因明義斷 1.56

1.56

釋二量中，以有古解：聖教由詮諸法共相，故比量攝。非之可爾。若云一切定心亦得共相，應比量收。又比量心亦得自相，應非比量。此難恐違。言定心緣得共相者，是何共相？若因明共相，違《佛地論》。《理門》亦云「諸修定者，離教分別，皆是現量。」云何定心得此共相？故雖定心緣比量教，離分別故，不名緣共相，以不分別一因三相，貫通宗喻各證知故。散心不證，但隨於教分別貫通，故緣共相，名為比量。設聖者心，知分別心以因貫之，亦證相故、不分別故，不名緣共相。若經中自共與因明別故，不應難云：比得自相、現得共相。若許得者，如何依二相唯立二量耶？俱緣於二相，二量有何別？又與經說二相何別？

In explaining the two pramāṇas, there is an ancient interpretation stating: 'Because the sacred teachings express the sāmānyalakṣaṇa of dharmas, they are subsumed under anumāna.' To refute this is acceptable. But if one says that all minds in meditative absorption (samāhita-citta) also grasp the sāmānyalakṣaṇa, they should be subsumed under anumāna; and if an inferential mind also grasps the svalakṣaṇa, it should not be anumāna—this challenge, I fear, is flawed. When it is said that the concentrated mind takes as object and grasps the sāmānyalakṣaṇa, what sāmānyalakṣaṇa is it? If it is the sāmānyalakṣaṇa of hetuvidyā, it contradicts the Buddhabhūmisūtra-śāstra. The Nyāyamukha also states: 'Those who cultivate meditation, being free from conceptual construction based on teaching, are all direct perception (pratyakṣa).' How could the concentrated mind grasp this sāmānyalakṣaṇa? Therefore, although the concentrated mind takes inferential teachings as object, because it is free from conceptual construction, it is not called taking the sāmānyalakṣaṇa as object; for it does not conceptually construct a single reason with its three characteristics (trairūpya) so as to connect the pratijñā and udāharaṇa and individually realize them. A distracted mind does not directly realize; it merely follows the teaching to conceptually construct and connect them, and thus it takes the sāmānyalakṣaṇa as object and is called anumāna. Even if an ārya's mind knows that a conceptual mind connects it via the reason, because it also directly realizes the characteristic without conceptually constructing, it is not called taking the sāmānyalakṣaṇa as object. If the svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa in the sūtras differ from those in hetuvidyā, one should not raise the objection: 'Anumāna grasps svalakṣaṇa, pratyakṣa grasps sāmānyalakṣaṇa.' If one admits that they grasp them, how could only two pramāṇas be established based on the two characteristics? If both take both characteristics as object, what distinction is there between the two pramāṇas? Furthermore, how would they differ from the two characteristics spoken of in the sūtras?