大乘義章 1.101

1.101

第二約宗辨諦相，門別有四：一約宗分法；二以深攝淺，隨義具論；三歷法分別；四辨即離。約宗分者，約宗之中事理相對，事為世諦、理為真諦。陰界入等彼此隔礙，是其事也；苦無常等十六聖諦通相之法，是其理也。第二宗中，因緣假有以為世諦，無性之空以為真諦。第三宗中，一切諸法異相之有以為世諦，無相之空以為真諦。此與前宗假名無性有何差別？前宗之中，觀因緣相，破法自性；此宗之中，觀諸法性，破因緣相。言法性者，妄想諸法以無為性，故觀法性不取緣相。前宗破性，觀法假有，如土木城雖無定性，不無假城；此宗破相，觀法如似乾闥婆城，無城為城即非城。城喻既然，幻化等譬類亦齊爾。第四宗中，義別有二：一依持義、二緣起義。若就依持以明二者，妄相之法以為能依、真為所依，能依之妄說為世諦、所依之真判為真諦。然彼破性破相宗中，有為世諦、無為真諦。今此宗中，妄有理無以為世諦、相寂體有為真諦也。若就緣起以明二者，清淨法界如來藏體緣起，造作生死涅槃，真性自體說為真諦；緣起之用，判為世諦（此一門竟）。

Second, distinguishing the characteristics of the truths according to the tenets has four approaches: 1. Dividing dharmas according to the tenets; 2. Subsuming the shallow with the deep and treating them fully according to meaning; 3. Distinguishing across dharmas; 4. Distinguishing identity and separation. Regarding division according to the tenets: within the tenets, phenomena and principle are contrasted; phenomena are worldly truth, and principle is the real truth. The mutual obstruction of the aggregates, realms, and sense fields is phenomena; the common characteristics of dharmas, such as suffering and impermanence across the sixteen noble truths, are principle. In the second tenet, provisional existence through causes and conditions is taken as worldly truth, and the emptiness of non-nature is taken as the real truth. In the third tenet, the existence of differentiated marks of all dharmas is taken as worldly truth, and the emptiness of marklessness is taken as the real truth. What difference is there between this and the provisional designation of non-nature in the previous tenet? In the previous tenet, by observing the marks of causes and conditions, one refutes the intrinsic nature of dharmas; in this tenet, by observing the nature of dharmas, one refutes the marks of causes and conditions. Speaking of the nature of dharmas, dharmas of false discrimination have non-existence as their nature, so observing the nature of dharmas does not grasp at conditional marks. The previous tenet refuted nature and observed dharmas as provisionally existent, just as a wall of earth and wood, though lacking a fixed nature, is not without a provisional wall; this tenet refutes marks and observes dharmas as like a Gandharva city: taking what is not a city to be a city means it is not a city. The analogy of the city being so, analogies such as illusions and transformations are equally of this kind. In the fourth tenet, there are two distinct meanings: 1. The meaning of support and dependence; 2. The meaning of conditional origination. If one clarifies the two truths in terms of support and dependence, dharmas of false marks are taken as that which depends, and the real is taken as that which is depended upon; the falsity that depends is spoken of as worldly truth, and the real that is depended upon is judged as the real truth. Now, in those tenets that refute nature and refute marks, the conditioned is worldly truth and the unconditioned is the real truth. In this tenet, however, false existence and absence of principle are taken as worldly truth, while tranquility of marks and ontological reality are taken as the real truth. If one clarifies the two truths in terms of conditional origination, the substance of the pure dharmadhātu tathāgatagarbha conditionally arises to produce saṃsāra and nirvāṇa; the self-substance of the true nature is spoken of as the real truth, and the functions of conditional origination are judged as worldly truth (this concludes the first section).