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大乘起信論義疏 2.25

大乘起信論義疏 2.25

Language
Classical Chinese

2.25

自下第二重顯,初問、後答。問意者,上明真如絕相斷言,何故此中具種種德,上下相違?答中有二:一者、正答;二者、「此義」以下釋所以。「雖有諸德而無別相」者,今此中就與上無違。雖有而無有相故不妨無,雖無而無無相故不妨有,恒有恒無。言「等同一味」者,此眾德皆同一味也。何為者?「唯一真如」自下釋所以,中有三:一者、正釋;二、傳釋;三者、結。何故一味者,題上句。「此義云何」以下,無分別故也。無彼此故無分別,故名一味。故無分別者,題上句。自下傳釋,離分別相故也。遠離六七識分別之相,故名離也。自下結也。「是無二」者,明其空有無二體也。「復以何義」自下第三別釋,此中有二:一者、略別本由;二者、「此義云何」下,別釋上義。「復以何義得說差別」者,是顯名也。「以依業識生滅相示」者,若無待對無,而對妄識辨故,得說差別也。自下別釋,此中有二:一者、上別釋中六句廣釋;二者、「乃至」以下,上總結此中別釋。就初中,上二句別釋,下四句者通釋。「以一切法」者,上明恒沙等法也。「本來唯心實無念」者,唯真無妄也。「而有妄心」者,是無明也,以有此故便起末條。「不覺起念」者,是業識也。「見諸境界」者,是轉識也。「故說無明」者,結本名也。此眾惑者,依理而起還迷真理,而心性無起也。言「無起」者,不為知返無知,故名無起。惑心分別為生,以分別攬真,真猶無分別,故言無起也;神知猶存,故言「即是大智慧光明義」也。此釋初句。「若心起見」者,則分別心也。「則有不見之相」者,是分別有相故。有徧有見則有不見之相,故知有知為相,名妄心也。「心性離見」者,即知而無知相,不緣而照,即是遍照法界義也。神知靈故即無不照,而不緣故靈豁無滯,於無礙故名遍照法界也。自下通釋。「若心有動」者,是三相所熏也。此中四句皆返釋也。「非真識知」者,返釋上中真實識知義也。「無有自性」者,返釋上中自性清淨心也。「非常」等者,返釋上中常樂我淨也。「熱惱衰變不自在」者,返釋上中清淨不變自在義也。三相所不遷故,故具四句。「乃至」以下,釋上結德,此中有二:初釋結德。此中有二:初明返釋,謂具有過恒沙等妄染之義也;後明順釋,謂對此義故心性無動,則為「過恒沙等淨功德相示現」也。自下釋結名,此中有二:初明顯非,謂「若心有起亦更見前法可念者,則有所少」也。後明顯是,謂「如是淨法無量功德,即是一心無有二也,更無所念,是故滿足,名為法身如來藏」也。「復次真如用」者,自下第二明其所說。言所說者,所謂行德,德不自顯,依詮得顯,由修行故方得成也。此中有二:一者、明其行德;二者、「此用有」以下,明其見聞得益不同。就初中有四:一者、明因時化物之行;二者、「此以何義」以下,明以因戒德;三者、「又亦」以下,明真諦觀;四者、「但隨」以下,明俗諦觀。「復次真如用者」,題名也。「所謂」以下,正明也。「發大慈悲」者,謂四等也。「修諸波羅蜜」者,謂六度也。「攝化眾生」者,謂四攝也。「立大誓願」者,謂四弘誓也。此四句者,明化物行體也。下明時節,盡度眾生,不限劫數,盡未來際也。言「以取眾生如己身」者,辨其平等之心。此中有平等行也,非為空行。「而不取眾生」者,此遣著也。若著眾生相者,即不得度眾生也。此之空行也。自下第二「此以何義」以下,明德。此中有二:一者、緣照;二者、明真照。「此以何義」者,設問發起也。「謂如實知」者,是緣智也,契真之智名如實知。「一切眾生及與己身真如平等」者,體無異故也。此之明智體,次辨智用。「以有如是大方便智除滅無明,見本法身」也。次明真照。「自然而有不思議業」者,是報身也。「種種之用」者,是應身,此行用也。「即與真如遍一切處」者,以行即理。自下第三明真諦觀,此中有二:一者、正釋。「又無有用相可得」者,與體別用不可得故也。二者、釋。何故不可得者,「謂諸佛者唯是法身智身」。「第一義諦」者,此之真觀也。如《華嚴》中十身相作是也。就真而望,無有別用觀生死也。次辨第四,明俗諦觀,「但隨眾生見聞得益,故說為用」也。

From here below is the second [section], which clarifies [the topic] again, first asking and then answering. As for the intention of the question: above it was explained that tathatā is devoid of marks and cuts off speech; why then does it possess various virtues here, [creating] a contradiction between above and below? In the answer there are two parts: first, the direct answer; second, from 'This meaning...' onward, an explanation of the reason. As for 'Although it possesses all virtues, it is devoid of distinct marks', this here does not conflict with what came before. Although [virtues] exist, because they lack marks, this does not impede their nonexistence; although they are nonexistent, because they lack the mark of nonexistence, this does not impede their existence—being ever-existent and ever-nonexistent. As for 'equally of one and the same flavor', these manifold virtues are all of one and the same flavor. Why? 'Being solely the one tathatā'—from here below the reason is explained, within which are three parts: first, the direct explanation; second, the sequential explanation; third, the conclusion. Why are they of one flavor? This states the opening phrase. From 'What does this mean?' downward, it is because there is no conceptual discrimination. Since there is no 'this' and 'that', there is no conceptual discrimination; hence it is called 'one flavor'. 'Therefore it is devoid of conceptual discrimination' states the opening phrase. From here below is the sequential explanation: because it is free from the marks of conceptual discrimination. It is deeply detached from the marks of conceptual discrimination of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses; hence it is called 'detached'. From here below is the conclusion. As for 'is non-dual', this clarifies that emptiness and existence are not two substances. From 'For what reason further...' below is the third part, the distinct explanation. Within this are two parts: first, briefly distinguishing the fundamental source; second, from 'What does this mean?' downward, distinctly explaining the above meaning. 'For what reason further can differentiation be spoken of?' is revealing the terms. 'Because it is demonstrated in reliance upon the marks of arising and ceasing of the activity-consciousness': if there were no opposition to nonexistence, it would not be so, but because it is differentiated against the deluded consciousness, differentiation can be spoken of. From here below is the distinct explanation, within which are two parts: first, the extensive explanation of the six phrases in the distinct explanation above; second, from 'and so forth...' downward, a distinct explanation of the general conclusion above. In the first part, the first two phrases are a distinct explanation, and the lower four phrases are a general explanation. As for 'Because all dharmas...', this above clarifies dharmas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. As for 'are originally mind only and truly devoid of thought', there is only the true and no delusion. As for 'Yet there is the deluded mind', this is avidyā; because this exists, the secondary branches thereupon arise. As for 'Unenlightened, it gives rise to thought', this is the activity-consciousness. As for 'perceiving all objects', this is the transforming consciousness. 'Therefore it is called avidyā' concludes with the original name. These manifold afflictions arise in reliance on the principle and in turn bewilder the true principle, yet the mind-nature has no arising. As for 'having no arising', because it does not return from knowing to non-knowing, it is called 'having no arising'. The conceptual discrimination of the deluded mind constitutes arising; since conceptual discrimination grasps the real while the real remains without conceptual discrimination, it is called 'having no arising'; the spiritual knowing still remains, and therefore it says, 'it is the meaning of the light of great wisdom.' This explains the first phrase. 'If the mind gives rise to view' refers to the discriminating mind. 'Then there is the mark of not seeing': this is because conceptual discrimination possesses marks. If there is pervasive seeing, there is the mark of not seeing; hence one knows that having knowing as a mark is called the deluded mind. As for 'The mind-nature is free from view', it is precisely knowing while devoid of the mark of knowing; illuminating without condition, this is precisely the meaning of 'pervasively illuminating the dharmadhātu'. Because spiritual knowing is efficacious, there is nothing it does not illuminate; yet because it does not condition, it is unobstructed, open and unhindered; being without obstruction, it is called 'pervasively illuminating the dharmadhātu'. From here below is the general explanation. 'If the mind has movement' refers to being perfumed by the three marks. The four phrases here are all inverse explanations. 'It is not true knowledge' inversely explains the meaning of 'true knowledge' above. 'It has no self-nature' inversely explains the 'intrinsically pure mind' above. 'It is not permanent...' and so on inversely explains the 'permanent, blissful, self, and pure' above. 'It is feverish, decaying, changing, and not sovereign' inversely explains the meaning of 'pure, unchanging, and sovereign' above. Because it is not shifted by the three marks, it thus possesses the four phrases. From 'and so forth...' downward explains the conclusion of virtues above, within which are two parts: first, explaining the conclusion of virtues. Within this are two parts: first, clarifying the inverse explanation, which refers to possessing the meaning of deluded defilements as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; second, clarifying the direct explanation, which refers to the mind-nature having no movement in contrast to this meaning, which is then 'manifested as marks of pure virtues exceeding the sands of the Ganges'. From here below explains the concluding names, within which are two parts: first, clearly showing what is not, meaning 'if the mind has arising and further sees prior dharmas as being thinkable, then it has a deficiency'; second, clearly showing what is right, meaning 'such pure dharmas of immeasurable virtues are precisely the one mind without duality, with nothing further to be thought of, and therefore being complete, it is called the dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha'. As for 'Furthermore, the function of tathatā', from here below is the second [major section], which clarifies what is taught. As for 'what is taught', it refers to the virtues of practice; virtues do not manifest of themselves but become manifest in reliance on the verbal teaching, and only through cultivation can they be fulfilled. Within this are two parts: first, clarifying the virtues of practice; second, from 'This function has...' downward, clarifying the differences in the benefits gained from seeing and hearing. In the first part there are four: first, clarifying the practice of transforming beings while on the causal stage; second, from 'For what reason is this?' downward, clarifying the causal virtue of precepts; third, from 'And also...' downward, clarifying the contemplation of the ultimate truth; fourth, from 'Merely following...' downward, clarifying the contemplation of the conventional truth. 'Furthermore, the function of tathatā' is stating the title. From 'What is called...' downward is the direct clarification. 'Giving rise to great compassion' refers to the four immeasurables. 'Cultivating all pāramitās' refers to the six perfections. 'Gathering and transforming sentient beings' refers to the four means of embracing. 'Establishing great vows' refers to the four universal vows. These four phrases clarify the substance of the practice of transforming beings. Below clarifies the temporal span: completely delivering sentient beings, not limited by kalpas, reaching to the end of the future. As for 'Taking sentient beings to be like one's own body', it distinguishes the mind of equality. Here there is the practice of equality, not empty practice. As for 'yet not grasping at sentient beings', this removes attachment. If one is attached to the marks of sentient beings, one cannot deliver sentient beings. This is empty practice. From here below, the second part from 'For what reason is this?' downward clarifies virtue. Within this are two parts: first, conditioned illumination; second, clarifying true illumination. 'For what reason is this?' raises a question to introduce [the topic]. 'It means knowing in accordance with reality' is conditioned wisdom; wisdom that accords with the real is called 'knowing in accordance with reality'. As for 'All sentient beings and one's own body are tathatā-equal', it is because their substance is not different. This clarifies the substance of wisdom; next it differentiates the function of wisdom: 'because of possessing such wisdom of great upāya, one extinguishes avidyā and sees the original dharmakāya.' Next it clarifies true illumination. 'Naturally possessing inconceivable activities' is the saṃbhogakāya. 'Manifold functions' is the nirmāṇakāya; this is the function of practice. 'Namely, being co-extensive with tathatā pervasively in all places' means that practice is identical to principle. From here below, the third part clarifies the contemplation of the ultimate truth, within which are two parts: first, the direct explanation. 'Furthermore, no mark of function can be apprehended' is because a function distinct from the substance cannot be apprehended. Second, the explanation. Why can it not be apprehended? 'Because the Buddhas are solely the dharmakāya and wisdom-body.' 'The ultimate truth' is this true contemplation. This is like the ten bodies mutually acting as each other in the Avataṃsaka. Looking from the perspective of the real, there is no distinct function contemplating saṃsāra. Next, differentiating the fourth, which clarifies the contemplation of the conventional truth: 'Merely in accordance with what sentient beings see and hear, obtaining benefit, it is therefore spoken of as function.'

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