起信論疏 1.18

1.18

「復次」以下，第二明真如相。在文有三：一者舉數總標、二者依數開章、三者依章別解。別解中即有二：先明空中，即有三句：略明、廣釋、第三總結。初中言「一切染法不相應」者，能所分別不相應故；「離一切法差別相」者，離所取相故；「以無虛妄心念故」者，離能取見故，即以離義而釋空也。廣釋之中，明絕四句。四句雖多，其要有二：謂有無等及一異等。以此二四句攝諸妄執，故對此二以顯真空。如《廣百論》云：「復次為顯世間所執諸法皆非真實，及顯外道所執不同。」故說頌曰：「有非有俱非，一非一雙泯，隨次應配屬，智者達非真。」釋曰：一切世間色等句義，言說所表、心慧所知、情執不同，略有四種：謂有、非有、俱許、俱非。隨次如應配四邪執：謂一、非一、雙許、雙非。數論外道執有等性與諸法一，即當有句。此執非真，所以者何？若青等色與色性一，應如色性，其體皆同；五樂等聲與聲性一，應如聲性，其體皆同；眼等諸根與根性一，應如根性，其體皆同，應一一根取一切境、應一一境對一切根。又一切法與有性一，應如有性，其體皆同也。勝論外道說有等性與諸法非一，當非有句。此亦非真。所以者何？若青等色與色性異，應如聲等非眼所行，聲等亦爾。又一切法異有性者，應如兔角其體本無，乃至廣破。無慚外道執有等性與彼諸法亦一亦異，當於亦有亦非有句。此亦非真。所以者何？若有性等與色等一，同數論過；與色等異，同勝論失。一異二種性相相違，而言體同，理不成立。一應非一，以即異故如異；異應非異，以即一故如一，乃至廣破。邪命外道執有性等與彼諸法非一非異，當於非有非非有句。此亦非真。所以者何？汝此所說非一異者，為俱是遮、為偏有表？若偏有表，應不雙非；若俱是遮，應無所執。有遮有表，理互相違；無遮無表，言成戲論，乃至廣破。如是世間起四種謗：謂有、非有、雙許、雙非，如次增益、損減、相違、戲論，是故世間所執非實。今此文中，「非有相」，是遣初句；「非無相」者，遣第二句；「非非有相、非非無相」者，遣第四句；「非有無俱」者，遣第三句。二句前後，隨論者意，皆有道理，不相傷也。一異四句，準釋可知，「乃至」以下，第三總結。於中二句：從此以下乃至「曰為空」，是順結也；「若離」以下，是反結也。釋「不空」中，亦有三句：初牒空門，謂言「已顯法體空無妄故」。次顯不空，「即是真心乃至則名不空」故。「亦無有相」以下，第三明空不空無二差別。雖曰不空，而無有相，是故不空不異於空。以離分別所緣境界，唯無分別所證相應故也。

From “Furthermore” onward is the second part, clarifying the characteristics of tathatā. The text has three parts: first, citing the number as a general indication; second, setting out the sections according to the number; third, explaining them separately according to the sections. In the separate explanation there are two: first, clarifying the empty, which has three clauses: a brief clarification, a detailed explanation, and third, a general conclusion. In the first, saying “it is not associated with any defiled phenomena” means that subject and object distinctions are not associated; “it is free from the distinct characteristics of all phenomena” means that it is free from the characteristics of the grasped; “because there are no false thoughts of the mind” means that it is free from the view of the grasper; thus it explains emptiness by means of the sense of freedom [from them]. In the detailed explanation, it clarifies the transcendence of the four extremes (catuskoṭi). Although the four extremes are many, their essentials are two: namely, existence/non-existence and the like, and oneness/difference and the like. Because these two sets of four extremes subsume all false attachments, true emptiness is revealed in contrast to these two. As the *Śataka-śāstra-vaipulya* states: “Furthermore, to reveal that all phenomena grasped by the worldly are unreal, and to reveal the differences grasped by non-Buddhists,” it utters this verse: “Existence, non-existence, both, and neither; / oneness, non-oneness, the negation of both; / each should be matched in corresponding order; / the wise penetrate their unreality.” The commentary states: All worldly categories such as matter, expressed by speech, known by the mental intellect, and falsely grasped, are briefly of four kinds: namely, existence, non-existence, admitting both, and denying both. According to their order, they should be matched with the four heterodox attachments: namely, oneness, non-oneness, admitting both, and denying both. The Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists hold that the nature of existence and the like is one with all phenomena, which corresponds to the extreme of existence. This attachment is not real. Why is this? If forms such as blue were one with the nature of form, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of form; if sounds such as the five musical notes were one with the nature of sound, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of sound; if the sense organs such as the eye were one with the nature of sense organs, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of sense organs, and each single sense organ should take all objects, and each single object should correspond to all sense organs. Furthermore, if all phenomena were one with the nature of existence, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of existence. The Vaiśeṣika non-Buddhists state that the nature of existence and the like is not one with all phenomena, corresponding to the extreme of non-existence. This is also not real. Why is this? If forms such as blue were different from the nature of form, they should not be the domain of the eye, like sound and the like; and sound and the like would be the same. Furthermore, if all phenomena were different from the nature of existence, their essence would fundamentally not exist, like the horns of a hare, down to extensive refutations. The non-shameless non-Buddhists (Nirgrantha) hold that the nature of existence and the like is both one with and different from those phenomena, corresponding to the extreme of both existence and non-existence. This is also not real. Why is this? If the nature of existence were one with form and the like, it would share the fault of the Sāṃkhya; if it were different from form and the like, it would share the error of the Vaiśeṣika. The two natures and characteristics of oneness and difference contradict each other, so to say their essence is the same cannot be rationally established. Oneness should not be one, because being identical with difference, it would be like difference; difference should not be different, because being identical with oneness, it would be like oneness, down to extensive refutations. The Ājīvika non-Buddhists hold that the nature of existence and the like is neither one with nor different from those phenomena, corresponding to the extreme of neither existence nor non-existence. This is also not real. Why is this? As for this which you speak of as neither one nor different: are both negations, or is one an affirmation? If one is an affirmation, there should not be a dual negation; if both are negations, there should be nothing grasped. Having both negation and affirmation is rationally contradictory; having neither negation nor affirmation makes words into idle discourse, down to extensive refutations. In this way, the worldly give rise to four kinds of slanders: namely, existence, non-existence, admitting both, and denying both, which correspond in turn to exaggeration, deprecation, contradiction, and idle discourse; therefore, what is grasped by the worldly is not real. Now, in this text, “without the characteristic of existence” rejects the first extreme; “without the characteristic of non-existence” rejects the second extreme; “without the characteristic of neither existence nor non-existence” rejects the fourth extreme; “without both existence and non-existence” rejects the third extreme. The sequence of the two extremes, following the intention of the treatise master, is in both cases reasonable and not contradictory. The four extremes of oneness and difference can be understood by analogy. From “down to” onward is the third part, the general conclusion. Within it are two clauses: from here down to “is called empty” is the affirmative conclusion; from “if free from” onward is the reverse conclusion. In the explanation of “non-empty,” there are also three clauses: first, citing the gate of emptiness, that is, saying “having already revealed that the essence of phenomena is empty and without falsity”; next, revealing the non-empty, “namely, the true mind […] is therefore called non-empty”; from “also without any characteristic” onward is the third part, clarifying that between empty and non-empty there is no dual distinction. Although it is called non-empty, it has no characteristics; therefore, non-empty is not different from empty. Because it is free from the objective realm of conceptual distinction, it is associated only with that which is realized by non-discriminative [wisdom].