大乘起信論義疏 2.31

2.31

Next below, the second [part] clarifies the counteragents to perverse attachments. Within this, there are two sections: first, clarifying the various different perverse attachments and displaying the correct meaning; second, explaining according to the text. In the first, there are three [subdivisions]: first, countering perverse attachments with respect to phenomenal consciousness and displaying the correct meaning; second, countering perverse attachments based on deluded consciousness and displaying the correct meaning; third, countering perverse attachments with respect to true consciousness in order to display the correct meaning. With respect to phenomenal consciousness, there are eight perverse attachments: First, grasping it as determinately one. Some people proclaim: 'Although the mind of the six consciousnesses differs according to the faculties, its nature and substance are one, coming and going between this and that, like a single monkey appearing in six windows, where there are not six monkeys together. The mind-consciousness is like this: appearing in the six faculties, there are not six minds.' Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that the mind is not one: consciousness has no separate substance; cognitive grasping through conditions is its meaning. For the mind of the six consciousnesses, the faculties relied upon are different, and the cognitive objects are also different; how could it be determinately one? If it were determinately one, it would always cognize one sense-object and would not undergo transformation. Furthermore, mental dharmas have no meaning of coming and going; wherever cognition occurs, it arises right in that place; one cannot say that it is one and comes and goes. Moreover, as for what they cited—taking the monkey as a simile to prove the unity of the mind—this meaning is not correct. Deluded worldlings think the monkey is determinately one and appears in six windows; yet in reality, the monkey arises and ceases moment by moment, and that which appears in this window does not go to that window. The mind-consciousness is like this: that which arises relying on the eye does not go to the other faculties; everything is like this. Second, grasping it as determinately distinct. Some people proclaim: 'The nature and substance of the mind of the six consciousnesses are determinately distinct.' Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that the mind is not distinct: within the scope of phenomenal affairs, continuity forms a single vessel; they are not completely separate substances. A single monkey wanders in six windows, yet there are not six monkeys. If one says that each of the six consciousnesses has a separate substance, then dharmas of separate substance would not obstruct or affect one another; eye-consciousness ought to arise again from eye-consciousness, and so on up to mental consciousness arising again from the mind, and they could not give rise to each other. We presently see that the five consciousnesses arise from mental consciousness, and mental consciousness arises from the five consciousnesses; the eye[-consciousness] is not a separate substance. Furthermore, if each of the six consciousnesses had a separate substance, dharmas of separate substance would not obstruct each other; because they do not obstruct each other, the minds of the six consciousnesses should always exist simultaneously and constantly function simultaneously. Because they do not constantly coexist, it is clear that they have no separate substance. Third, grasping it as determinately permanent. Some people hear it said that across the three time periods karma and its fruition are uninterrupted, and they suppose that the mind is determinately permanent, coming and going in saṃsāra, being constantly a single consciousness, its mental substance unchanging even as functions arise and decline. Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that consciousness is impermanent. The mind is different among humans, different among devas; the minds in the six destinies are each distinct; how could it be permanent? Moreover, as a sūtra says: 'A mind associated with suffering is different; a mind associated with pleasure is different; a mind associated with neither-suffering-nor-pleasure is different.' Since everything is distinct like this, how could it be permanent? It is merely that worldlings do not know the marks of the mind and falsely suppose it to be permanent, just as a child seeing a whirling firebrand thinks it is unbroken. If the mind were permanent, the wholesome should always be wholesome and the unwholesome should constantly be unwholesome without any change; because there is change, it is determinately known to be impermanent. Fourth, grasping it as determinately annihilated. Some people hear it said that mind-consciousness is impermanent and immediately suppose it to be determinately annihilated. Countering this attachment, it is said that the mind is uninterrupted: creating karma in the present life, one will definitely obtain the fruition later. How could it be determinately annihilated? For example, although the transformation of milk into curds is different, if one places poison in the milk, the curds will harm someone. The mind is also like this: if this body creates evil, in the future one will definitely experience the painful fruition-retribution; it is clear that it is not annihilated. Fifth, grasping it as determinately existent. As the Abhidharma says: 'The eighteen realms and the like each abide in their own nature; they are existent and not empty. When one speaks of emptiness, it is only that the self and person falsely conceptualized upon the aggregates are empty, but the substance of dharmas is not empty; because dharmas are not empty, mind-consciousness is determinately existent.' Countering this perverse attachment, it is said that consciousness is empty. What are the marks of emptiness? Consciousness precisely takes discriminating cognition as its meaning. For instance, a single thought of consciousness is endowed with the four marks: initially arising, next abiding, then changing, and finally ceasing. Among the four, which one is cognition? Is the initial mark cognition, or the middle, or the final? If the initial mark were cognition, the remaining [marks] should not be cognition; if the remaining were not cognition, they would not be called consciousness. If the remaining marks were cognition, the initial [mark] should not be cognition; if the initial were not cognition, the initial would not be called consciousness. If one says that each of the four marks is separately cognition, then there would be four thoughts separately cognizing dharmas; how would that relate to a single thought being fully endowed with the four marks? If one replies: 'The four marks separately are not cognition, but when combined together they cognize,' [then] things that are not cognition, when united together, how could they have cognition? Just as when a hundred blind people gather together, how could they have any sight? Furthermore, the four marks have no principle of combining at all. Why is there no combining? When the mark of arising is present, the other marks do not yet exist; with what else could it combine? And so on up to when the fourth mark of ceasing is present, the other marks have already passed away; with what again could it combine? Examining it forward and backward, there is no meaning of combining at all; how can one say that there is cognition in combination? Since the meaning of cognition does not exist, how could there be a determinate consciousness? Therefore a sūtra says: 'Form and so on up to feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness—all are empty.' Sixth, grasping it as determinately non-existent. Some people hear it said that the five aggregates are empty and quiescent, and immediately suppose that the causes and conditions of worldly truth also do not exist. Countering this attachment, it is said that consciousness is not non-existent. If there were no mind-consciousness, how could seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing be obtained? We presently see that each of the six consciousnesses has its own function; it is clearly known not to be non-existent. Furthermore, if there were no consciousness, there would be no wholesome or unwholesome; if there were no wholesome or unwholesome, there would also be neither suffering nor pleasure; this would fall into the perverse view of severing the roots of goodness and should not be accepted. When sūtras speak of emptiness, they discuss it with respect to the real; within worldly truth, mind-consciousness is not non-existent. Seventh, grasping that mind-consciousness stands alone without mental factors, as the Tathāgata's true teaching. Countering this attachment, it is said that there are simultaneous mind and mental factors. Hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: "The Buddha taught that there are determinately no mental factors."' The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] also says: 'The determination of mental factors among the ten universal mental dharmas clarifies that it is not without mental factors.' Nāgārjuna also says: 'For example, with pond water: when a gem is present it becomes clear, when an elephant enters it becomes turbid.' Water is a simile for the mind-king; the gem and elephant are similes for mental factors. In that simile, can one say that the water, gem, and elephant are one? Mental dharmas are like this; how could there be no separate mental factors? Eighth, grasping that mental factors determinately exist outside the mind. As the Abhidharma says. Countering this attachment, it is clarified that they are not determinately distinct. Hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: "The Buddha taught that there are determinately mental factors."' If there were determinately separate mental factors outside the mind, having nothing to do with the affairs of the mind, why would they not arise separately when there is no mind? Furthermore, if there were determinately separate mental factors outside the mind, then since consciousness arises from the mind, the various factors should also have a separate basis upon which to rely. If they had a separate basis to rely upon, this meaning would not be correct. Why is it not correct? In that school, it is said that minds of the three natures associate differently: for example, in the stage of the desire realm, when a wholesome mind arises, twenty-two mental factors arise together in association; when an unwholesome [mind] arises, twenty-one mental factors arise together in association; when an indeterminate [mind] arises, twelve mental factors arise together in association. When wholesome or unwholesome arises from an indeterminate mind, the twelve identical factors might have a basis to rely upon, but on what mind would the remaining different factors rely? If they arose without relying on anything, then mental dharmas would lack an immediately preceding condition, which the sūtra teachings do not allow. If they have no separate basis and arise relying on the mind, they share the same basis with consciousness, which clarifies that they are not outside the mind. What is the principle? Precisely that mental substance simultaneously possesses the various distinct meanings of feeling, perception, formations, and so on; it is not established sequentially as in the Tattvasiddhi, nor is it established with distinct substances according to the single mental substance divided by distinct meanings, as in the Abhidharma. Both meanings are accommodated, and thus there is no controversy.