起信論疏筆削記 12.60

12.60

今若會彼同此論者，彼宗既言此識緣境微細難知，當知密同今論之意。以彼宗說從種生故，同是識分，不得不說緣境界也。又若會此同彼說者，此論所明前六緣境，即是第八麁分功用，由於境界熏彼本識，起此分別。斯則本識有緣境義，以是麁故，隔為事識，不名第八。又彼宗說第八心王有遍行五心所相應者，由說此識能緣境界，是故有王心所相應。如正緣境時，須有作意，能警其心，引心趣境。以趣境故，根、境、識三分別變異，令心觸彼。以觸境故，四種和合，領納違順。以領納故，於境取像，施設種種名言之事。以取像故，遂令其心造作驅役。此五皆由緣境故得，是故第八有五相應。今論既不說此緣境，亦無心所與之相應，故不同彼。又彼宗中不說第八生起元由從真起妄，但據現在成就位說，故無覺義。然亦說有無始本有菩提種子，而不即是本覺真如，以未了故，且隱密說。今論所明，依如來藏有生滅心，以迷覺故，成於不覺。雖成不覺，覺性不變，故有覺義。以依實教顯了相說，故不同彼。若彼已說有覺義者，如何彰此二教淺深？學者應知。

If we now reconcile that [school] to be identical with this treatise: since that school states that this consciousness cognizing objects is subtle and difficult to know, one should understand that it secretly accords with the intent of this treatise. Because that school says it arises from seeds, being equally a part of consciousness, it must perforce speak of cognizing objects. Furthermore, if we reconcile this [treatise] to be identical with their explanation: what this treatise clarifies as the first six cognizing objects is precisely the coarse aspect of the eighth consciousness's functioning; because external objects perfuse that fundamental consciousness, this conceptual differentiation arises. Thus the fundamental consciousness has the meaning of cognizing objects, but because it is coarse, it is demarcated as the phenomenon-discriminating consciousness (vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna) and not named the eighth. Moreover, that school says that the eighth mind-king has five omnipresent mental concomitants conjoined with it because it says this consciousness can cognize objects; therefore, it has the conjunction of king and mental concomitants. As when directly cognizing an object, there must be attention (manaskāra), which can alert the mind and lead the mind toward the object. Because it turns toward the object, the triad of sense-faculty, object, and consciousness discriminates and transforms, causing the mind to make contact (sparśa) with it. Because it contacts the object, the four things unite, and it feels (vedanā) agreeable and disagreeable [stimuli]. Because it feels, it grasps marks from the object (saṃjñā), positing various conventional linguistic matters. Because it grasps marks, it then impels the mind into action and drive (cetanā). These five are all obtained through cognizing objects; therefore the eighth has five [mental concomitants] conjoined. This treatise, since it does not say that this [eighth consciousness] cognizes objects, also has no mental concomitants conjoined with it; hence it is not like that [school]. Furthermore, in that school, they do not explain the initial origin of the eighth's arising as emerging from the real to produce delusion; they merely explain based on the state of present realization, and therefore do not have the meaning of enlightenment. Although they also speak of beginningless, inherently existing seeds of bodhi, these are not directly the tathatā of original enlightenment; because they had not fully realized it, they provisionally spoke of it in an esoteric manner. What this treatise clarifies is that the mind of arising and ceasing exists based on the tathāgatagarbha, and because it is deluded about enlightenment, it forms non-enlightenment. Although it forms non-enlightenment, the nature of enlightenment does not change; hence it has the meaning of enlightenment. Because it is spoken based on the explicit marks of the real teaching, it is not like that [school]. If they had already spoken of having the meaning of enlightenment, how could the depth and shallowness of these two teachings be manifested? Scholars should know this.