Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

大乘起信論義疏 2.25

English (machine translation) 2.25

Language
English

2.25

From here below is the second [section], which clarifies [the topic] again, first asking and then answering. As for the intention of the question: above it was explained that tathatā is devoid of marks and cuts off speech; why then does it possess various virtues here, [creating] a contradiction between above and below? In the answer there are two parts: first, the direct answer; second, from 'This meaning...' onward, an explanation of the reason. As for 'Although it possesses all virtues, it is devoid of distinct marks', this here does not conflict with what came before. Although [virtues] exist, because they lack marks, this does not impede their nonexistence; although they are nonexistent, because they lack the mark of nonexistence, this does not impede their existence—being ever-existent and ever-nonexistent. As for 'equally of one and the same flavor', these manifold virtues are all of one and the same flavor. Why? 'Being solely the one tathatā'—from here below the reason is explained, within which are three parts: first, the direct explanation; second, the sequential explanation; third, the conclusion. Why are they of one flavor? This states the opening phrase. From 'What does this mean?' downward, it is because there is no conceptual discrimination. Since there is no 'this' and 'that', there is no conceptual discrimination; hence it is called 'one flavor'. 'Therefore it is devoid of conceptual discrimination' states the opening phrase. From here below is the sequential explanation: because it is free from the marks of conceptual discrimination. It is deeply detached from the marks of conceptual discrimination of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses; hence it is called 'detached'. From here below is the conclusion. As for 'is non-dual', this clarifies that emptiness and existence are not two substances. From 'For what reason further...' below is the third part, the distinct explanation. Within this are two parts: first, briefly distinguishing the fundamental source; second, from 'What does this mean?' downward, distinctly explaining the above meaning. 'For what reason further can differentiation be spoken of?' is revealing the terms. 'Because it is demonstrated in reliance upon the marks of arising and ceasing of the activity-consciousness': if there were no opposition to nonexistence, it would not be so, but because it is differentiated against the deluded consciousness, differentiation can be spoken of. From here below is the distinct explanation, within which are two parts: first, the extensive explanation of the six phrases in the distinct explanation above; second, from 'and so forth...' downward, a distinct explanation of the general conclusion above. In the first part, the first two phrases are a distinct explanation, and the lower four phrases are a general explanation. As for 'Because all dharmas...', this above clarifies dharmas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. As for 'are originally mind only and truly devoid of thought', there is only the true and no delusion. As for 'Yet there is the deluded mind', this is avidyā; because this exists, the secondary branches thereupon arise. As for 'Unenlightened, it gives rise to thought', this is the activity-consciousness. As for 'perceiving all objects', this is the transforming consciousness. 'Therefore it is called avidyā' concludes with the original name. These manifold afflictions arise in reliance on the principle and in turn bewilder the true principle, yet the mind-nature has no arising. As for 'having no arising', because it does not return from knowing to non-knowing, it is called 'having no arising'. The conceptual discrimination of the deluded mind constitutes arising; since conceptual discrimination grasps the real while the real remains without conceptual discrimination, it is called 'having no arising'; the spiritual knowing still remains, and therefore it says, 'it is the meaning of the light of great wisdom.' This explains the first phrase. 'If the mind gives rise to view' refers to the discriminating mind. 'Then there is the mark of not seeing': this is because conceptual discrimination possesses marks. If there is pervasive seeing, there is the mark of not seeing; hence one knows that having knowing as a mark is called the deluded mind. As for 'The mind-nature is free from view', it is precisely knowing while devoid of the mark of knowing; illuminating without condition, this is precisely the meaning of 'pervasively illuminating the dharmadhātu'. Because spiritual knowing is efficacious, there is nothing it does not illuminate; yet because it does not condition, it is unobstructed, open and unhindered; being without obstruction, it is called 'pervasively illuminating the dharmadhātu'. From here below is the general explanation. 'If the mind has movement' refers to being perfumed by the three marks. The four phrases here are all inverse explanations. 'It is not true knowledge' inversely explains the meaning of 'true knowledge' above. 'It has no self-nature' inversely explains the 'intrinsically pure mind' above. 'It is not permanent...' and so on inversely explains the 'permanent, blissful, self, and pure' above. 'It is feverish, decaying, changing, and not sovereign' inversely explains the meaning of 'pure, unchanging, and sovereign' above. Because it is not shifted by the three marks, it thus possesses the four phrases. From 'and so forth...' downward explains the conclusion of virtues above, within which are two parts: first, explaining the conclusion of virtues. Within this are two parts: first, clarifying the inverse explanation, which refers to possessing the meaning of deluded defilements as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; second, clarifying the direct explanation, which refers to the mind-nature having no movement in contrast to this meaning, which is then 'manifested as marks of pure virtues exceeding the sands of the Ganges'. From here below explains the concluding names, within which are two parts: first, clearly showing what is not, meaning 'if the mind has arising and further sees prior dharmas as being thinkable, then it has a deficiency'; second, clearly showing what is right, meaning 'such pure dharmas of immeasurable virtues are precisely the one mind without duality, with nothing further to be thought of, and therefore being complete, it is called the dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha'. As for 'Furthermore, the function of tathatā', from here below is the second [major section], which clarifies what is taught. As for 'what is taught', it refers to the virtues of practice; virtues do not manifest of themselves but become manifest in reliance on the verbal teaching, and only through cultivation can they be fulfilled. Within this are two parts: first, clarifying the virtues of practice; second, from 'This function has...' downward, clarifying the differences in the benefits gained from seeing and hearing. In the first part there are four: first, clarifying the practice of transforming beings while on the causal stage; second, from 'For what reason is this?' downward, clarifying the causal virtue of precepts; third, from 'And also...' downward, clarifying the contemplation of the ultimate truth; fourth, from 'Merely following...' downward, clarifying the contemplation of the conventional truth. 'Furthermore, the function of tathatā' is stating the title. From 'What is called...' downward is the direct clarification. 'Giving rise to great compassion' refers to the four immeasurables. 'Cultivating all pāramitās' refers to the six perfections. 'Gathering and transforming sentient beings' refers to the four means of embracing. 'Establishing great vows' refers to the four universal vows. These four phrases clarify the substance of the practice of transforming beings. Below clarifies the temporal span: completely delivering sentient beings, not limited by kalpas, reaching to the end of the future. As for 'Taking sentient beings to be like one's own body', it distinguishes the mind of equality. Here there is the practice of equality, not empty practice. As for 'yet not grasping at sentient beings', this removes attachment. If one is attached to the marks of sentient beings, one cannot deliver sentient beings. This is empty practice. From here below, the second part from 'For what reason is this?' downward clarifies virtue. Within this are two parts: first, conditioned illumination; second, clarifying true illumination. 'For what reason is this?' raises a question to introduce [the topic]. 'It means knowing in accordance with reality' is conditioned wisdom; wisdom that accords with the real is called 'knowing in accordance with reality'. As for 'All sentient beings and one's own body are tathatā-equal', it is because their substance is not different. This clarifies the substance of wisdom; next it differentiates the function of wisdom: 'because of possessing such wisdom of great upāya, one extinguishes avidyā and sees the original dharmakāya.' Next it clarifies true illumination. 'Naturally possessing inconceivable activities' is the saṃbhogakāya. 'Manifold functions' is the nirmāṇakāya; this is the function of practice. 'Namely, being co-extensive with tathatā pervasively in all places' means that practice is identical to principle. From here below, the third part clarifies the contemplation of the ultimate truth, within which are two parts: first, the direct explanation. 'Furthermore, no mark of function can be apprehended' is because a function distinct from the substance cannot be apprehended. Second, the explanation. Why can it not be apprehended? 'Because the Buddhas are solely the dharmakāya and wisdom-body.' 'The ultimate truth' is this true contemplation. This is like the ten bodies mutually acting as each other in the Avataṃsaka. Looking from the perspective of the real, there is no distinct function contemplating saṃsāra. Next, differentiating the fourth, which clarifies the contemplation of the conventional truth: 'Merely in accordance with what sentient beings see and hear, obtaining benefit, it is therefore spoken of as function.'

Linked texts (1)