大乘起信論別記 1.99

1.99

問：云何得知此第七識不但緣心，亦緣境界？答：此有二證：一依比量道理；二依聖言量。比量道理者，此意根必與意識同緣境界，是立宗也。為彼意識不共所依故，是辨因也。諸是不共所依，必與能依同境，如眼根等，是隨同品言也。或不同緣者，必非不共所依，如次第滅意根等，是遠離言也。如是宗因譬喻無邊，故知意根亦緣六塵。若言此意與意識不心同緣者，亦可眼與眼識不必同境，俱是不共所依故。眼等識根既不得爾，無同類故，義不得成。若言此意非不共依者，則無不共依，識不應起，如眼識等。只是自教相違過失，如佛經說故「眼不壞故，眼識得生，乃至意不壞故，意識得生。」乃至廣說。又論說「此不共依」，故知此意但緣於識不緣餘境，是義不成。若依此能依意識緣一切法，當知所依意根亦對一切法，是故此意亦緣自體，以有自證分故；亦緣自所相應心法，以無能障法故。彼諸心法，背證自體，有自證分，是故不度同一所緣。當知此義通於八識，所以得知。故《莊嚴論》云「已說求染淨說」，《成唯識》偈曰「能取及所取，此二唯心光，貪光及信光，二光無二法。」釋曰：上半者，成唯識人，應知能取所取，唯是心光。下半者，貪等煩惱光，信等善法光，如是二光，亦無染淨二法。以不離心光，別有貪等、信等法故。以此文證。故知諸心數法，亦為心光所照故，不離心光；以不離心光故，即是心光也。如鏡中像鏡光所照，是故此像不離鏡光；以不離故，即是鏡光。當知此中道理亦爾。然雖似影像，無別本法所不緣者。設有本法心數異影像心數者，則同一所緣之義不成故。聖言量者，如十卷經云「彼七種識，依諸境界念觀而生。」又云「境界風吹動，七識波浪轉。」今此論中，釋彼經意云「以有境界緣故，復生六種相。」由此等文故得知乎！次，

Question: How is it known that this seventh consciousness does not merely take the mind as its cognitive object, but also takes external objects as its cognitive object? Answer: There are two proofs for this: first, relying on the reasoning of inference (anumāna); second, relying on the authority of sacred scripture (āptāgama). As for the reasoning of inference: "This mental faculty (manendriya) necessarily takes objects in common with the manovijñāna" is the formulation of the thesis (pratijñā). "Because it is the uncommon support (asādhāraṇāśraya) for that manovijñāna" is the presentation of the reason (hetu). "Whatever is an uncommon support necessarily shares the same cognitive object with that which relies upon it, just as the visual faculty and so forth" is the statement of positive concomitance (anvaya). "Alternatively, that which does not take the same cognitive object is necessarily not an uncommon support, just as the immediately preceding and ceased mental faculty (samanantarātīta-manas) and so forth" is the statement of negative concomitance (vyatireka). Since such thesis, reason, and examples are limitless, one knows that the mental faculty also takes the six sense objects as its cognitive objects. If one were to claim that this manas and the manovijñāna do not mentally take the same cognitive objects, then one could also claim that the visual faculty and the visual consciousness do not necessarily share the same cognitive object, since both are uncommon supports. Since it cannot be so for the visual and other consciousnesses and faculties, having no similar case, the proposition cannot be established. If one were to claim that this manas is not an uncommon support, then without an uncommon support consciousness could not arise, just like the visual consciousness and so forth. This is simply the fault of contradicting one's own scriptural teaching, for the Buddha's sūtra says: "Because the visual faculty is not impaired, visual consciousness is able to arise; … up to, because the mental faculty is not impaired, manovijñāna is able to arise," and so on at length. Furthermore, treatises state that "this is the uncommon support"; thus one knows that the claim that this manas only takes consciousness as its cognitive object and does not take other objects cannot be established. If, relying on this, the dependent manovijñāna takes all dharmas as its cognitive objects, one should know that the supporting mental faculty also faces all dharmas. Therefore, this manas also takes its own substance as an object, because it possesses the self-verifying aspect (svasaṃvittibhāga); it also takes the mental factors (caitta) associated with itself as objects, because there is no obstructing dharma. Those various mental factors, turning back to verify their own substances, possess the self-verifying aspect; therefore, they do not fail to have the same cognitive object. One should know that this meaning extends throughout all eight consciousnesses, which is how it is known. Hence the Zhuangyan lun (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra) says: "Having explained the seeking of defilement and purity..."; and the Cheng weishi verse states: "The grasper and the grasped— / these two are merely the light of the mind; / the light of greed and the light of faith, / these two lights have no dual dharmas." Commentary: As for the first half, a person who has attained consciousness-only should know that the grasper and the grasped are merely the light of the mind. As for the second half, the light of defilements such as greed and the light of wholesome dharmas such as faith—these two lights likewise have no two separate dharmas of defilement and purity. This is because, apart from the light of the mind, there are no separate dharmas such as greed and faith. Using this textual proof, one knows that the various mental factors, also being illuminated by the light of the mind, are not separate from the light of the mind; because they are not separate from the light of the mind, they are precisely the light of the mind. Just as an image in a mirror is illuminated by the mirror's light, so this image is not separate from the mirror's light; because it is not separate, it is precisely the mirror's light. One should know that the principle here is also like this. However, although they resemble mirrored reflections, there is no separate underlying dharma that is not cognized as an object. If there were an underlying dharma's mental factor that was distinct from the reflected mental factor, then the principle of sharing the same cognitive object could not be established. As for the authority of sacred scripture, the Ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: "Those seven consciousnesses arise based on the mindful contemplation of various objects." It also says: "Blown by the wind of objects, / the waves of the seven consciousnesses turn." Now in this treatise, explaining the meaning of that sūtra, it says: "Because there are the conditions of external objects, six kinds of characteristics are further produced." From such passages as these, how could one not know it? Next,