因明義斷 1.57

1.57

釋自共相經論相違中，全未盡理。《佛地經論》、《成唯識論》及因明等，說自共相各少差別。且《佛地經論》所明自共，即三科等皆名自相，各守自性。苦無常等名為共相，理通餘故。《唯識論》云「名詮自性，句詮差別。」少與彼同，亦談彼二相故。然言假智及詮，唯依諸法共相而轉者，此約能詮不得彼體。如詮色時，以其色言通一切色，智增彼相，不得自體。詮於此轉，名為共相。不同無常等義貫通一切，不唯色故，名為共相。即通於經所說二相，起詮之時總名共相，非所詮者即名自相。亦不同因明所立共相，彼約增其諸法自體。相通自類，不由他心總貫諸法，名為共相。因明論中，藉因三相貫通宗喻，如縷貫花，比智方起。故《理門》云「若所比處，此相定遍於餘同類，念此定有；於彼無處，念此遍無。是故由此生決定解」。此即於彼假智及詮共相之上更起共相，不可說彼定即因明所說共相。不立比量，言不詮三相故，智緣於彼不相通故。雖知此言及比量智亦於增益共相上轉，意不說彼，名因明中所立共相，彼不作想貫餘法故。彼設通餘，各自類故。今此貫餘，通異類故，宗中所立亦通喻故，說此為共。《瑜伽》等中言自共相，因明論中共相所攝，比量立故。然不同因，是先陳後說，自性差別攝。立我為有無，名立自相故。因明自相亦與經別，雖經自相亦現量得，名為自相。然彼經中自共二相，俱是因明所說自相，各附法體，別別證故，名現量緣。如斯分別，妙符經論所說理故。此即會釋并出體訖。餘雖問答分別二相，引三藏釋及解二量。問答門中所說二相，不關因明自共二相，不能煩敘，彼略所問答。但於《唯識》，似謂增益名共相中推求自共，亦不異經中所說二相，披者當悉。

In explaining the contradictions between sūtras and treatises regarding svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, [the author] has completely failed to grasp the principle. The Buddhabhūmisūtra-śāstra, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, hetuvidyā, and other texts explain svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa with slight differences between them. First, as explained in the Buddhabhūmisūtra-śāstra, the three categories (skandha, dhātu, āyatana) and so forth are all called svalakṣaṇa, as each preserves its own nature. Suffering, impermanence, and so forth are called sāmānyalakṣaṇa, because their principle extends to other dharmas. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: 'Names express svabhāva; sentences express viśeṣa.' This is slightly similar to that, as it also discusses those two characteristics. However, when it says that nominal cognition and nominal expression operate solely relying on the sāmānyalakṣaṇa of dharmas, this is spoken from the perspective that the expressive word does not attain the entity itself. For example, when expressing form (rūpa), because the word 'form' applies to all forms, cognition superimposes that characteristic and does not attain the entity itself. The expression operating upon this is called sāmānyalakṣaṇa. This is not like the meaning of impermanence and so forth connecting all things and not being restricted to form, which is called sāmānyalakṣaṇa. That is to say, it applies to both characteristics spoken of in the sūtras: at the time an expression arises, it is collectively called sāmānyalakṣaṇa, and what is not expressed is called svalakṣaṇa. Nor is it the same as the sāmānyalakṣaṇa established in hetuvidyā; that is spoken from the perspective of superimposing upon the entities of dharmas themselves. The characteristic extends to its own kind and does not depend on another's mind collectively connecting dharmas to be called sāmānyalakṣaṇa. In hetuvidyā treatises, relying on the three characteristics of the reason to connect the pratijñā and udāharaṇa like a thread stringing flowers, inferential cognition then arises. Therefore the Nyāyamukha states: 'At the subject of inference, this characteristic is definitely pervasive; in other similar instances, one recalls that it definitely exists; where that is absent, one recalls that it is completely absent. Therefore, from this a decisive understanding is produced.' This is generating a further sāmānyalakṣaṇa on top of the sāmānyalakṣaṇa of nominal cognition and expression; one must not say that it is definitely the sāmānyalakṣaṇa spoken of in hetuvidyā. If one does not formulate an inference, the words do not express the three characteristics, because the cognition taking them as object does not connect them. Although we know that these words and inferential cognition also operate upon a superimposed sāmānyalakṣaṇa, the intention is not to speak of that as the sāmānyalakṣaṇa established in hetuvidyā, because it does not form a conceptual thought to connect other dharmas. Even if that extends to others, it is only within each own class. Now, this one connects to others and extends across different classes; and because what is established in the pratijñā also extends to the udāharaṇa, this is said to be 'common' (sāmānya). The svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi and elsewhere are subsumed under the sāmānyalakṣaṇa in hetuvidyā treatises, because they are established by anumāna. Yet this is not like the reason; it is stated first and explained later, subsumed under svabhāva and viśeṣa. Establishing the self as existent or non-existent is called establishing the svalakṣaṇa. The svalakṣaṇa of hetuvidyā also differs from that of the sūtras; although the svalakṣaṇa in the sūtras is also attained by pratyakṣa and called svalakṣaṇa, nevertheless the two characteristics, svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, in those sūtras are both the svalakṣaṇa spoken of in hetuvidyā: because each adheres to the entity of the dharma and is distinctively realized, they are called objects of pratyakṣa. Making distinctions like this conforms wonderfully to the principles stated in the sūtras and treatises. This concludes the reconciliation and identification of their essential natures. As for the rest, although there are questions and answers distinguishing the two characteristics, citing the explanations of the Tripiṭaka Master, and explaining the two pramāṇas, the two characteristics spoken of in those questions and answers do not pertain to the svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa of hetuvidyā, so they cannot be recounted in detail; they are merely what was briefly asked and answered. But in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, it seems that in investigating svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa within superimposed designations called sāmānyalakṣaṇa, it is also no different from the two characteristics spoken of in the sūtras; those who examine it will understand.