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起信論疏 2.1.1

起信論疏 2.1.1

Language
Classical Chinese

2.1.1

「復次」以下,第三廣上立義分中生滅之相,於中有二:先明生滅麁細之相、後顯麁細生滅之義。 初中亦二:一者正明麁細、二者對人分別。 初中亦二:總標、別解。 別解中言「一者麁,與心相應故」者,六種染中,前之三染,是心相應,其相麁顯。 經中說名為相生滅也。 「二者細,與心不相應故」者,後三染心,是不相應,無心心法麁顯之相; 其體微細,恒流不絕。 經中說名相續生滅。 如十卷經云「識有二種滅。 何等為二? 一者相滅、二相續滅; 生住亦如是。 」四卷經云「諸識有二種生住滅,所謂流注生及相生,滅亦如是。 」經中直出二種名字,不別顯相; 故今論主約於相應不相應義,以辨二種麁細相也。 對人分別中,麁中之麁者,謂前三中初二是也; 麁中之細者,即此三中後一是也。 以前中初二俱在意識,行相是麁,故凡夫所知也。 前中後一是第七識,行相不麁,非凡所了也; 後中初二能現能見,能所差別,故菩薩所知; 最後一者,能所未分,故唯佛能了也。 此下第二明生滅義,於中有二:先明生緣、後顯滅義。 初中亦二:先明通緣、後顯別因。 通而言之,麁細二識皆依無明住地而起,故言「二種生滅依於無明熏習而有」; 別而言之,依無明因故,不相應心生; 依境界緣故,相應心得起,故言「依因者不覺義故,依緣者妄作境界義」。 若具義說,各有二因。 如四卷經云「大慧! 不思議熏,及不思議變,是現識因; 取種種塵,及無始妄想熏,是分別事識因。 」解云:不思議熏者,謂無明能熏真如,不可熏處而能熏故,故名不可思議熏也。 不思議變者,所謂真如受無明熏,不可變異而變異故,故名不思議變。 此熏及變甚微且隱,故所起現識行相微細,於中亦有轉識業識; 然舉麁兼細,故但名現識也。 取種種塵者,現識所取種種境界,能動心海起七識浪故。 無始妄想熏者,即彼現識名為妄想,從本以來未曾離想,故名無始妄想。 如上文言,以從本來未曾離念,故名「無始無明」,此中妄想當知亦爾。 如十卷經云「阿梨耶識知名識相,所有體相,如虛空中有毛輪住,不淨智所行境界。 」由是道理故是妄想。 彼種種塵及此妄想,熏於自相心海,令起七識波浪。 妄想及塵,麁而且顯,故其所起分別事識,行相麁顯,成相應心也。 欲明現識因不思議熏故得生,依不思議變故得住; 分別事識緣種種塵故得生,依妄想熏故得住。 今此論中但取生緣,故細中唯說無明熏,麁中單舉境界緣也。 「若因滅」下,次顯滅義,於中有二:一者直明; 「問曰」以下,往復除疑。 始中言「若因滅則緣滅」者,隨於何位得對治時,無明因滅,境界隨滅也。 「因滅故不相應心滅」者,三種不相應心親依無明因生,故無明滅時亦隨滅也。 「緣滅故相應心滅」者,三種相應染心親依境界緣起,故境界滅時亦隨滅也。 依是始終起盡道理,以明二種生滅之義,非約剎那生滅義也。 此下第二往復除疑,先問、後答。 問中言「若心滅者云何相續」者,對外道說而作是問。 如十卷經云「若阿梨耶識滅者,不異外道斷見戲論。 諸外道說『離諸境界,相續識滅,相續識滅已,即滅諸識。 』大慧! 若相續識滅者,無始世來諸識應滅。 」此意正明諸外道說,如生無想天,入無想定時,離諸境界,相續識滅; 根本滅故,末亦隨滅也。 如來破云:若彼眾生入無想時,眾生之本相續識滅者,六七識等種子隨滅,不應從彼還起諸識; 而從彼出還起諸識,當知入無想時,其相續識不滅,如是破也。 今此論中依此而問,若入無想定、滅盡定時心體滅者,云何還續? 故言若心滅者云何相續也。 若入彼時心體不滅還相續者,此相續相何由永滅? 故言「云何說究竟滅」也。 答中有三,謂法、喻、合。

From "Furthermore" below is the third [section], which elaborates on the aspects of arising and ceasing in the "Establishing the Meaning" section above. Within this there are two parts: first, clarifying the coarse and subtle aspects of arising and ceasing, and second, revealing the meaning of coarse and subtle arising and ceasing. The first part also has two sections: first, directly clarifying the coarse and subtle; second, distinguishing them with respect to persons. The first [of these] also has two: a general indication and a particular explanation. In the particular explanation, where it says "First is the coarse, because it corresponds with the mind," among the six kinds of defilement, the first three defilements correspond with the mind, and their aspects are coarse and manifest. In the sūtras, this is called "the arising and ceasing of aspects." Where it says "Second is the subtle, because it does not correspond with the mind," the latter three defiled minds do not correspond [with the mind], lacking the coarse and manifest aspects of mind and mental factors; their essence is subtle and flows constantly without interruption. In the sūtras, this is called "the arising and ceasing of continuity." As the ten-fascicle sūtra says: "Consciousness has two kinds of cessation. What are the two? First is the cessation of aspects, and second is the cessation of continuity; arising and abiding are likewise." The four-fascicle sūtra says: "The consciousnesses have two kinds of arising, abiding, and ceasing: namely, continuous arising and aspect arising; cessation is likewise." The sūtras merely present the two terms without separately manifesting their aspects; therefore, the author of the treatise now draws upon the meanings of corresponding and non-corresponding to distinguish the two kinds of coarse and subtle aspects. In distinguishing them with respect to persons, the "coarse among the coarse" refers to the first two among the first three; the "subtle among the coarse" is the latter one among these three. Because the first two among the former are both in the mental consciousness (manovijñāna), their active aspects are coarse, and thus they are known by ordinary beings. The latter one among the former is the seventh consciousness; its active aspect is not coarse, so it cannot be understood by ordinary beings. The first two among the latter are capable of manifesting and capable of perceiving, with a distinction between subject and object; hence they are known by bodhisattvas. The final one has not yet divided into subject and object; therefore, only a Buddha can fully comprehend it. From here below is the second [part], clarifying the meaning of arising and ceasing, which contains two: first, clarifying the conditions for arising; second, revealing the meaning of cessation. The first [of these] also has two: first, clarifying the common conditions; second, revealing the particular causes. Speaking generally, both coarse and subtle consciousnesses arise by relying on the ground of avidyā; hence it says: "The two kinds of arising and ceasing exist by relying on the perfuming of avidyā." Speaking particularly, because of reliance on the cause of avidyā, the non-corresponding mind arises; because of reliance on the condition of objects, the corresponding mind is able to arise; hence it says: "Relying on the cause means the sense of non-enlightenment; relying on the condition means the sense of falsely creating objects." If stated with complete meaning, each has two causes. As the four-fascicle sūtra says: "Mahāmati! Inconceivable perfuming and inconceivable transformation are the causes of the manifesting consciousness; grasping various dusts and the perfuming of beginningless false conceptualisation are the causes of the object-discriminating consciousness." The explanation says: "Inconceivable perfuming" means that avidyā can perfume tathatā; because it can perfume where it cannot be perfumed, it is called inconceivable perfuming. "Inconceivable transformation" means that tathatā receives the perfuming of avidyā; because it is transformed where it cannot be transformed, it is called inconceivable transformation. This perfuming and transformation are extremely subtle and hidden; therefore, the active aspect of the manifesting consciousness that arises is subtle, and within it there are also the evolving consciousness and the karmic consciousness; however, mentioning the coarse encompasses the subtle, so it is only called the manifesting consciousness. "Grasping various dusts" means that the various objects grasped by the manifesting consciousness can stir the ocean of mind and raise the waves of the seven consciousnesses. "The perfuming of beginningless false conceptualisation" means that this very manifesting consciousness is called false conceptualisation; since it has never been separated from conception from the beginning, it is called beginningless false conceptualisation. As the text above says, because it has never been separated from thought from the beginning, it is called "beginningless avidyā"; false conceptualisation here should be known to be likewise. As the ten-fascicle sūtra says: "The ālayavijñāna is called the aspect of consciousness that knows, whose essential aspect is like a circle of hair abiding in empty space—the realm traversed by impure wisdom." By this principle, it is false conceptualisation. Those various dusts and this false conceptualisation perfume the ocean of mind of self-character, causing the waves of the seven consciousnesses to arise. False conceptualisation and dusts are coarse and manifest; therefore, the object-discriminating consciousness they give rise to has coarse and manifest active aspects and becomes the corresponding mind. It is intended to show that the manifesting consciousness is able to arise because of the cause of inconceivable perfuming, and is able to abide by relying on inconceivable transformation; the object-discriminating consciousness is able to arise due to the condition of various dusts, and is able to abide by relying on the perfuming of false conceptualisation. Now, this treatise merely takes the conditions for arising; therefore, regarding the subtle, it only speaks of the perfuming of avidyā, and regarding the coarse, it solely mentions the condition of objects. From "If the cause ceases" below, it next reveals the meaning of cessation, within which there are two: first, a direct explanation; from "Question:" below, an exchange to dispel doubts. In the beginning, where it says "If the cause ceases, then the condition ceases," it means that at whatever stage the antidote is attained, the cause of avidyā ceases, and objects cease accordingly. Where it says "Because the cause ceases, the non-corresponding mind ceases," it means that the three kinds of non-corresponding mind arise in direct reliance on the cause of avidyā; therefore, when avidyā ceases, they also cease accordingly. Where it says "Because the condition ceases, the corresponding mind ceases," it means that the three kinds of corresponding defiled mind arise in direct reliance on the condition of objects; therefore, when objects cease, they also cease accordingly. By relying on this principle of beginning and end, arising and exhaustion, it clarifies the meaning of the two kinds of arising and ceasing, not in terms of the meaning of moment-to-moment arising and ceasing. From here below is the second, an exchange to dispel doubts, first a question and then an answer. In the question, where it says "If the mind ceases, how can there be continuity?" this question is raised with respect to what non-Buddhists say. As the ten-fascicle sūtra says: "If the ālayavijñāna were to cease, it would not differ from the conceptual proliferation of the nihilistic view of non-Buddhists. The various non-Buddhists say: 'Free from various objects, the continuous consciousness ceases; after the continuous consciousness has ceased, all consciousnesses cease.' Mahāmati! If the continuous consciousness were to cease, all consciousnesses from beginningless worldly realms would have to cease." This meaning directly explains that the non-Buddhists say that, just as when being born into the heaven of non-conception or entering the absorption of non-conception, being free from all objects, the continuous consciousness ceases; because the root ceases, the branches also cease accordingly. The Tathāgata refutes this, saying: if, when those sentient beings enter non-conception, the continuous consciousness that is the root of sentient beings were to cease, the seeds of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, and so forth, would cease accordingly, and all consciousnesses should not arise again from that; yet when emerging from that, all consciousnesses arise again, so one should know that when entering non-conception, that continuous consciousness does not cease. Such is the refutation. Now, in this treatise, it inquires based on this: if the essence of the mind were to cease when entering the absorption of non-conception or the absorption of cessation, how could it continue again? Hence it says: "If the mind ceases, how can there be continuity?" If, when entering those [absorptions], the essence of the mind does not cease and continues again, by what means could this aspect of continuity ever cease permanently? Hence it says: "How can one speak of ultimate cessation?" In the answer, there are three parts: namely, the principle, the simile, and the application.

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