起信論疏筆削記 2.11

2.11

"Analogy" (pi) means comparison; "metaphor" (yu) means to make clear. That is, using proximate matters as a comparison to cause profound dharmas to be understood. Thus Asaṅga said: "A metaphor has the meaning of an observed aspect; namely, harmonizing and correctly stating an observed aspect with an unobserved aspect is called a metaphor." Siṃhabhadra (Shizijue) said: "The observed aspect refers to the portion already made clear. The unobserved aspect refers to the portion not yet made clear. Using the portion made clear to elucidate the portion not yet made clear brings about equivalence of meaning." Any correct statement is called establishing a metaphor, yet there are two kinds: first, homologous; second, heterologous. As for the homologous: if in that instance it demonstrates that the homogeneous instance of the reason is definitely endowed with the property—as in, if it is produced, it is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, etc. As for the heterologous: if in that instance it states that where the probandum is absent, the reason is completely absent—as in, if it is permanent, it is seen to be non-produced, like empty space, etc. Only when free from the ten fallacies is it a correct metaphor. The homologous metaphor has five fallacies: namely, unestablished property of the probans, unestablished property of the probandum, both unestablished, absence of connection, and inverted connection. The heterologous metaphor has five fallacies: namely, non-exclusion of the property of the probandum, non-exclusion of the property of the probans, non-exclusion of both, absence of separation, and inverted separation. The thesis (pakṣa) is the dharma to be established; the reason (hetu) is the ground of the thesis; together with the preceding metaphor they are all factors of proof (sādhana). Therefore the Hetuvidyā-śāstra states: "Through the multiple statements of thesis, reason, and metaphor, that which is not yet understood by inquirers is revealed." The thesis has an essence and a basis; the basis has a qualifier (dharma) and a qualificand (dharmin). Together upon the essence and basis, it must be free from nine fallacies to be a correct thesis: namely, contradiction with perception (pratyakṣa-viruddha), contradiction with inference (anumāna-viruddha), contradiction with common consensus (loka-viruddha), contradiction with one's own doctrine (āgama-viruddha), contradiction with one's own words (svavacana-viruddha), unaccepted qualifier, unaccepted qualificand, both unaccepted, and already established by consensus (siddhasādhana). The reason has three characteristics (trairūpya): namely, presence of the reason in the thesis (pakṣadharmatva), definite presence in homogeneous instances (sapakṣe sattvam), and complete absence in heterogeneous instances (vipakṣe 'sattvam). There are two kinds of reason: the producing reason (janaka-hetu) and the illuminating reason (jñāpaka-hetu). The producing reason is like a seed producing a sprout; the illuminating reason is like a lamp illuminating an object. Each of these two reasons has three types. The three of the producing reason are: first, producing reason of words; second, producing reason of cognition; third, producing reason of meaning. The three of the illuminating reason are: first, illuminating reason of cognition; second, illuminating reason of words; third, illuminating reason of meaning; as explained in detail in that commentary. This reason factor must be free from fourteen fallacies to be a correct reason: namely, unproven to both (ubhayāsiddha), unproven to one (anyatarāsiddha), unproven basis (āśrayāsiddha), doubtful (sandigdhāsiddha), common inconclusive (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika), uncommon inconclusive (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika), present in part of homogeneous and all heterogeneous, present in part of heterogeneous and all homogeneous, present in part of both, counterbalanced (viruddhāvyabhicārin), contradictory to the property's own nature (dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana), contradictory to the property's particularity (dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana), contradictory to the locus's own nature (dharmi-svarūpaviparītasādhana), and contradictory to the locus's particularity (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana). These three factors together must be free from thirty-three fallacies, along with various deficiencies and the like; since this is not the primary focus here, they cannot be fully detailed. Although thesis, reason, and metaphor are spoken of in the present treatise, they are not like the combination of the three factors in hetuvidyā that forms an inference. Rather, in the present text, it either raises the thesis alone, or raises thesis and reason, or raises thesis and metaphor, or raises reason and metaphor. As the treatise states below: "First, dharma; second, meaning." Here, "dharma" and "meaning" are simply what hetuvidyā terms the subject (subject of debate) and predicate mentioned later as dharmin and dharma. For example, in formulating an inference: 'The One Mind is the dharmin; it definitely possesses the three greatnesses,' is the thesis. The reason is: 'Because it possesses the two marks of tathatā and arising-and-ceasing.' This merely cites the thesis and reason without adducing a metaphor. Or as it states: 'Tathatā is the dharmin; it definitely cannot be established and cannot be eliminated,' is the thesis. The reason is: 'Because all dharmas are completely real, and all are identical with suchness.' This also merely cites thesis and reason; the rest are to be understood by analogy. If setting this treatise against the five natures, the thesis in an inference should be formulated thus: 'The single tathatā-nature is the dharmin; it can definitely accord with conditions,' is the thesis. The reason is: 'Because it is the impartial basis of conditioned dharmas.' Homologous metaphor: 'Like empty space.'