因明義斷 1.62

1.62

解能破中，敘舊解云：又聲論師對佛弟子，立聲為常，德所依故，猶如擇滅。諸非常者，皆非德依，如四大種。此德依因，雖有所言，三相並闕。判云：此恐未然，此應但是不成因攝，非謂缺減。此判不然，未詳作意。若據支顯，此不成收。今據相明，三相都闕，故是闕過。又闕初相，可名不成。亦闕後二，何獨不成？故名缺減。又引古云又解云：古師既以八為能立，故亦依此以辨闕過。謂闕一有八，闕二有二十八，乃至闕七有八，闕八有一，名闕減過者。於理恐乖。且如現比二量，依何等相說名為闕？若以立量之時，無故名闕、有故名具。其相云何？若以違現比故名闕、不違名具者，既違現比，理應即於宗因喻中，隨其所應定不成就。如何說言有闕一等過？故知非也。此判全非。設宗因喻違現比量，何非闕過？如闕有法，說因無依，宗等違量，何非是闕？既陳三支，非是三闕，但違二量，故是闕過。方又二量，據立論者自解宗智，要依於自現比二智以立比量。若自不閑，何以能立？故《理門》云「如自決定已，悕他決定生。」又云「如是應知，悟他比量亦不離此得成能立。」故闕成過。又違二量，即宗因喻不須別說，能立已說宗因喻訖，何須復說現等量耶？又宗等違，猶無二智，故置此違。若依二智，立必無違，故闕成過。然隨一闕，非是闕過，作句數爾。若闕二時，方為過故。自釋闕中，約因一、喻二及因三相，句雖有七，過容有六，以闕異喻有非過故。若無故明闕，非缺減過；有故辨闕故，是過如前，故容有六。此亦不爾。有故辨違，亦不成過，可容有六。有故辨闕，既許是過，即容有七，何但言六？又標說云及因三相，因三相中七句皆過，何容只六？又言闕異，此非是過。此非了義。如立無常，常空非有名闕異者，此判定非。故彼論云「若無常宗，全無異品，對不立有虛空等。」論云何得說彼處此無？此敘他設難，非謂陳那不說為異故。論主答云「若彼無有，於彼不轉，全無有疑，故無此過。」既言於彼不轉，全無有過，即是異品云無有過。故前復云「若所立無說名異品，非與同品相違或異。」此意不要有體方名異喻，但無所立即名異故。故《理門論》正解喻云「前是遮詮，後唯止濫，由合及離比度義故。由是雖對不立實有大虛空等，而得顯示無有宗處無因義成。」此即異喻不說云闕。若要有體方為異喻，亦是遮詮，何成止濫？又解二似喻中，似同即有無俱不成，似異喻即無，無俱不遣。無既雙遣，何非異喻？故知言闕於異喻者，或言中不陳；或雖陳言，隨有不遣，即闕因相名之為闕。此無異依，有異法喻。前雖具明，對此故亦更說。

In explaining refutation (dūṣana), an older interpretation is recounted: “Furthermore, against a Buddhist, a Śabdika formulates: ‘Sound is permanent; because it is a locus of qualities; like analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha). Whatever is not permanent is not a locus of qualities, like the four great elements.’ Although something is stated for this reason ‘being a locus of qualities’, all three characteristics (trairūpya) are missing.” [The commentator] judges: “This may not be so; this should merely fall under the unestablished reason (asiddhahetu), and is not what is called a deficiency (nyūnatva).” This judgment is incorrect, as it fails to understand the intention. If viewed in terms of the members (avayava), this falls under the unestablished. Now, explaining it in terms of the characteristics (lakṣaṇa), all three characteristics are missing; therefore, it is the fault of deficiency. Moreover, if it lacked [only] the first characteristic, it could be called unestablished; but since it also lacks the latter two, why should it solely be unestablished? Thus it is termed deficiency. Furthermore, citing the ancients, another explanation says: “Since the ancient masters took eight as sādhana, they also identified the fault of deficiency based on these. That is, lacking one has eight [combinations], lacking two has twenty-eight, up to lacking seven having eight, and lacking eight having one—these are termed faults of deficiency.” This, logically, is suspect. Consider pratyakṣa and anumāna: based on what characteristics are they said to be deficient? If at the time of formulating an inference, its absence is called deficiency and its presence is called completeness, what are their characteristics? If contradicting pratyakṣa or anumāna is called deficiency, and not contradicting them is called completeness, then since it contradicts pratyakṣa or anumāna, logically it should simply be determined as not established within the pratijñā, hetu, or udāharaṇa according to what applies. How could one speak of the fault of lacking one, and so forth? Therefore, we know this is incorrect. This judgment is entirely mistaken. Supposing the pratijñā, hetu, or udāharaṇa contradicts pratyakṣa or anumāna, why would it not be a fault of deficiency? Just as when the dharmin is lacking, the hetu is said to have no support, when the pratijñā and so forth contradict valid cognition, why would that not be a deficiency? Since the three members have been stated, it is not a deficiency of the three, but merely contradicts the two pramāṇas; therefore, it is a fault of deficiency. Furthermore, the two pramāṇas are based on the proponent’s own understanding of the pratijñā: one must rely on one’s own two cognitions, pratyakṣa and anumāna, in order to formulate an anumāna. If one is not clear oneself, how could one establish it for others? Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states: “Having determined it oneself, one desires to generate determination in another.” It also says: “Thus it should be known that anumāna for enlightening others also does not depart from this in achieving sādhana.” Hence, a deficiency constitutes a fault. Furthermore, if contradicting the two pramāṇas means that pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa need not be stated separately, then since the sādhana has already fully stated pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa, why would pratyakṣa and other pramāṇas need to be stated again? Moreover, when the pratijñā and so forth contradict [valid cognition], it is as if the two cognitions do not exist; hence this contradiction is posited. If one relies on the two cognitions, the formulation will certainly be without contradiction; hence a deficiency constitutes a fault. However, lacking any single one is not a fault of deficiency; that is merely formulating numerical permutations. Only when lacking two does it become a fault. In his own explanation of deficiency, regarding one hetu, two udāharaṇas, and the three characteristics of the hetu, although there are seven permutations, there are only six faults, because lacking the negative example (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta) is sometimes not a fault. If one explains deficiency by [mere] absence, it is not the fault of deficiency; distinguishing deficiency by [faulty] presence, it is a fault as before, and thus there can be six. This too is not so. If one distinguishes contradiction by presence, it also would not constitute a fault, so that six could be possible. But since distinguishing deficiency by presence is accepted as a fault, there can be seven; why say only six? Furthermore, he explicitly states ‘and the three characteristics of the hetu’; among the three characteristics of the hetu, all seven permutations are faults, so how could there be only six? Moreover, saying that lacking the negative [example] is not a fault is an incomplete teaching (nītārtha). For instance, when establishing impermanence, to say that permanent space’s non-existence is called lacking the negative [example]—this judgment is certainly incorrect. Therefore, that treatise says: “If for the proposition of impermanence there is no vipakṣa at all, against one who does not establish space and so forth as existent,” the treatise asks, “how can one say that it is absent there?” This recounts an objection raised by another, not that Dignāga does not regard it as a vipakṣa. The treatise master replies: “If it does not exist, it does not occur there, and there is no doubt whatsoever; hence there is no such fault.” Since he says that it does not occur there and there is no fault whatsoever, that precisely means that the vipakṣa is without fault. Therefore, it was said earlier: “If the absence of the probandum is called vipakṣa, it is not that it is contrary to or different from the sapakṣa.” The intention here is that there need not be an existent entity for it to be called a negative example; merely the absence of the probandum is called negative. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha, directly explaining the example, says: “The former is an exclusion (apoha), the latter is merely preventing overextension, because of inferring the meaning through positive concomitance (anvaya) and negative concomitance (vyatireka). Thereby, even against one who does not establish great space and so forth as substantially existent, one is able to show that where the proposition is absent, the hetu’s absence is established.” This means that the negative example is not said to be deficient. If it required an existent entity to be a negative example, it would also be an exclusion; how could it merely prevent overextension? Furthermore, in explaining the two pseudo-examples, the pseudo-positive example includes the unestablished in presence, absence, or both; while the pseudo-negative example includes the non-exclusion of presence, absence, or both. Since absence excludes both, why would it not be a negative example? Therefore, we know that speaking of lacking the negative example means either that it is not stated in words, or that although stated in words, an existent thing is not excluded according to what applies, which lacks the characteristic of the hetu and is termed deficiency. Here, there is no negative substratum, but there is a negative example. Although this was fully explained before, it is stated again in response to this.