因明義斷 1.65

1.65

論說其宗亦名能立，已如前解，更不繁述。若必宗支定為能立，何為所立？無所說能，理為不可。若云非要故不說者，立量本令他悟，無所立法，令他悟何？故此為要。既無別所立，明知今意宗為所立。此中隨古言能不違，云十四過類，義同《如實論》中道理，難品中三種難也。此雖無文，今應略述。寬狹同異，至下當知。

That the treatise states the pratijñā is also called sādhana has already been explained above and will not be repeated in detail. If the pratijñā member must definitely be the sādhana, what would be the sādhya? Without a probandum to speak of a probans is logically inadmissible. If one says it is not essential and therefore not mentioned, establishing an inference is fundamentally to lead another to understanding; without a dharma to be established, what would one lead another to understand? Therefore, this is essential. Since there is no other sādhya, it is clear that in the present intention the pratijñā is the sādhya. Here, following the ancient terminology of ‘sādhana’ without contradiction, the fourteen kinds of futile rejoinders (jāti) are identical in meaning to the three kinds of rejoinders in the Chapter on Objections in the Tarkaśāstra. Although there is no text [cited here], they should now be briefly described. Their broadness, narrowness, identity, and difference will be known below.