大乘起信論義疏 2.42

2.42

就凡執中隨義具論，略有二種：一者、執有；二者、執無。執有之中，別有四種：一者、執實同神。有人聞說藏識是我，謂同外道所取神我。對治此執，說如來藏非我眾生，非命非人。二者、執真中具足真染。有人聞說生死二法是如來藏，便謂真中有生死。對治此執，說如來藏自性清淨。從本以來，唯有清淨恒沙佛法，無有染污。若言真中實有生死，而便證會永離生死，無有是處。若言有彼緣起作用，隨世法門非無此義。三者、執有淨相。有人聞說如來藏中，備有一切諸功德法不增不減，即謂真中有色心等自相著別。對治此執，說如來藏雖具諸法，依真如說，無彼此相、無自他相，乃至亦無離自他相；翻對染故，說彼真中具一切法。又彼真中，恒沙等法同體緣集無有差別，不得別取差別之相。四者、執始終相。有人聞說依如來藏有生死，謂如來藏始起生死。又復說如來之藏起生死故，雖得涅槃還起生死，起生死故涅槃有終。對治此執，說如來藏無始無終。以無始故，依起生死，生死無始。是以論言「若有宣說，三界之外，更有眾生初始起者，是外道說，非正佛法。以無終故依成涅槃。」涅槃無終，執無之中別有三種：一者、執空義以為真識。有人聞說真識離相是法無我，便謂六識七識空義即是真識。對治此執，說識不空。經言空者，於真識中無彼妄情所取相故名為空，非謂真識一向是空。故《唯識論》言「對彼凡夫、外道之人，取我我所，故說色等一切法空。非離言境一切皆空。」行者是其離言境者，謂佛行處唯有真識，更無餘識及外境界，云何言空？又復如彼《勝鬘經》說「宣說二識：一者、空如來藏，謂諸煩惱空無自實；二者、不空如來藏，謂過恒沙一切佛法。」又取六識、七識空理為真識者，是彼二中空如來藏，何關真識不空藏乎？又他經中宣說生空、法空及與第一義空，此三空外別更宣說利耶識空。明知六識、七識心空，非是真識。又真識中雖有空義，不說空義以為真識；事識之中雖有空義，不以空義以為真識；妄識之中雖有空義，不說空義以為妄識。真識亦爾。不說空義以為真識，真識是真實知之性，云何言空？若說心空為真識者，小乘法中亦說心空，以何義故不名真識？二者、執法身以為空。有人聞說如來法身畢竟寂滅，猶如虛空，是人不知為破著故，即謂法身一向是空。對治是執，說實不空。所言空者，對有故說，何處別有空體可得？又論說「一向境界但是心有，心外無法，若離妄心境界隨滅。唯有真心無所不遍，即是如來廣大性智，究竟善有非是虛空。」三者、執真如以為定空。有人聞說世間涅槃一切空寂，乃至真如亦畢竟空、離一切相，不知此等為破著故，即謂真如唯是其空。對治此執，說如來不空，具足無量性功德，云何言空？

Discussing pṛthagjanas' clinging fully according to its meaning, there are briefly two kinds: first, clinging to existence; second, clinging to non-existence. Within clinging to existence, there are specifically four kinds: First is clinging to it as an actual entity identical to an ātman. Some people, hearing it taught that the ālayavijñāna is the self, consider it identical to the spiritual self grasped by non-Buddhists. To counter this clinging, it is taught that the tathāgatagarbha is not a self, not a sentient being, not a life-principle, and not a person. Second is clinging that reality is fully replete with both true and defiled. Some people, hearing it taught that the two dharmas of saṃsāra are the tathāgatagarbha, thereupon consider that saṃsāra exists within reality. To counter this clinging, it is taught that the tathāgatagarbha is intrinsically pure: from the beginning, there are only pure Buddha-dharmas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, without any defilement. If one claims that saṃsāra truly exists within reality, yet one could realize and forever leave saṃsāra, that is impossible. If one says that it has that function of dependent origination according to conventional teaching, such an idea is not absent. Third is clinging to the existence of marks of purity. Some people, hearing it taught that the tathāgatagarbha is fully endowed with all meritorious dharmas without increase or decrease, immediately consider that within reality there are distinct individual marks of form, mind, and so forth. To counter this clinging, it is taught that although the tathāgatagarbha is endowed with all dharmas, spoken according to tathatā, there is no mark of this or that, no mark of self or other, and even no mark of separation from self and other; it is only to counter defilement that reality is spoken of as endowed with all dharmas. Furthermore, within reality, dharmas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges share the same substance and are conditionally gathered without distinction; one must not separately grasp marks of distinction. Fourth is clinging to marks of beginning and end. Some people, hearing it taught that saṃsāra exists based on the tathāgatagarbha, consider that the tathāgatagarbha initially produces saṃsāra. Moreover, they say that because the tathāgatagarbha produces saṃsāra, even after attaining nirvāṇa, it will produce saṃsāra again, and because it produces saṃsāra, nirvāṇa has an end. To counter this clinging, it is taught that the tathāgatagarbha has neither beginning nor end. Because it has no beginning, saṃsāra arises based on it, and saṃsāra has no beginning. Therefore the treatise says: 'If anyone proclaims that outside the three realms there are sentient beings who initially arose, this is a non-Buddhist doctrine, not the correct Buddha-Dharma. Because it has no end, nirvāṇa is accomplished based on it.' Nirvāṇa having no end, within clinging to non-existence there are specifically three kinds: First is clinging to the meaning of emptiness as the true consciousness. Some people, hearing it taught that the true consciousness is free of marks and is the selflessness of dharmas, thereupon consider the emptiness of the six and seven consciousnesses to be precisely the true consciousness. To counter this clinging, it is taught that consciousness is not empty. When the sūtras say it is empty, it is called empty because within the true consciousness there are no marks grasped by those false sentiments; it does not mean that the true consciousness is completely empty. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'To counter those pṛthagjanas and non-Buddhists who grasp a self and what belongs to a self, it is taught that all dharmas such as form are empty; it does not mean that the sphere beyond words is entirely empty.' For practitioners, that which is the sphere beyond words refers to the realm of the Buddha's practice, where there is only the true consciousness and no other consciousnesses or external realms—how could one say it is empty? Furthermore, as the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra teaches: 'Two consciousnesses are proclaimed: first, the empty tathāgatagarbha, meaning that all defilements are empty, lacking self-reality; second, the non-empty tathāgatagarbha, meaning all Buddha-dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges.' Moreover, if one grasps the empty principle of the six and seven consciousnesses as the true consciousness, that is the empty tathāgatagarbha among those two; what has it to do with the non-empty garbha of the true consciousness? Furthermore, other sūtras teach the emptiness of persons, the emptiness of dharmas, and the emptiness of the ultimate truth; outside these three emptinesses, they additionally teach the emptiness of the ālaya consciousness. Hence it is clear that the emptiness of the minds of the six and seven consciousnesses is not the true consciousness. Furthermore, although there is the meaning of emptiness within the true consciousness, one does not speak of the meaning of emptiness as the true consciousness; although there is the meaning of emptiness within the phenomena-consciousness, one does not take the meaning of emptiness to be the true consciousness; although there is the meaning of emptiness within the false consciousness, one does not speak of the meaning of emptiness as the false consciousness. The true consciousness is also like this: one does not speak of the meaning of emptiness as the true consciousness; the true consciousness is the nature of true knowing, so how could one say it is empty? If one spoke of the emptiness of mind as the true consciousness, the Hīnayāna teachings also speak of the emptiness of mind—by what meaning would it not be called the true consciousness? Second is clinging to the dharmakāya as empty. Some people, hearing it taught that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is ultimately quiescent like empty space, not knowing that this was to break attachments, immediately consider that the dharmakāya is completely empty. To counter this clinging, it is taught that it is truly not empty. What is called empty is spoken in contrast to existence; where else could a separate substance of emptiness be found? Furthermore, the treatise says: 'Objects are solely existent in mind; there are no dharmas outside the mind. If one departs from the false mind, objects cease accordingly. There is only the true mind, all-pervading, which is the Tathāgata's vast innate wisdom, ultimately and truly existing, not empty space.' Third is clinging to tathatā as definitively empty. Some people, hearing it taught that the mundane world and nirvāṇa are all empty and quiescent, and even tathatā is ultimately empty and free from all marks, not knowing that these were to break attachments, immediately consider that tathatā is solely empty. To counter this clinging, it is taught that the Tathāgata is not empty, being fully endowed with immeasurable innate qualities; how could one say it is empty?