大乘義章 1.100

1.100

第二門中，差別有二：一分宗別、二約宗辨諦。言分宗者，宗別有四：一立性宗，亦名因緣；二破性宗，亦曰假名；三破相宗，亦名不真；四顯實宗，亦曰真宗。此四乃是望義名法，經論無名。經論之中雖無此名，實有此義。四中前二是其小乘，後二大乘。大小之中各分淺深，故有四也。言立性者，小乘中淺，宣說諸法各有體性。雖說有性，皆從緣生，不同外道立自然性。此宗當彼《阿毘曇》也。言破性者，小乘中深，宣說諸法虛假無性，不同前宗立法自性。法雖無性，不無假相，此宗當彼《成實論》也。破相宗者，大乘中淺，明前宗中虛假之相亦無所有，如人遠觀陽炎為水、近觀本無，不但無性，水相亦無，諸法像此。雖說無相，未顯法實。顯實宗者，大乘中深，宣說諸法妄想故有。妄想無體，起必託真。真者所謂如來藏性，恒沙佛法同體緣集，不離不脫、不斷不異。此之真性緣起，集成生死涅槃。真所集故，無不真實。辨此實性，故曰真宗。此四宗中別乃無量，且據斯義以別宗耳。前之兩宗，經同論別；後之二宗，經論不殊，隨義分之。前二宗中言經同者，據佛本教，同顯在於四《阿含》中，無別部黨。言論別者，小乘眾生情見未融，執定彼此，言成諍論，故有《毘曇》、《成實》之別。後二宗中言經同者，據佛本教，隨就何經以義分之，不別部帙，是曰經同。言論同者，大乘之人情無異執、言無諍競，故無異論。有人一向言無四宗。是所不應，四中前二不分自異，不待言論；後之兩宗，經中處處且有斯義。何須致疑？如《勝鬘》中明如來藏，有其二種：一者空藏，即是不真；二不空藏，即是顯實。又如《鴦掘摩羅經》中，彼訶文殊不知真法、妄取法空，所取妄空即是不真，其所不知真實法者即是顯實。又《涅槃》中，見一切空即是不真，不見不空；不空之實即是真宗。經說非一，何得言無？又人立四別配部黨，言《阿毘曇》是因緣宗，《成實論》者是假名宗，《大品》、《法華》如是等經是不真宗，《華嚴》、《涅槃》、《維摩》、《勝鬘》如是等經是其真宗。前二可爾，後二不然，是等諸經乃可門別，淺深不異。若論破相，違之畢竟；若論其實，皆明法界緣起法門；語其行德，皆是真性緣起所成。但就所成行門不同，故有此異。《華嚴》、《法華》，三昧為宗；諸部《般若》，智慧為宗；《涅槃經》者，以佛果德涅槃為宗；《維摩經》者，以不思議解脫為宗；《勝鬘經》者，一乘為宗。如是諸經宗歸各異，門別雖殊旨歸一等，勿得於中輒定淺深。眾經宗別，分之麁爾。

In the second section, there are two distinctions: 1. Distinguishing the tenets; 2. Distinguishing the truths according to the tenets. Regarding the distinction of tenets, there are four tenets: 1. The tenet establishing nature, also named causes and conditions; 2. The tenet refuting nature, also called provisional designation; 3. The tenet refuting marks, also named non-true; 4. The tenet revealing the real, also called the real tenet. These four are designations of doctrines based on meaning; they do not have these names in the sūtras and treatises. Although these names do not exist in the sūtras and treatises, their meanings truly exist. Among the four, the first two are Hīnayāna, and the latter two are Mahāyāna. Within both the great and small, shallow and deep are respectively distinguished, hence there are four. As for 'establishing nature', it is shallow within Hīnayāna, proclaiming that all dharmas each have their own essence and nature. Although it speaks of having a nature, they all arise from conditions, unlike non-Buddhists who establish a self-existent nature. This tenet corresponds to the Abhidharma. As for 'refuting nature', it is deep within Hīnayāna, proclaiming that all dharmas are provisional, empty, and devoid of nature, unlike the previous tenet which establishes an intrinsic nature of dharmas. Although dharmas are devoid of nature, provisional marks are not absent; this tenet corresponds to the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra. As for the tenet refuting marks, it is shallow within Mahāyāna, clarifying that the provisional marks in the previous tenet are also non-existent, just as when one views a mirage from afar it seems to be water, but when viewed up close there was originally none; not only is there no nature, even the mark of water is absent; all dharmas are like this. Although it speaks of marklessness, it has not yet revealed the real nature of dharmas. As for the tenet revealing the real, it is deep within Mahāyāna, proclaiming that all dharmas exist due to false discrimination. False discrimination has no essence; when it arises it must rely on the real. The 'real' refers to the nature of the tathāgatagarbha, in which buddha-dharmas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges are gathered in conditional origination with identical essence, neither separate nor detached, neither severed nor different. The conditional origination of this true nature gathers to form saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Because it is gathered by the real, there is nothing that is not real. Because it distinguishes this real nature, it is called the real tenet. Within these four tenets, specific variations are measureless; we merely rely on these meanings to distinguish the tenets. For the first two tenets, the sūtras are identical while the treatises differ; for the latter two tenets, sūtras and treatises do not differ, and are distinguished according to meaning. For the first two tenets, saying that the sūtras are identical means that, based on the Buddha's original teaching, they are equally revealed in the four Āgamas without different factions. Saying that the treatises differ means that because the views of Hīnayāna sentient beings were not yet harmonized, they clung definitively to this or that, and their words turned into disputes; hence there is the difference between the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi. For the latter two tenets, saying that the sūtras are identical means that, based on the Buddha's original teaching, whichever sūtra one takes up, they are distinguished by meaning without separate fascicles; this is called the sūtras being identical. Saying that the treatises are identical means that because Mahāyāna practitioners have no divergent attachments in mind and no contentions in speech, there are no divergent treatises. Some people claim outright that there are no four tenets. This is improper: of the four, the first two are distinct on their own without dividing them, not requiring treatises [to prove it]; for the latter two tenets, their meanings are found everywhere in the sūtras. Why should any doubt be raised? As in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra, it clarifies that the tathāgatagarbha has two kinds: the first is the empty garbha, which is the non-true; the second is the non-empty garbha, which is revealing the real. Furthermore, as in the Aṅgulimālīya Sūtra, it rebukes Mañjuśrī for not knowing the real Dharma and falsely grasping at the emptiness of dharmas; the false emptiness grasped is the non-true, and the real Dharma he did not know is revealing the real. Furthermore, in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, seeing all as empty is the non-true, failing to see the non-empty; the reality of the non-empty is the real tenet. The sūtras state this more than once; how can one say they do not exist? Moreover, some people establish four [tenets] and assign them separately to scriptural divisions, saying that the Abhidharma is the tenet of causes and conditions; the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra is the tenet of provisional designation; sūtras such as the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā and the Lotus Sūtra are the tenet of the non-true; and sūtras such as the Avataṃsaka, the Nirvāṇa, the Vimalakīrti, and the Śrīmālādevī are the tenet of the real. The first two may be accepted, but the latter two are not so. These sūtras may indeed have different approaches, but their depth is not different. If one discusses refuting marks, they refute them completely; if one discusses their reality, they all clarify the Dharma approach of the conditional origination of the dharmadhātu; speaking of their practices and virtues, all are accomplished through the conditional origination of the true nature. It is only because the approaches to practice they accomplish differ that there is this distinction: the Avataṃsaka and Lotus take samādhi as their tenet; the various Prajñā texts take wisdom as their tenet; the Nirvāṇa Sūtra takes the nirvāṇa of the Buddha's fruition virtues as its tenet; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra takes inconceivable liberation as its tenet; and the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra takes the one vehicle as its tenet. Thus the tenets to which these various sūtras belong each differ; although their approaches are distinct, their ultimate intent is equal; one should not arbitrarily determine depth among them. The distinction among the tenets of the various sūtras has been roughly divided in this way.