起信論疏筆削記 2.11

2.11

譬，比也。喻，曉也。即以近事比類，令於深法得曉了。故無著云：「喻者見邊義，謂以所見邊與未所見邊和合正說，名之為喻。」師子覺云：「所見邊者，謂已顯了分。未所見邊者，謂未顯了分。以顯了分顯未顯了分，令義平等。」所有正說名為立喻，然有二種：一者同法、二者異法。同法者，若於是處顯因同品，決定有性，謂若所作，見彼無常，譬如瓶等。異法者，若於是處說所立無，因遍非有，謂若是常，見非所作，如虛空等。然離十過，方為正喻。同喻五過：謂能立法不成、所立法不成、俱不成、無合、倒合。異喻五過：謂所立法不遣、能立法不遣、俱不遣、不離、倒離。宗謂所成立法，因即宗家因由，所以與前譬喻皆為能立故。《因明論》云：由宗因喻多言開示，諸有問者未了義故。然宗者有體有依，依有能別所別。依體之上共離九過，方為正宗，謂現量相違、比量相違、世間相違、自教相違、自語相違、能別不極成、所別不極成、俱不極成、相符極成。因有三相，謂遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性。然因有二種，謂生因、了因，生因如種生芽，了因如燈照物。然此二因各有三種，生因三者：一言生因、二智生因、三義生因。了因三者：一智了因、二言了因、三義了因。廣如彼疏。然此因支離十四過方為正因，謂兩俱不成、隨一不成、所依不成、猶豫不成、共不定、不共不定、同品一分轉異品遍轉、異品一分轉同品遍轉、俱品一分轉、決定相違、法自相相違、法差別相違、有法自相相違、有法差別相違。然此三支共離三十三過，并諸闕減等，今非正意，不能具陳。然今論中雖說宗因譬喻，不同因明三事合集，成於比量。但今文中或單舉宗義，或舉宗因，或舉宗喻，或舉因喻。如下論云：一者法、二者義。此之法、義但是因明前陳，後說有法及法。如立量云：一心是有法，定具三大故，為宗。因云：以有真如、生滅二相故。此但舉其宗因而不引喻。或云：真如是有法，定不可立不可遣故，為宗。因云：以一切法悉皆真故，皆同如故。此亦但舉宗因也，餘皆例知。若以此論對五性，宗應立量云：一真如性是有法，定能隨緣故，為宗。因云：是有為法，平等所依故。同喻：如虛空。

"Analogy" (pi) means comparison; "metaphor" (yu) means to make clear. That is, using proximate matters as a comparison to cause profound dharmas to be understood. Thus Asaṅga said: "A metaphor has the meaning of an observed aspect; namely, harmonizing and correctly stating an observed aspect with an unobserved aspect is called a metaphor." Siṃhabhadra (Shizijue) said: "The observed aspect refers to the portion already made clear. The unobserved aspect refers to the portion not yet made clear. Using the portion made clear to elucidate the portion not yet made clear brings about equivalence of meaning." Any correct statement is called establishing a metaphor, yet there are two kinds: first, homologous; second, heterologous. As for the homologous: if in that instance it demonstrates that the homogeneous instance of the reason is definitely endowed with the property—as in, if it is produced, it is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, etc. As for the heterologous: if in that instance it states that where the probandum is absent, the reason is completely absent—as in, if it is permanent, it is seen to be non-produced, like empty space, etc. Only when free from the ten fallacies is it a correct metaphor. The homologous metaphor has five fallacies: namely, unestablished property of the probans, unestablished property of the probandum, both unestablished, absence of connection, and inverted connection. The heterologous metaphor has five fallacies: namely, non-exclusion of the property of the probandum, non-exclusion of the property of the probans, non-exclusion of both, absence of separation, and inverted separation. The thesis (pakṣa) is the dharma to be established; the reason (hetu) is the ground of the thesis; together with the preceding metaphor they are all factors of proof (sādhana). Therefore the Hetuvidyā-śāstra states: "Through the multiple statements of thesis, reason, and metaphor, that which is not yet understood by inquirers is revealed." The thesis has an essence and a basis; the basis has a qualifier (dharma) and a qualificand (dharmin). Together upon the essence and basis, it must be free from nine fallacies to be a correct thesis: namely, contradiction with perception (pratyakṣa-viruddha), contradiction with inference (anumāna-viruddha), contradiction with common consensus (loka-viruddha), contradiction with one's own doctrine (āgama-viruddha), contradiction with one's own words (svavacana-viruddha), unaccepted qualifier, unaccepted qualificand, both unaccepted, and already established by consensus (siddhasādhana). The reason has three characteristics (trairūpya): namely, presence of the reason in the thesis (pakṣadharmatva), definite presence in homogeneous instances (sapakṣe sattvam), and complete absence in heterogeneous instances (vipakṣe 'sattvam). There are two kinds of reason: the producing reason (janaka-hetu) and the illuminating reason (jñāpaka-hetu). The producing reason is like a seed producing a sprout; the illuminating reason is like a lamp illuminating an object. Each of these two reasons has three types. The three of the producing reason are: first, producing reason of words; second, producing reason of cognition; third, producing reason of meaning. The three of the illuminating reason are: first, illuminating reason of cognition; second, illuminating reason of words; third, illuminating reason of meaning; as explained in detail in that commentary. This reason factor must be free from fourteen fallacies to be a correct reason: namely, unproven to both (ubhayāsiddha), unproven to one (anyatarāsiddha), unproven basis (āśrayāsiddha), doubtful (sandigdhāsiddha), common inconclusive (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika), uncommon inconclusive (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika), present in part of homogeneous and all heterogeneous, present in part of heterogeneous and all homogeneous, present in part of both, counterbalanced (viruddhāvyabhicārin), contradictory to the property's own nature (dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana), contradictory to the property's particularity (dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana), contradictory to the locus's own nature (dharmi-svarūpaviparītasādhana), and contradictory to the locus's particularity (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana). These three factors together must be free from thirty-three fallacies, along with various deficiencies and the like; since this is not the primary focus here, they cannot be fully detailed. Although thesis, reason, and metaphor are spoken of in the present treatise, they are not like the combination of the three factors in hetuvidyā that forms an inference. Rather, in the present text, it either raises the thesis alone, or raises thesis and reason, or raises thesis and metaphor, or raises reason and metaphor. As the treatise states below: "First, dharma; second, meaning." Here, "dharma" and "meaning" are simply what hetuvidyā terms the subject (subject of debate) and predicate mentioned later as dharmin and dharma. For example, in formulating an inference: 'The One Mind is the dharmin; it definitely possesses the three greatnesses,' is the thesis. The reason is: 'Because it possesses the two marks of tathatā and arising-and-ceasing.' This merely cites the thesis and reason without adducing a metaphor. Or as it states: 'Tathatā is the dharmin; it definitely cannot be established and cannot be eliminated,' is the thesis. The reason is: 'Because all dharmas are completely real, and all are identical with suchness.' This also merely cites thesis and reason; the rest are to be understood by analogy. If setting this treatise against the five natures, the thesis in an inference should be formulated thus: 'The single tathatā-nature is the dharmin; it can definitely accord with conditions,' is the thesis. The reason is: 'Because it is the impartial basis of conditioned dharmas.' Homologous metaphor: 'Like empty space.'