因明義斷 1.58

1.58

今者總攝自相差別，略有二門：一依諸經論、二直據因明。且諸經論中自共二相，總有四對：一體義對。五蘊等法名為自性，苦無常等名為差別，如《佛地論》等說。二總別對。汎名為色，即是自性，如有漏色無漏色等，名為差別。即前第一體之與義俱有總別，自共如次更無別體，即諸經論皆悉通明。三詮非詮對。非詮對者名為自性，名言詮者即名差別。即《唯識》等云「諸法自性、假智及詮，俱非境故。」亦通前二。若名言詮皆名共相，非名言詮即名自相。四名句對。名所詮者名為自相，句所詮名為差別。即《唯識》等云「名詮自性，句詮差別。」亦通初二，詮體詮總名詮自性，詮義詮別名詮共相。望第三對，名及句身並詮共相，以所增相可通於餘，非二自相故名為共。除因明理，攝諸說盡。若因明中所說二相亦有四對：一體義對，即《瑜伽》等言「所成有二：一自性、二差別。」即前第一對。二總別對，四相違是，即前第二。且隨所爭，不過此二。據因明理，自共二相非如前說體性各定。三先陳後說對，即辨宗依，是通前二對，但先陳者即為自相，後說者即為差別，非定何法。即攝所成非成對，以所成者名為差別，非所成者即名自相。故《理門》云「觀所成故，立法有法。但成於後，非成前故。」四言陳意許對，即四相違因所違者是。雖違有法及別義，名二差別相違之因，然唯意許，不是言彰。如法差別，既不言彰，准知有法差別相違亦是意許。雖通局對，通名差別，局名自相，然此即前體義對攝。後說意許，即前總別對中別義，更無別體。問：因明所陳，不過經中自共二相，如何說與經義有別？答：有三義別。一因明二相據前後說分自共二，以後別前，非如經說。縱雖前後二相恒定，談法性故。二言陳意許。設經自性對爭意許，亦名差別。三因明二相據通局分，以後所說必貫於餘。不爾喻無，非成比量，即名為似。前所說者不必須通。因明論意，舉喻證宗故須通喻。雖不通喻，亦名差別，即定是過，然體不定。經汎通辨，雖遍不遍，二相即定。故有差別。

Now, to summarise svalakṣaṇa and viśeṣa in general, there are briefly two approaches: first, relying on the various sūtras and śāstras; second, directly based on hetuvidyā. First, with respect to the two marks, svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, in the various sūtras and śāstras, there are in total four pairs. First, the pair of substance and meaning (ti-yi). The dharmas of the five aggregates and so forth are called svabhāva (svalakṣaṇa), while suffering, impermanence, and so forth are called viśeṣa (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), as stated in the Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra and elsewhere. Second, the pair of universal and particular (zong-bie). In general, to name something "form" is svabhāva, whereas impure form, pure form, and so forth are called viśeṣa. That is, both the substance and the meaning of the preceding first pair have the universal and the particular; svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa respectively have no separate substance apart from these, as is comprehensively explained throughout the various sūtras and śāstras. Third, the pair of the expressible and the inexpressible (quan-feiquan). What is not expressible is called svabhāva, whereas what is expressed by nominal designations is called viśeṣa. This is what the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and others state: "Because the svabhāva of dharmas, conceptual cognitions, and expressions are not their domain." This also applies to the previous two pairs. If it is expressed by nominal designations, it is entirely called sāmānyalakṣaṇa; if it is not expressed by nominal designations, it is called svalakṣaṇa. Fourth, the pair of name and phrase (ming-ju). What is expressed by a name is called svalakṣaṇa, and what is expressed by a phrase is called viśeṣa. This is what the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and others state: "Names express svabhāva, while phrases express viśeṣa." This also applies to the first two pairs: expressing the substance and expressing the universal is called expressing svabhāva, while expressing the meaning and expressing the particular is called expressing sāmānyalakṣaṇa. In relation to the third pair, both words and phrases express sāmānyalakṣaṇa, because the superimposed mark can extend to other things and is not the svalakṣaṇa of the two; hence it is called common. Setting aside the principles of hetuvidyā, this encompasses all these explanations. If we turn to the two marks spoken of in hetuvidyā, there are also four pairs. First, the pair of substance and meaning: as the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts say, "What is to be established (sādhya) is of two kinds: first, svabhāva; second, viśeṣa." This is the same as the first pair above. Second, the pair of universal and particular: the four viruddha [hetus] are this; this is the same as the second pair above. Depending on what is disputed, it does not go beyond these two. According to the principles of hetuvidyā, the two marks—svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa—are not fixed in their respective substances as previously described. Third, the pair of the earlier-stated and the later-stated: that is, discerning the locus of the thesis (pakṣa-saṃbandhin). This applies to the previous two pairs: whatever is stated earlier is the svalakṣaṇa, and whatever is spoken later is the viśeṣa; it is not fixed to any particular dharma. This encompasses the pair of what is to be established and what is not to be established, because what is to be established is called viśeṣa, while what is not to be established is called svalakṣaṇa. Therefore the Nyāyamukha states: "Having observed what is to be established, one posits the dharma and dharmin. For one establishes only the latter, not the former." Fourth, the pair of explicitly stated and implicitly intended: that is, what is contradicted by the four viruddha hetus. Although contradicting the dharmin and contradicting the intended additional meaning are called the two hetus that contradict the viśeṣa (viśeṣaviruddha), they are only implicitly intended and not verbally made manifest. Just as the viśeṣa of the dharma is not verbally made manifest, by analogy one knows that the contradiction of the viśeṣa of the dharmin is likewise implicitly intended. Although there is the pair of the pervasive and the restricted—where the pervasive is called viśeṣa and the restricted is called svalakṣaṇa—this is subsumed under the preceding pair of substance and meaning. The later-stated implicitly intended [aspect] is the specific meaning within the preceding pair of universal and particular, having no separate substance. Question: What is set forth in hetuvidyā does not go beyond the two marks of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa found in the sūtras; why is it said to differ from the meaning of the sūtras? Answer: There are three points of difference. First, in hetuvidyā the two marks are divided into svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa based on earlier and later statement, distinguishing the later from the earlier, unlike what is taught in the sūtras. Even though there are earlier and later [statements in the sūtras], the two marks are always fixed, because they address the nature of dharmas. Second, the explicitly stated and implicitly intended: even if the svabhāva of the sūtras is in dispute regarding its implicit intention, it is also called viśeṣa. Third, the two marks in hetuvidyā are divided according to the pervasive and the restricted, because what is spoken later must pervade the other [instances]. Otherwise, the example would be absent, it would not accomplish an anumāna, and it would be called a fallacious sādhana. What was stated earlier need not necessarily pervade. The intention of the treatise on hetuvidyā is to cite an example to prove the thesis; hence it must pervade the example. Even if it does not pervade the example, it is still called viśeṣa, though it is definitely a fallacious error; its substance is thus not fixed. The sūtras generally and comprehensively examine them, and whether pervasive or non-pervasive, the two marks are fixed. Therefore, there is a difference.