起信論疏 1.18

1.18

From “Furthermore” onward is the second part, clarifying the characteristics of tathatā. The text has three parts: first, citing the number as a general indication; second, setting out the sections according to the number; third, explaining them separately according to the sections. In the separate explanation there are two: first, clarifying the empty, which has three clauses: a brief clarification, a detailed explanation, and third, a general conclusion. In the first, saying “it is not associated with any defiled phenomena” means that subject and object distinctions are not associated; “it is free from the distinct characteristics of all phenomena” means that it is free from the characteristics of the grasped; “because there are no false thoughts of the mind” means that it is free from the view of the grasper; thus it explains emptiness by means of the sense of freedom [from them]. In the detailed explanation, it clarifies the transcendence of the four extremes (catuskoṭi). Although the four extremes are many, their essentials are two: namely, existence/non-existence and the like, and oneness/difference and the like. Because these two sets of four extremes subsume all false attachments, true emptiness is revealed in contrast to these two. As the *Śataka-śāstra-vaipulya* states: “Furthermore, to reveal that all phenomena grasped by the worldly are unreal, and to reveal the differences grasped by non-Buddhists,” it utters this verse: “Existence, non-existence, both, and neither; / oneness, non-oneness, the negation of both; / each should be matched in corresponding order; / the wise penetrate their unreality.” The commentary states: All worldly categories such as matter, expressed by speech, known by the mental intellect, and falsely grasped, are briefly of four kinds: namely, existence, non-existence, admitting both, and denying both. According to their order, they should be matched with the four heterodox attachments: namely, oneness, non-oneness, admitting both, and denying both. The Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists hold that the nature of existence and the like is one with all phenomena, which corresponds to the extreme of existence. This attachment is not real. Why is this? If forms such as blue were one with the nature of form, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of form; if sounds such as the five musical notes were one with the nature of sound, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of sound; if the sense organs such as the eye were one with the nature of sense organs, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of sense organs, and each single sense organ should take all objects, and each single object should correspond to all sense organs. Furthermore, if all phenomena were one with the nature of existence, they should be identical in essence, just like the nature of existence. The Vaiśeṣika non-Buddhists state that the nature of existence and the like is not one with all phenomena, corresponding to the extreme of non-existence. This is also not real. Why is this? If forms such as blue were different from the nature of form, they should not be the domain of the eye, like sound and the like; and sound and the like would be the same. Furthermore, if all phenomena were different from the nature of existence, their essence would fundamentally not exist, like the horns of a hare, down to extensive refutations. The non-shameless non-Buddhists (Nirgrantha) hold that the nature of existence and the like is both one with and different from those phenomena, corresponding to the extreme of both existence and non-existence. This is also not real. Why is this? If the nature of existence were one with form and the like, it would share the fault of the Sāṃkhya; if it were different from form and the like, it would share the error of the Vaiśeṣika. The two natures and characteristics of oneness and difference contradict each other, so to say their essence is the same cannot be rationally established. Oneness should not be one, because being identical with difference, it would be like difference; difference should not be different, because being identical with oneness, it would be like oneness, down to extensive refutations. The Ājīvika non-Buddhists hold that the nature of existence and the like is neither one with nor different from those phenomena, corresponding to the extreme of neither existence nor non-existence. This is also not real. Why is this? As for this which you speak of as neither one nor different: are both negations, or is one an affirmation? If one is an affirmation, there should not be a dual negation; if both are negations, there should be nothing grasped. Having both negation and affirmation is rationally contradictory; having neither negation nor affirmation makes words into idle discourse, down to extensive refutations. In this way, the worldly give rise to four kinds of slanders: namely, existence, non-existence, admitting both, and denying both, which correspond in turn to exaggeration, deprecation, contradiction, and idle discourse; therefore, what is grasped by the worldly is not real. Now, in this text, “without the characteristic of existence” rejects the first extreme; “without the characteristic of non-existence” rejects the second extreme; “without the characteristic of neither existence nor non-existence” rejects the fourth extreme; “without both existence and non-existence” rejects the third extreme. The sequence of the two extremes, following the intention of the treatise master, is in both cases reasonable and not contradictory. The four extremes of oneness and difference can be understood by analogy. From “down to” onward is the third part, the general conclusion. Within it are two clauses: from here down to “is called empty” is the affirmative conclusion; from “if free from” onward is the reverse conclusion. In the explanation of “non-empty,” there are also three clauses: first, citing the gate of emptiness, that is, saying “having already revealed that the essence of phenomena is empty and without falsity”; next, revealing the non-empty, “namely, the true mind […] is therefore called non-empty”; from “also without any characteristic” onward is the third part, clarifying that between empty and non-empty there is no dual distinction. Although it is called non-empty, it has no characteristics; therefore, non-empty is not different from empty. Because it is free from the objective realm of conceptual distinction, it is associated only with that which is realized by non-discriminative [wisdom].