起信論疏 2.1.1

2.1.1

From "Furthermore" below is the third [section], which elaborates on the aspects of arising and ceasing in the "Establishing the Meaning" section above. Within this there are two parts: first, clarifying the coarse and subtle aspects of arising and ceasing, and second, revealing the meaning of coarse and subtle arising and ceasing. The first part also has two sections: first, directly clarifying the coarse and subtle; second, distinguishing them with respect to persons. The first [of these] also has two: a general indication and a particular explanation. In the particular explanation, where it says "First is the coarse, because it corresponds with the mind," among the six kinds of defilement, the first three defilements correspond with the mind, and their aspects are coarse and manifest. In the sūtras, this is called "the arising and ceasing of aspects." Where it says "Second is the subtle, because it does not correspond with the mind," the latter three defiled minds do not correspond [with the mind], lacking the coarse and manifest aspects of mind and mental factors; their essence is subtle and flows constantly without interruption. In the sūtras, this is called "the arising and ceasing of continuity." As the ten-fascicle sūtra says: "Consciousness has two kinds of cessation. What are the two? First is the cessation of aspects, and second is the cessation of continuity; arising and abiding are likewise." The four-fascicle sūtra says: "The consciousnesses have two kinds of arising, abiding, and ceasing: namely, continuous arising and aspect arising; cessation is likewise." The sūtras merely present the two terms without separately manifesting their aspects; therefore, the author of the treatise now draws upon the meanings of corresponding and non-corresponding to distinguish the two kinds of coarse and subtle aspects. In distinguishing them with respect to persons, the "coarse among the coarse" refers to the first two among the first three; the "subtle among the coarse" is the latter one among these three. Because the first two among the former are both in the mental consciousness (manovijñāna), their active aspects are coarse, and thus they are known by ordinary beings. The latter one among the former is the seventh consciousness; its active aspect is not coarse, so it cannot be understood by ordinary beings. The first two among the latter are capable of manifesting and capable of perceiving, with a distinction between subject and object; hence they are known by bodhisattvas. The final one has not yet divided into subject and object; therefore, only a Buddha can fully comprehend it. From here below is the second [part], clarifying the meaning of arising and ceasing, which contains two: first, clarifying the conditions for arising; second, revealing the meaning of cessation. The first [of these] also has two: first, clarifying the common conditions; second, revealing the particular causes. Speaking generally, both coarse and subtle consciousnesses arise by relying on the ground of avidyā; hence it says: "The two kinds of arising and ceasing exist by relying on the perfuming of avidyā." Speaking particularly, because of reliance on the cause of avidyā, the non-corresponding mind arises; because of reliance on the condition of objects, the corresponding mind is able to arise; hence it says: "Relying on the cause means the sense of non-enlightenment; relying on the condition means the sense of falsely creating objects." If stated with complete meaning, each has two causes. As the four-fascicle sūtra says: "Mahāmati! Inconceivable perfuming and inconceivable transformation are the causes of the manifesting consciousness; grasping various dusts and the perfuming of beginningless false conceptualisation are the causes of the object-discriminating consciousness." The explanation says: "Inconceivable perfuming" means that avidyā can perfume tathatā; because it can perfume where it cannot be perfumed, it is called inconceivable perfuming. "Inconceivable transformation" means that tathatā receives the perfuming of avidyā; because it is transformed where it cannot be transformed, it is called inconceivable transformation. This perfuming and transformation are extremely subtle and hidden; therefore, the active aspect of the manifesting consciousness that arises is subtle, and within it there are also the evolving consciousness and the karmic consciousness; however, mentioning the coarse encompasses the subtle, so it is only called the manifesting consciousness. "Grasping various dusts" means that the various objects grasped by the manifesting consciousness can stir the ocean of mind and raise the waves of the seven consciousnesses. "The perfuming of beginningless false conceptualisation" means that this very manifesting consciousness is called false conceptualisation; since it has never been separated from conception from the beginning, it is called beginningless false conceptualisation. As the text above says, because it has never been separated from thought from the beginning, it is called "beginningless avidyā"; false conceptualisation here should be known to be likewise. As the ten-fascicle sūtra says: "The ālayavijñāna is called the aspect of consciousness that knows, whose essential aspect is like a circle of hair abiding in empty space—the realm traversed by impure wisdom." By this principle, it is false conceptualisation. Those various dusts and this false conceptualisation perfume the ocean of mind of self-character, causing the waves of the seven consciousnesses to arise. False conceptualisation and dusts are coarse and manifest; therefore, the object-discriminating consciousness they give rise to has coarse and manifest active aspects and becomes the corresponding mind. It is intended to show that the manifesting consciousness is able to arise because of the cause of inconceivable perfuming, and is able to abide by relying on inconceivable transformation; the object-discriminating consciousness is able to arise due to the condition of various dusts, and is able to abide by relying on the perfuming of false conceptualisation. Now, this treatise merely takes the conditions for arising; therefore, regarding the subtle, it only speaks of the perfuming of avidyā, and regarding the coarse, it solely mentions the condition of objects. From "If the cause ceases" below, it next reveals the meaning of cessation, within which there are two: first, a direct explanation; from "Question:" below, an exchange to dispel doubts. In the beginning, where it says "If the cause ceases, then the condition ceases," it means that at whatever stage the antidote is attained, the cause of avidyā ceases, and objects cease accordingly. Where it says "Because the cause ceases, the non-corresponding mind ceases," it means that the three kinds of non-corresponding mind arise in direct reliance on the cause of avidyā; therefore, when avidyā ceases, they also cease accordingly. Where it says "Because the condition ceases, the corresponding mind ceases," it means that the three kinds of corresponding defiled mind arise in direct reliance on the condition of objects; therefore, when objects cease, they also cease accordingly. By relying on this principle of beginning and end, arising and exhaustion, it clarifies the meaning of the two kinds of arising and ceasing, not in terms of the meaning of moment-to-moment arising and ceasing. From here below is the second, an exchange to dispel doubts, first a question and then an answer. In the question, where it says "If the mind ceases, how can there be continuity?" this question is raised with respect to what non-Buddhists say. As the ten-fascicle sūtra says: "If the ālayavijñāna were to cease, it would not differ from the conceptual proliferation of the nihilistic view of non-Buddhists. The various non-Buddhists say: 'Free from various objects, the continuous consciousness ceases; after the continuous consciousness has ceased, all consciousnesses cease.' Mahāmati! If the continuous consciousness were to cease, all consciousnesses from beginningless worldly realms would have to cease." This meaning directly explains that the non-Buddhists say that, just as when being born into the heaven of non-conception or entering the absorption of non-conception, being free from all objects, the continuous consciousness ceases; because the root ceases, the branches also cease accordingly. The Tathāgata refutes this, saying: if, when those sentient beings enter non-conception, the continuous consciousness that is the root of sentient beings were to cease, the seeds of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, and so forth, would cease accordingly, and all consciousnesses should not arise again from that; yet when emerging from that, all consciousnesses arise again, so one should know that when entering non-conception, that continuous consciousness does not cease. Such is the refutation. Now, in this treatise, it inquires based on this: if the essence of the mind were to cease when entering the absorption of non-conception or the absorption of cessation, how could it continue again? Hence it says: "If the mind ceases, how can there be continuity?" If, when entering those [absorptions], the essence of the mind does not cease and continues again, by what means could this aspect of continuity ever cease permanently? Hence it says: "How can one speak of ultimate cessation?" In the answer, there are three parts: namely, the principle, the simile, and the application.