯。問：若據意許，立云有作有緣性，即是法差別，云何名有法差別？答：准前釋，望不加言名有法差別，若加言已即名法故。然成此法，意成有法。故《理門》云「但以法故成於法，如是成立於有法。」問：若加言已，與法何殊？答：法自相等，本只爭法，不爭有法，故不得言如是成立於有法。若云：即成聲無常等云成立有法者。不然。《瑜伽》等云「所成立法有二種，一自性、二差別。若成聲之無常，亦名成自性，此二何別？」故作此解，妙之又妙。

In explaining the reason that is contradictory to the dharmin's viśeṣa (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana), it is said: 'Just as this very reason, with respect to the preceding pratijñā, can establish not only the dharmin's viśeṣa of "serving as that which produces a cognitive basis" (dṛṣṭigocaratva / cognitional causality), but can also establish what is contradictory to the dharmin's viśeṣa, namely "serving as that which does not produce a cognitive basis".' This explanation is incorrect. If so, it should become an inconclusive (anaikāntika) reason, not a contradictory (viruddha) reason. Since there is no similar example (sapakṣa-udāharaṇa) possessing the nature of producing a cognitive basis of Great Being (mahāsattā), by what principle could it establish 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis of Great Being'? The treatise says: 'Like excluding substance and so forth, both are determined; it does not say that establishing "serving as that which produces a cognitive basis" is also determined.' Below, where it formally explains the text on 'both are determined', the fault is the same as this. Furthermore, [the author] himself says: 'Because the reason operates only in the vipakṣa, it is not inconclusive.' If so, how can it be said that 'both are determined'? Because sapakṣa is absent. Question: Since it is said that what is intended is not taken as the viśeṣa, is this 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis' explicitly expressed in words, or is it that which is intended? If it is said to be explicitly stated in words, how could one formulate the pratijñā: 'Great Being serves as that which produces a cognitive basis'? When one says 'Great Being', does the opponent accept it or not? If they accept it, it is proving what is already established (siddhasādhana); if they do not accept it, the subject to be qualified (viśeṣya) is lacking. Does 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis' mean 'Great Being' or 'non-non-existent being'? If one says 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis of Great Being', if the other accepts it, it is proving what is already established; if they do not accept it, the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) is lacking, and therefore the other does not accept it. Thus, both are unestablished (asiddha); how could a formal inference be established? If one says that the word 'being' implicitly contains it, and 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis' also implicitly contains it, then this is what is intended—how could one say it is explicitly expressed in words? One cannot say 'just as you formulate it'. If that person says: 'Although saying "being is not substance" is what is intended, the words themselves have already expressed "serving as that which produces a cognitive basis"—why not accept this?', that is not so. Why is this? The previous inference stated: 'Because of not being substance', when one says 'being', the words themselves express the being inherent in substance. When one says 'not substance', apart from Great Being, what other being is there? Therefore, when one says 'being', it is explicitly expressed by the words. Now, 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis' does not say 'not substance', because it takes 'being' as the dharmin and 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis' as the dharma. In both cases, within 'non-non-existent being serving as that which produces a cognitive basis', intending 'serving as that which produces a cognitive basis of Great Being' or 'serving as that which does not produce a cognitive basis of Great Being' constitutes its viśeṣa. Now, relying on what is intended, one raises objections to show its fault; therefore, it is not explicitly expressed in words. Question: If, relying on what is intended, one formulates 'being serves as that which produces a cognitive basis', this is the viśeṣa of the dharma; why is it called the viśeṣa of the dharmin? Answer: In accordance with the previous explanation, in view of not adding explicit words it is called the viśeṣa of the dharmin, because if one has already added explicit words, it is called the dharma. However, in establishing this dharma, one intends to establish the dharmin. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states: 'One establishes the dharma solely through the dharma; in this way, one establishes the dharmin.' Question: If one has already added explicit words, how does it differ from the dharma? Answer: Regarding the svalakṣaṇa of the dharma and so forth, originally one only contests the dharma and does not contest the dharmin; thus one cannot say 'in this way one establishes the dharmin'. If one says: 'Just establishing sound as impermanent, etc., is called establishing the dharmin', this is not so. The Yogācārabhūmi and other texts state: 'The dharma to be established is of two kinds: first, svabhāva; second, viśeṣa. If one establishes the impermanence of sound, it is also called establishing svabhāva; how do these two differ?' Therefore, making this interpretation is subtle and most excellent.