起信論疏筆削記 12.60

12.60

If we now reconcile that [school] to be identical with this treatise: since that school states that this consciousness cognizing objects is subtle and difficult to know, one should understand that it secretly accords with the intent of this treatise. Because that school says it arises from seeds, being equally a part of consciousness, it must perforce speak of cognizing objects. Furthermore, if we reconcile this [treatise] to be identical with their explanation: what this treatise clarifies as the first six cognizing objects is precisely the coarse aspect of the eighth consciousness's functioning; because external objects perfuse that fundamental consciousness, this conceptual differentiation arises. Thus the fundamental consciousness has the meaning of cognizing objects, but because it is coarse, it is demarcated as the phenomenon-discriminating consciousness (vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna) and not named the eighth. Moreover, that school says that the eighth mind-king has five omnipresent mental concomitants conjoined with it because it says this consciousness can cognize objects; therefore, it has the conjunction of king and mental concomitants. As when directly cognizing an object, there must be attention (manaskāra), which can alert the mind and lead the mind toward the object. Because it turns toward the object, the triad of sense-faculty, object, and consciousness discriminates and transforms, causing the mind to make contact (sparśa) with it. Because it contacts the object, the four things unite, and it feels (vedanā) agreeable and disagreeable [stimuli]. Because it feels, it grasps marks from the object (saṃjñā), positing various conventional linguistic matters. Because it grasps marks, it then impels the mind into action and drive (cetanā). These five are all obtained through cognizing objects; therefore the eighth has five [mental concomitants] conjoined. This treatise, since it does not say that this [eighth consciousness] cognizes objects, also has no mental concomitants conjoined with it; hence it is not like that [school]. Furthermore, in that school, they do not explain the initial origin of the eighth's arising as emerging from the real to produce delusion; they merely explain based on the state of present realization, and therefore do not have the meaning of enlightenment. Although they also speak of beginningless, inherently existing seeds of bodhi, these are not directly the tathatā of original enlightenment; because they had not fully realized it, they provisionally spoke of it in an esoteric manner. What this treatise clarifies is that the mind of arising and ceasing exists based on the tathāgatagarbha, and because it is deluded about enlightenment, it forms non-enlightenment. Although it forms non-enlightenment, the nature of enlightenment does not change; hence it has the meaning of enlightenment. Because it is spoken based on the explicit marks of the real teaching, it is not like that [school]. If they had already spoken of having the meaning of enlightenment, how could the depth and shallowness of these two teachings be manifested? Scholars should know this.