大乘起信論別記 1.99

1.99

Question: How is it known that this seventh consciousness does not merely take the mind as its cognitive object, but also takes external objects as its cognitive object? Answer: There are two proofs for this: first, relying on the reasoning of inference (anumāna); second, relying on the authority of sacred scripture (āptāgama). As for the reasoning of inference: "This mental faculty (manendriya) necessarily takes objects in common with the manovijñāna" is the formulation of the thesis (pratijñā). "Because it is the uncommon support (asādhāraṇāśraya) for that manovijñāna" is the presentation of the reason (hetu). "Whatever is an uncommon support necessarily shares the same cognitive object with that which relies upon it, just as the visual faculty and so forth" is the statement of positive concomitance (anvaya). "Alternatively, that which does not take the same cognitive object is necessarily not an uncommon support, just as the immediately preceding and ceased mental faculty (samanantarātīta-manas) and so forth" is the statement of negative concomitance (vyatireka). Since such thesis, reason, and examples are limitless, one knows that the mental faculty also takes the six sense objects as its cognitive objects. If one were to claim that this manas and the manovijñāna do not mentally take the same cognitive objects, then one could also claim that the visual faculty and the visual consciousness do not necessarily share the same cognitive object, since both are uncommon supports. Since it cannot be so for the visual and other consciousnesses and faculties, having no similar case, the proposition cannot be established. If one were to claim that this manas is not an uncommon support, then without an uncommon support consciousness could not arise, just like the visual consciousness and so forth. This is simply the fault of contradicting one's own scriptural teaching, for the Buddha's sūtra says: "Because the visual faculty is not impaired, visual consciousness is able to arise; … up to, because the mental faculty is not impaired, manovijñāna is able to arise," and so on at length. Furthermore, treatises state that "this is the uncommon support"; thus one knows that the claim that this manas only takes consciousness as its cognitive object and does not take other objects cannot be established. If, relying on this, the dependent manovijñāna takes all dharmas as its cognitive objects, one should know that the supporting mental faculty also faces all dharmas. Therefore, this manas also takes its own substance as an object, because it possesses the self-verifying aspect (svasaṃvittibhāga); it also takes the mental factors (caitta) associated with itself as objects, because there is no obstructing dharma. Those various mental factors, turning back to verify their own substances, possess the self-verifying aspect; therefore, they do not fail to have the same cognitive object. One should know that this meaning extends throughout all eight consciousnesses, which is how it is known. Hence the Zhuangyan lun (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra) says: "Having explained the seeking of defilement and purity..."; and the Cheng weishi verse states: "The grasper and the grasped— / these two are merely the light of the mind; / the light of greed and the light of faith, / these two lights have no dual dharmas." Commentary: As for the first half, a person who has attained consciousness-only should know that the grasper and the grasped are merely the light of the mind. As for the second half, the light of defilements such as greed and the light of wholesome dharmas such as faith—these two lights likewise have no two separate dharmas of defilement and purity. This is because, apart from the light of the mind, there are no separate dharmas such as greed and faith. Using this textual proof, one knows that the various mental factors, also being illuminated by the light of the mind, are not separate from the light of the mind; because they are not separate from the light of the mind, they are precisely the light of the mind. Just as an image in a mirror is illuminated by the mirror's light, so this image is not separate from the mirror's light; because it is not separate, it is precisely the mirror's light. One should know that the principle here is also like this. However, although they resemble mirrored reflections, there is no separate underlying dharma that is not cognized as an object. If there were an underlying dharma's mental factor that was distinct from the reflected mental factor, then the principle of sharing the same cognitive object could not be established. As for the authority of sacred scripture, the Ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: "Those seven consciousnesses arise based on the mindful contemplation of various objects." It also says: "Blown by the wind of objects, / the waves of the seven consciousnesses turn." Now in this treatise, explaining the meaning of that sūtra, it says: "Because there are the conditions of external objects, six kinds of characteristics are further produced." From such passages as these, how could one not know it? Next,