大乘起信論義疏 2.31

2.31

自下第二明對治邪執，於中兩門分別：一者、明種種邪執不同，顯示正義；二者、隨文解釋。就初中有三：一者、就事識中對治邪執，顯示正義；二者、據妄識中對治邪執，顯示正義；三者、約真識中對治邪執，以顯正義。就事識中邪執有八：一者、執之定一。有人宣說：六識之心隨根雖別，體性是一，往來彼此，如一獼猴，六扃現俱非有六猴。心識如此，六根中現，非有六心，對此邪執說心非一，識無別體，緣知為義。六識之心，所依根異，所緣亦異，云何定一？若定是一，常了一塵不應轉變。又復心法無往來義，隨有知處，即彼處生，不得說言一而往來。又彼所引，獼猴為喻證心一者，是義不然。凡夫愚人謂猴定一、六扃中現；然實獼猴念念生滅，此扃現者不至彼扃。心識如是，依眼生者不至餘根，如是一切。二者、執定異別。有人宣說：六識之心體性定異。對此邪執說心不別，於事分齊相續一盧，非全別體。一獼猴遊於六扃，非有六猴。若言六識各別有體，別體之法不相忓頩，眼識還應從眼識生，乃至意識還從意生，不得相起。現見五識從意識生，意識從於五識而生，眼非別體。又若六識各別有體，別體之法不相妨礙，不相妨故六識之心，常應並有、恒應並用，不常並故，明無別體也。三者、執定常。有人聞說，三世之中業果不斷，謂心定常生死往來，常是一識，用雖興廢心體不變。對此邪執說識無常。人中心異、天中亦異，六道之心各各別異，云何是常？又如經說「苦相應心異，樂相應心異，不苦不樂相應心異。」如是一切各異，云何是常？但諸凡夫不知心相，妄謂是常，猶如小兒見旋火輪，謂不斷絕。若心常者，善應常善、惡應恒惡，無有變異，以變異故定知無常。四者、執定斷。有人聞說心識無常，便謂定斷。對治此執說心不斷，現世造業，後必得果。云何定斷？譬如乳酪轉變雖異，置毒乳中，酪則害人。心亦如是，此身造惡，必未受苦果報，明非是斷。五者、執定有。如《毘曇》說「十八界等各住已性，是有不空。謂言空者，但空陰上橫計我人，不空法體，法不空故心識定有。」對此邪執，說識是空。空相云何？識者正以別知為義。如一念識即具四相，初生次住終異後滅。於四中何者是知？為初相知、為中為後？若初相知者，餘應不知，餘若不知則不名識。若餘相知，初應不知，初若不知初不名識。若言四相各別是知，便是四念各別知法，何關一念具足四相？答言：四相別非是知，和合之中方知者非知共合。云何有知？如百盲聚，豈有所見。又復四相都無合理。云何無合者？生相現時餘相未有，餘誰共合？乃至第四滅相現時餘相已謝，復與誰合？進退推求都無合義，云何說言和合有知？知義既無，焉有定識？是故經說「色乃至受想行識，一切皆空也。」六者、執定無。有人聞說五陰空寂，便謂世諦因緣亦無。對治此執，說識非無。若無心識，云何而得見聞覺知？現見六識各有作用，明知不無。又若無識則無善惡，若無善惡亦無苦樂，則入邪見斷善根中，不宜受之。經言空者就真為論，於世諦中不無心識。七者、執心識獨立無數，如來實說。對治此執，說有同時心心數法。故《涅槃》云「我諸弟子不解我意，唱言：佛說定無心數。」又《涅槃》說「十大地中心數之定，明非無數。」又龍樹云「譬如池水，珠在則清，象入便濁。」水喻心王，珠象喻數，於彼喻中可說言水珠象一，心法如是，寧無別數？八者、執心外定有數。如《毘曇》說「對治此執，明非定別。」故《涅槃》云「我諸弟子不解我意，唱言：佛說定有心數。」若使心外定有別數，無預心事，無心之時何不別起？又若心外定有別數，識從意生，諸數亦應別有所依。若別有依，是義不然。云何不然？於彼宗中，說三性心相應各異，如欲界地善心起時，二十二數相應共生；不善起時，二十一數相應共生；無記起時，有十二數相應共生。從無記心起善惡時，十二同數可有所依？自餘別數意何所依？若無依生，是則心法無次第緣。經說不許。若無別依，依意生者與識同依，明非心外。道理云何？即彼心體同時具有，受想行等諸義差別，不同《成實》前後建立；就一心體隨義別分，不同《毘曇》異體建立，兩義兼通故非諍論。

Next below, the second [part] clarifies the counteragents to perverse attachments. Within this, there are two sections: first, clarifying the various different perverse attachments and displaying the correct meaning; second, explaining according to the text. In the first, there are three [subdivisions]: first, countering perverse attachments with respect to phenomenal consciousness and displaying the correct meaning; second, countering perverse attachments based on deluded consciousness and displaying the correct meaning; third, countering perverse attachments with respect to true consciousness in order to display the correct meaning. With respect to phenomenal consciousness, there are eight perverse attachments: First, grasping it as determinately one. Some people proclaim: 'Although the mind of the six consciousnesses differs according to the faculties, its nature and substance are one, coming and going between this and that, like a single monkey appearing in six windows, where there are not six monkeys together. The mind-consciousness is like this: appearing in the six faculties, there are not six minds.' Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that the mind is not one: consciousness has no separate substance; cognitive grasping through conditions is its meaning. For the mind of the six consciousnesses, the faculties relied upon are different, and the cognitive objects are also different; how could it be determinately one? If it were determinately one, it would always cognize one sense-object and would not undergo transformation. Furthermore, mental dharmas have no meaning of coming and going; wherever cognition occurs, it arises right in that place; one cannot say that it is one and comes and goes. Moreover, as for what they cited—taking the monkey as a simile to prove the unity of the mind—this meaning is not correct. Deluded worldlings think the monkey is determinately one and appears in six windows; yet in reality, the monkey arises and ceases moment by moment, and that which appears in this window does not go to that window. The mind-consciousness is like this: that which arises relying on the eye does not go to the other faculties; everything is like this. Second, grasping it as determinately distinct. Some people proclaim: 'The nature and substance of the mind of the six consciousnesses are determinately distinct.' Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that the mind is not distinct: within the scope of phenomenal affairs, continuity forms a single vessel; they are not completely separate substances. A single monkey wanders in six windows, yet there are not six monkeys. If one says that each of the six consciousnesses has a separate substance, then dharmas of separate substance would not obstruct or affect one another; eye-consciousness ought to arise again from eye-consciousness, and so on up to mental consciousness arising again from the mind, and they could not give rise to each other. We presently see that the five consciousnesses arise from mental consciousness, and mental consciousness arises from the five consciousnesses; the eye[-consciousness] is not a separate substance. Furthermore, if each of the six consciousnesses had a separate substance, dharmas of separate substance would not obstruct each other; because they do not obstruct each other, the minds of the six consciousnesses should always exist simultaneously and constantly function simultaneously. Because they do not constantly coexist, it is clear that they have no separate substance. Third, grasping it as determinately permanent. Some people hear it said that across the three time periods karma and its fruition are uninterrupted, and they suppose that the mind is determinately permanent, coming and going in saṃsāra, being constantly a single consciousness, its mental substance unchanging even as functions arise and decline. Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that consciousness is impermanent. The mind is different among humans, different among devas; the minds in the six destinies are each distinct; how could it be permanent? Moreover, as a sūtra says: 'A mind associated with suffering is different; a mind associated with pleasure is different; a mind associated with neither-suffering-nor-pleasure is different.' Since everything is distinct like this, how could it be permanent? It is merely that worldlings do not know the marks of the mind and falsely suppose it to be permanent, just as a child seeing a whirling firebrand thinks it is unbroken. If the mind were permanent, the wholesome should always be wholesome and the unwholesome should constantly be unwholesome without any change; because there is change, it is determinately known to be impermanent. Fourth, grasping it as determinately annihilated. Some people hear it said that mind-consciousness is impermanent and immediately suppose it to be determinately annihilated. Countering this attachment, it is said that the mind is uninterrupted: creating karma in the present life, one will definitely obtain the fruition later. How could it be determinately annihilated? For example, although the transformation of milk into curds is different, if one places poison in the milk, the curds will harm someone. The mind is also like this: if this body creates evil, in the future one will definitely experience the painful fruition-retribution; it is clear that it is not annihilated. Fifth, grasping it as determinately existent. As the Abhidharma says: 'The eighteen realms and the like each abide in their own nature; they are existent and not empty. When one speaks of emptiness, it is only that the self and person falsely conceptualized upon the aggregates are empty, but the substance of dharmas is not empty; because dharmas are not empty, mind-consciousness is determinately existent.' Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that consciousness is empty. What are the marks of emptiness? Consciousness precisely takes discriminating cognition as its meaning. For instance, a single thought of consciousness is endowed with the four marks: initially arising, next abiding, then changing, and finally ceasing. Among the four, which one is cognition? Is the initial mark cognition, or the middle, or the final? If the initial mark were cognition, the remaining [marks] should not be cognition; if the remaining were not cognition, they would not be called consciousness. If the remaining marks were cognition, the initial [mark] should not be cognition; if the initial were not cognition, the initial would not be called consciousness. If one says that each of the four marks is separately cognition, then there would be four thoughts separately cognizing dharmas; how would that relate to a single thought being fully endowed with the four marks? If one replies: 'The four marks separately are not cognition, but when combined together they cognize,' [then] things that are not cognition, when united together, how could they have cognition? Just as when a hundred blind people gather together, how could they have any sight? Furthermore, the four marks have no principle of combining at all. Why is there no combining? When the mark of arising is present, the other marks do not yet exist; with what else could it combine? And so on up to when the fourth mark of ceasing is present, the other marks have already passed away; with what again could it combine? Examining it forward and backward, there is no meaning of combining at all; how can one say that there is cognition in combination? Since the meaning of cognition does not exist, how could there be a determinate consciousness? Therefore a sūtra says: 'Form and so on up to feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness—all are empty.' Sixth, grasping it as determinately non-existent. Some people hear it said that the five aggregates are empty and quiescent, and immediately suppose that the causes and conditions of worldly truth also do not exist. Countering this attachment, it is said that consciousness is not non-existent. If there were no mind-consciousness, how could seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing be obtained? We presently see that each of the six consciousnesses has its own function; it is clearly known not to be non-existent. Furthermore, if there were no consciousness, there would be no wholesome or unwholesome; if there were no wholesome or unwholesome, there would also be neither suffering nor pleasure; this would fall into the perverse view of severing the roots of goodness and should not be accepted. When sūtras speak of emptiness, they discuss it with respect to the real; within worldly truth, mind-consciousness is not non-existent. Seventh, grasping that mind-consciousness stands alone without mental factors, as the Tathāgata's true teaching. Countering this attachment, it is said that there are simultaneous mind and mental factors. Hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: "The Buddha taught that there are determinately no mental factors."' The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] also says: 'The determination of mental factors among the ten universal mental dharmas clarifies that it is not without mental factors.' Nāgārjuna also says: 'For example, with pond water: when a gem is present it becomes clear, when an elephant enters it becomes turbid.' Water is a simile for the mind-king; the gem and elephant are similes for mental factors. In that simile, can one say that the water, gem, and elephant are one? Mental dharmas are like this; how could there be no separate mental factors? Eighth, grasping that mental factors determinately exist outside the mind. As the Abhidharma says. Countering this attachment, it is clarified that they are not determinately distinct. Hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: "The Buddha taught that there are determinately mental factors."' If there were determinately separate mental factors outside the mind, having nothing to do with the affairs of the mind, why would they not arise separately when there is no mind? Furthermore, if there were determinately separate mental factors outside the mind, then since consciousness arises from the mind, the various factors should also have a separate basis upon which to rely. If they had a separate basis to rely upon, this meaning would not be correct. Why is it not correct? In that school, it is said that minds of the three natures associate differently: for example, in the stage of the desire realm, when a wholesome mind arises, twenty-two mental factors arise together in association; when an unwholesome [mind] arises, twenty-one mental factors arise together in association; when an indeterminate [mind] arises, twelve mental factors arise together in association. When wholesome or unwholesome arises from an indeterminate mind, the twelve identical factors might have a basis to rely upon, but on what mind would the remaining different factors rely? If they arose without relying on anything, then mental dharmas would lack an immediately preceding condition, which the sūtra teachings do not allow. If they have no separate basis and arise relying on the mind, they share the same basis with consciousness, which clarifies that they are not outside the mind. What is the principle? Precisely that mental substance simultaneously possesses the various distinct meanings of feeling, perception, formations, and so on; it is not established sequentially as in the Tattvasiddhi, nor is it established with distinct substances according to the single mental substance divided by distinct meanings, as in the Abhidharma. Both meanings are accommodated, and thus there is no controversy.